

Turmoil in Turkey and Hungary's Relations with NATO

A Neoclassical Realist Perspective on the
AKP and FIDESZ Period

The present dissertation was defended at
Prague University of Economics and Business in 2025

Bilal Bahadır Karaca

Born in Istanbul, Bilal Bahadır Karaca completed a bachelor's degree at Marmara University in Istanbul. Following graduation, he applied for and was awarded a government-funded international scholarship as part of a joint initiative by the Turkish Ministry of National Education and the Council of Higher Education to enhance Turkey's qualified workforce. Within this framework, he was assigned to study abroad on behalf of Istanbul University and was sent to the Czech Republic.

Karaca received a master's degree from Charles University and completed doctoral studies at Prague University of Economics and Business. Following the completion of the PhD, Karaca has been serving as Dr. Lecturer in the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Political Sciences, at Istanbul University.

Karaca's research interests focus on Central European politics, international politics, foreign policy analysis, and security studies.

Bilal Bahadır Karaca

**Turmoil in Turkey
and
Hungary's Relations with NATO**

A Neoclassical Realist Perspective on the
AKP and FIDESZ Period

maurer.press
Frankfurt am Main

Bibliographic Information of the German National Library

The German National Library lists this publication in the German National Bibliography; detailed bibliographic data are available online at the German National Library website: <http://dnb.d-nb.de>

© Published by Verlag Hans Jürgen Maurer

under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0).

The work, including all of its parts, is protected by copyright. Any use beyond the narrow limits of copyright law without the consent of the copyright holder is prohibited and punishable by law. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, and processing in electronic systems.

The book has undergone a double blind peer review.

maurer.press
is an imprint of
Verlag Hans-Jürgen Maurer
Im Trierischen Hof 14
60311 Frankfurt/Germany
www.maurer.press
GPSR-Kontakt: info@maurer.press

ISBN 978-3-949550-43-0
e-ISBN 978-3-949550-44-7

Preface

This book is, first and foremost derived from my doctoral dissertation, which I prepared and defended between 2019 and 2025 at Prague University of Economics and Business in Prague, Czechia. At the same time, it is the product of an academic journey whose roots stretch from the streets of Istanbul to those of Prague a journey that was at times deeply enjoyable, and at others, considerably demanding.

When I was awarded the overseas postgraduate scholarship provided by the Ministry of National Education of the Republic of Turkey under Law No. 1416, I had the opportunity to study and live in Central Europe, and particularly in Czechia. This experience not only allowed me to pursue my academic work in a new geographical and intellectual setting, but also significantly reshaped the way I understood the world and approached academic inquiry. As I built a life in a new country, a new geographical setting, and among new people, the observations I made, my reflections on the region's political developments, and my efforts to follow the pulse of current affairs gradually became the foundation of my curiosity about the subject of this book.

Central Europe is a region of particular importance to the study of international politics, not only because of its geopolitical position but also because of its strong historical memory. Having historically been a crossroads of competing power struggles, the region and its countries have experienced major historical upheavals, including occupations, wars, the ideological divisions created by the Cold War, popular uprisings, and the reconstruction of democratic institutions. This historical experience has inevitably left its mark on the contemporary political attitudes and foreign policy preferences of the countries in the region. Particularly since the 2010s, the relationships between these countries and the European Union, as well as their positions within the Euro-Atlantic order, have attracted increasing academic attention.

Among these developments, Hungary and the position of Viktor Orbán's government within the Euro-Atlantic order became a particular subject of interest for me. At the same time, the parallels reflected in some of the crises experienced between my own country, Turkey,

and the Euro-Atlantic order during the Erdoğan era encouraged me to pursue a more in-depth study, bringing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into the analysis as well.

During the research process, it was not only the political positions adopted by Turkey and Hungary at different points in time that attracted my attention. How these cases could be explained through the theoretical approaches of the discipline of international relations also became an important dimension of the study. The differences between the explanations offered by various theoretical approaches raised questions about where the framework provided by Neoclassical Realism is sufficient and where it requires further development. Accordingly, this study not only examines the cases of Turkey and Hungary from historical and empirical perspectives, but also discusses the explanatory capacity and limitations of Neoclassical Realism. Addressing certain ambiguities within the theoretical framework in a more systematic manner through these cases became one of the principal aims of the research and, ultimately, one of its main contributions.

At the same time, the emergence of this book cannot, of course, be attributed solely to my own curiosity and academic interest in the subject. From the beginning of this long journey to the completion of the book, the academic insights, criticisms, contributions, and personal support of many people have been of great importance to me. The overseas postgraduate scholarship provided by the Ministry of National Education of the Republic of Turkey likewise constituted one of the most important forms of financial support that made this work possible.

I would first like to express my sincere gratitude to my doctoral supervisor, Doc. Ing. Mgr. Radka Druláková, Ph.D., for her valuable guidance and contributions throughout my doctoral studies and academic work. I am also deeply grateful to Prof. Dr. Erhan Afyoncu and Prof. Dr. Gülay Öğün Bezer, whose support and valuable insights have accompanied me at different stages of my academic career. I would also like to express my gratitude to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Habib Tekin for his support throughout the publication process and for

helping this work make the transition from a doctoral dissertation to a published book. I would also like to thank my friend Berk Köksal, with whom I have exchanged ideas on academic matters and who has been a constant source of support throughout this process.

I am deeply grateful to my father, Dr. Ali Karaca, my mother, Ayşe Karaca, and my siblings, who stood by me not only throughout the academic dimension of this long journey but also during its more personal and challenging moments. Their support has always been an important source of strength for me, particularly during the more difficult stages of this work. Finally, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Republic of Turkey and the Ministry of National Education of the Republic of Turkey for providing me with the scholarship that made it possible for me to pursue postgraduate education abroad.

This book examines different historical and political periods in Turkey and Hungary through two distinct cases, while also engaging with the broader question of how these cases can be explained within the theoretical framework of international relations. I therefore hope that the book will be of interest not only to scholars working on Turkey, Hungary and NATO, but also to a broader readership interested in international relations theory and contemporary European politics.

Bilal Bahadır Karaca

Istanbul, August 2026

Table of Contents

PREFACE	v
INTRODUCTION	13
CHAPTER 1.....	23
1.1. Review of the Literature and the Limitations of Contemporary Research on Turkey-NATO and Hungary-NATO Relations.....	23
1.2. Theoretical Structure: Neoclassical Realism	35
1.3. Methodology and Structure of the Research	50
1.4. Research Questions and Hypotheses.....	60
CHAPTER 2.....	63
2.2. Transforming NATO: Strategies and Missions.....	65
2.2.1. End of the Cold War and New Relations with Former Adversaries (1990-2000)	65
2.2.2. Fight against Terrorism after 9/11 and Reset in Relations. with Putin's Russia (2000-2020)	81
2.3. Turkey-NATO Relations During the AKP Government: Emergence of Conflict Areas in the Context of International Political Developments (2002-2020)	100
2.4. Hungary-NATO Relations During the FIDESZ Government: Emergence of Conflict Areas in the Context of International Political Developments (2010-2020)	116
2.5. Remarks on the Chapter.....	134
CHAPTER 3.....	137
3.1. Ideational Factors.....	138
3.1.1. Leader Image: Ideological Base of Erdoğan and AKP.....	138
3.1.2. Strategic Culture (Grand Strategy) of Turkey.....	149
3.2. Remarks on Ideational Factors	157
3.3. Political Survival.....	158
3.3.1. Domestic Institutions.....	159
3.3.1.1. AKP's Position in the Parliament.....	159
3.3.1.2. AKP and Turkish Army.....	165
3.3.2. State-Society Relations	170
3.4. Remarks on Political Survival.....	174

CHAPTER 4.....	177
4.1. Ideational Factors.....	178
4.1.1. Leader Image: Ideological Base of Orbán and FIDESZ.....	178
4.1.2. Strategic Culture (Grand Strategy) of Hungary.....	192
4.2. Remarks on Ideational Factors.....	199
4.3. Political Survival.....	200
4.3.1. Domestic Institution: FIDESZ's Position in the Parliament.....	201
4.3.2. State-Society Relations.....	206
4.4. Remarks on Political Survival.....	209
CONCLUSION.....	211
5.1. Findings and Discussion.....	211
5.2. Contributions and Limitations of Research and Recommendations for Further Studies.....	219
REFERENCES.....	222

ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
EU	European Union
FIDESZ	Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség
HDP	Halkların Demokratik Partisi
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JOBBIK	Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom
LMP	Lehet Más a Politika
MDP	Magyar Demokrata Fórum
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi
MSZP	Magyar Szocialista Párt
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PFP	Partnership for Peace
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan
PYD	Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat
SZDSZ	Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége
UN	United Nations
YPG	Yekîneyên Parastina Gel

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Neoclassical Realism and Formation of Foreign Policy and Security Strategies.....	39
Figure 2: Domestic Factors (Intervening Variables) Model of Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell	47
Figure 3: Diagram of the Intervening Variables Model.....	57
Figure 4: NATO's Transforming Strategies and Missions	99
Figure 5: International Political Dynamics and Emerging Conflict Areas in Turkey-NATO Relations.....	116
Figure 6: International Political Dynamics and Emerging Conflict Areas in Hungary-NATO Relations.....	134
Figure 7: Milestones of Erdoğan's Political Perceptions.....	149
Figure 8: Milestones of Orbán's Political Perceptions.....	192

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of alliance has garnered significant scholarly attention within the International Relations (IR) discipline for many years. However, the conceptualization of this phenomenon lacks a unified character due to variations in interpretation. Nonetheless, it is feasible to articulate a comprehensive definition of the alliance concept by identifying common elements addressed in various studies, despite divergent theoretical perspectives on alliance occurrence, the origins of threat-security, and alliance functioning. Drawing upon shared elements in the studies, the broad definition of the alliance concept encompasses a security-oriented formal or informal association between two or more states. States within the same alliance harbor mutual expectations and security concerns. Consequently, these states engage in political, military, and economic coordination to avert security threats and fulfill mutual expectations.¹ Alliances, being a reflection of a state's interaction with other states in line with its national interests, constitute one of the most critical instruments for a state, contingent upon its foreign and security policy objectives and strategies.² However, changes in these policies and objectives can shift a state's

¹ George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962); Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987); Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," *Journal of International Affairs* 44, no. 1 (1990); Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962–73," *International Organization* 45, no. 3 (1991); Patricia A. Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004). Robert O. Keohane, "Alliances, Threats, and the Uses of Neorealism," *International Security* 13, no. 1 (1988); Sorpong Peou, "Realism and Constructivism in Southeast Asian Security Studies Today: A Review Essay," *The Pacific Review* 15, no. 1 (2002).

² T. Clifton Morgan and Glenn Palmer, "To Protect and to Serve: Alliances and Foreign Policy Portfolios," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 2 (2003).

approach toward this instrument, namely, alliances. In this regard, a state's relations with the alliance it is a part of may become problematic and include controversial areas. Examples of such instances can be observed in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) history.

It is widely believed that NATO is the foremost and successful alliance of both the past and the present.³ Established in 1949 following the Second World War, the alliance was formed through the collaboration of states with the primary goal of ensuring lasting peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region, countering the aggression of the Soviet Union. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, NATO persevered by adapting its strategies; it expanded its sphere of influence and gained strength with new member countries from the former Soviet space. Although the alliance has managed to sustain its strength and achieve new successes, historical examples, such as France (1966) and Greece's withdrawal (1974) from NATO military command have illustrated how changes in states' foreign and security policies can alter their approaches to NATO. France, a founding member of NATO, withdrew from the military command of the alliance in 1966 under the leadership of President Charles de Gaulle. The primary controversial areas were struggles for dominance between France and the United States within NATO and changes in France's security policies to aim for more political independence.⁴ Similarly, Greece's relations with NATO became problematic in the 1970s. Greece withdrew from the alliance's military structure in 1974, asserting contrasting policies with the alliance regarding the Aegean-

³ Wallace J Thies, *Why NATO Endures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Javier Solana, "NATO's Success in Kosovo," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 6 (1999); John Andreas Olsen, "Understanding NATO," *The RUSI Journal* 165, no. 3 (2020).

⁴ Andreas Wenger, "Crisis and Opportunity: NATO's Transformation and the Multilateralization of Détente, 1966–1968," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 6, no. 1 (2004).

Mediterranean Seas and the Island of Cyprus.⁵ Despite NATO facing these kinds of challenging relations over seven decades, member states have not opted to terminate their affiliations with NATO or reposition themselves within other alliances.⁶

Besides the historical instances evident in the alliance's past, it is also possible to discuss similar controversial issues unfolding within the alliance today. In this regard, contentious and problematic areas in the relations between NATO and the two member states come to the fore. Among these member countries, Turkey is recognized as one having conflicting domains with the alliance. In the context of international power balance, the foreign policy pursued by the Turkish government (such as its Middle East and North Africa (MENA) policy and positive relations/cooperations established with the Russian Federation) is regarded as the primary cause for the conflict of interests between Turkey and NATO. Factors like the ongoing S-400 air defence system crisis and the embargo on purchasing F-35 fighter jets are seen as political manifestations of these conflict areas.⁷ In contemporary times, another country whose problematic relationship with the alliance is questioned emerges as Hungary. Issues such as Hungary's foreign policy towards Russia (which leans positively) within the context of international political balances, as well as its political stance on the Ukraine issue, are considered, akin to the example of Turkey, as primary factors contributing to the clash of interests between Hungary and NATO.⁸

⁵ Kamer Kasım, "Soğuk Savaş Dönemi Sonrası Kıbrıs Sorunu," *Gazî Akademik Bakış* 1, no. 1 (2007), p. 59.

⁶ Greece returned to NATO's military command in 1980. France followed the same path and backed to the military command of NATO in 2009.

⁷ Ali Balcı, "A Three-Level Analysis of Turkey's Crisis with the U.S.-Led Order," *Insight Turkey* 21, no. 4 (2019); Tarık Oğuzlu, "NATO ve Türkiye: Dönüşen İttifakın Sorgulayan Üyesi," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 9, no. 34 (2012).

⁸ Zsuzsanna Végh, "Hungary's 'Eastern Opening' Policy toward Russia: Ties That Bind?," *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* 24, no. 1 (2015); Veronika Józwiak, "The Role of Defence Cooperation in

On the other hand, some scholars attribute the emergence of disagreements and problematic areas in the relations between Turkey and Hungary with NATO to the current governments of these countries and the ideological motifs they possess. Studies holding this perspective highlight the relationship between the right-wing and conservative ideological approaches of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP – *in English: Justice and Development Party*) in Turkey and Viktor Orbán's Fidesz- Magyar Polgári Szövetség'i (FIDESZ- *in English: Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance*) in Hungary and the shift in states' perceptions regarding international politics. Accordingly, they consider the ideologies of the current governments in Turkey and Hungary as the fundamental reason for the problems experienced with the Euro-Atlantic, emphasizing the necessity of questioning this matter.⁹

At this point, one might question why examining and scrutinizing Turkey and Hungary's relations with NATO is important. In a broader context, NATO is an organization comprised of many members, and each country within the alliance fundamentally defends its national interests. For instance, a perspective formed within this context might regard occasional conflicts of interest between member states and the alliance (provided they do not alter or affect the structure of the alliance) as a natural process within the scope of international politics and may not attach significant importance to such occurrences.

Hungary's Relations with the US", *The Polish Institute of International Affairs*, no. 59 (2019).

⁹ Tark Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?," *Turkish Studies* 9, no. 1 (2008); Mehtap Kara, "Linking Turkey's Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: The Justice and Development Party's Political Strategies and Their Divergent Foreign Policy Effects," *Turkish Studies* 23, no. 4 (2022); Péter Visnovitz and Erin Kristin Jenne, "Populist Argumentation in Foreign Policy: The Case of Hungary under Viktor Orbán, 2010–2020," *Comparative European Politics* 19, no. 6 (2021); Aron Buzogány, "Illiberal Democracy in Hungary: Authoritarian Diffusion or Domestic Causation?," *Democratization* 24, no. 7 (2017).

However, on the other hand, it is undeniable that NATO is an alliance that continuously renews its strategies and missions in the context of international political balances, and it builds its strategies through the consensus of member states (the unanimous decision-making and veto power of all members).¹⁰ In this regard, disagreements and political divergences between member states and NATO, while not necessarily leading to radical changes in the alliance's structure, can significantly influence the formulation and implementation of the alliance's strategies and missions. In other words, conflicts between member states and NATO can undermine the coherence of the alliance. Moreover, disagreements and inconsistencies that may arise within NATO can indirectly influence the foreign policy behaviours of non-member states. Signals from NATO can prompt various states to revise their positions in international politics and develop different strategies. In this direction, examining and questioning the disagreements in Turkey and Hungary's relations with NATO can be seen as increasingly important. For instance, in this context, while debating whether Turkey's and Hungary's foreign policy approaches and problematic relations with NATO weaken Western security efforts, the possibility of this situation causing a fracture within the alliance is evaluated.¹¹ Similarly, some officials within NATO even express that these problematic relations narrow the alliance's political manoeuvring room.¹² Likewise, it is indicated that non-NATO states

¹⁰ NATO, "Consensus Decision-Making at NATO," 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49178.htm. (Accessed on 6 October 2023).

¹¹ Stefan Grobe, "Europe's Week: Hungary and Turkey Block Western Efforts against Russia," *Euronews*, 2022, <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/05/20/europe-s-week-hungary-and-turkey-block-western-efforts-against-russia>; The Economist, "Turkey and NATO Are Growing Apart," 2018, <https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/02/01/turkey-and-nato-are-growing-apart>? (Accessed on 6 October 2023).

¹² Jakob Lindgaard and Moritz Pieper, "Turkey's NATO Future: Between Alliance Dependency, Russia, and Strategic Autonomy" (Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2020), p. 34.

like Russia may develop new strategies that deepen the problematic areas in Turkey and Hungary's relations with NATO (during the AKP and FIDESZ government periods) and extend this to a broader domain within the alliance.¹³

Considering all this, the Turkey-NATO, and Hungary-NATO relationships, currently under various forms of scrutiny, debate, and significance in terms of international relations, indicate that during the periods of the AKP and FIDESZ governments, the problematic relations/conflicts arising between these two states and the alliance present a puzzle that needs to be resolved and elucidated. The different perspectives (perspectives have been briefly exemplified above and will be further discussed in detail in the literature review section) already put forward that examine this puzzle (what these problematic relations are and why they have arisen) serve as a fundamental starting point, yet they also reveal their shortcomings.

When examining these different approaches, the first and most notable detail that stands out is the division into two main axes: systemic level (international political balances) and domestic level (ideologies of current governments). These approaches, progressing along these two axes, undoubtedly address essential points and provide clues for solving this puzzle by offering specific explanations. In this regard, these approaches are valuable and cannot be ignored. However, on the other hand, the progression of these perspectives along two separate axes (lack of comprehensiveness) and their single-layered structure also constitute their fundamental deficiency. Specifically, approaches that examine the issue at the international political level may overlook important clues by disregarding domestic factors. Similarly, solely focusing on domestic ideological motifs also amounts to ignoring the realities of international politics. At this point, there emerges a need for a multilayered

¹³ Evelyn Farkas, "The Future of NATO: New Challenges and Opportunities," GMF, 2019, <https://www.gmfus.org/news/future-nato-new-challenges-and-opportunities>.

approach to both provide a more detailed explanation of this puzzle and to reveal whether a stronger third alternative exists beyond these two fundamental axes.

Focusing on both international politics (system level) and domestic factors (having a multilayered structure), as well as adopting an integrative approach to the relations between these layers, strengthens Neoclassical Realism (NCR) in addressing the mentioned perspective deficiency. NCR acknowledges international politics as a predominant element in states' foreign policy decisions while referring to unit-level elements as intervening variables and claiming that these elements also influence foreign policy making. In other words, NCR elucidates the cause-effect relationship between the international political situation (independent variable) and foreign policy outcomes (dependent variable) while also asserting that domestic factors (intervening variables) play a role in this cause-effect relationship.¹⁴

Apart from the strength brought by its multilayered structure, it is also possible to mention NCR's weaknesses. These weaknesses can be attributed to two main reasons. The first is the complexity regarding the intervening variables proposed within the scope of NCR theory. While NCR addresses similar concepts and factors regarding which domestic factors will be considered intervening variables, there is no standard agreement.¹⁵

¹⁴ See, for example: Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998): 144–72; Nicholas Kitchen, "Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation," *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 1 (2010): 117–43; Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

¹⁵ See, for example: Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Colin Dueck, "Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy, 2000–2004," *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 4 (2004): 511–35; Norrin M. Ripsman, "Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups," in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge:

This situation creates confusion in determining the intervening variables. The second weakness is the confusion regarding how intervening variables should be utilized. Cases where domestic factors, in other words, intervening variables, can be considered as primary causes within the cause-effect relationship may raise questions about the differences or limitations of NCR theory compared to other theories.¹⁶

Among these, as noted by Elias Gotz, the issue regarding the limitations of NCR theory is resolved through the complementary use of intervening variables. Approaches that consider intervening variables as primary causes will not be considered within NCR theory and will be eliminated.¹⁷ In this regard, adopting the perspective of NCR theory and utilizing domestic elements (intervening variables) as complementary factors will effectively examine and explain the Turkey-NATO and Hungary-NATO relationships in detail. Thus, this study will add new elaboration to these two cases, which have already been subject to various interpretations (both in the context of international politics and government ideologies) and will create added value to the multifaceted explanation of these two issues.

Another drawback of NCR, the confusion arising from the determination of intervening variables, requires the establishment of a modelling resulting from the consolidation of elements in existing studies on this theory. A comprehensive and logically robust model can be constructed by combining similar concepts and factors proposed by previous studies (on NCR) in a

Cambridge University Press, 2009), 170–93; Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

¹⁶ Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?,” *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999): 5–55; Kevin Narizny, “On Systemic Paradigms and Domestic Politics: A Critique of the Newest Realism,” *International Security* 42, no. 2 (2017): 155–90.

¹⁷ Elias Götz, “Neoclassical Realist Theories, Intervening Variables, and Paradigmatic Boundaries,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 17, no. 2 (2021), p. 8–11.

complementary manner. In this respect, this study will attempt to explain the Turkey-NATO and Hungary-NATO relationships by benefiting from the multilayered structure of NCR and the complementary factor power of intervening variables while also aiming to develop modelling regarding intervening variables (the details of this modelling are extensively discussed in the theory and methodology section). Thus, the research adopts a perspective that contributes additional value to developing NCR's theoretical outlook and treating intervening variables.¹⁸

In light of these considerations, this research has two significant features. Firstly, it conducts a theory test with the modelling it presents. Secondly, it provides an alternative explanation for the disputes between Turkey and Hungary with NATO during the AKP and FIDESZ governments, employing NCR's multilayered foreign policy perspective encompassing international politics and domestic factors. At this point, it conceptualizes states' problems with NATO in terms of the relations between conservative right-wing governments' efforts to maintain their administrative power (political survival) and ideational structures. In this context, the study should be regarded as a case study that thoroughly examines Turkey and Hungary, in other words, two separate conditions (it does not directly compare them). While analysing these cases, the research sets a time limit of the year 2020 for both countries. The temporal limit set for the year 2020 is related to the planning regarding data collection, processing, and the anticipated completion of the study within a specified timeframe.

¹⁸ Building on this work, the author has published two academic articles derived from the cases of Turkey and Hungary, applying the Neoclassical realist perspective, in international academic journals. See: Bilal Bahadır Karaca, "Vişegrad Grubu Ülkelerinin Rusya Federasyonu ile Siyasi İlişkileri: Ortak Ya Da Farklı Pozisyon?," *Rusya Araştırmaları Dergisi* 5 5, no. 1 (2021): 131–55; Bilal Bahadır Karaca and Berk Köksal, "The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy in Syria: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective," *Przegląd Strategiczny* 15, no. 1 (2022): 43–58.

CHAPTER 1

Turmoil in Turkey and Hungary's Relations with NATO

1.1. Review of the Literature and the Limitations of Contemporary Research on Turkey-NATO and Hungary-NATO Relations

Alliances, which are fundamental components of international politics, extend their influence beyond shaping the theoretical domain to impacting states' foreign policy behaviours and security strategies, thereby permeating into the practical sphere. In this context, research on alliances and state relations is imperative for understanding the foundations of international politics.¹⁹ Accordingly, from the early days of the discipline of IR to the present, numerous scholars and studies have focused on the concept of alliances. However, the various changes that have occurred in international politics over historical processes have diversified approaches to the phenomenon of alliances and precluded the formation of a common consensus. Consequently, interpretations regarding alliances and state relations have been articulated in connection with various phenomena such as power, military threats, ideology, and cultural identity across different epochs.²⁰ Theories such as realism, liberal institutionalism, and constructivism also emerge as primary theoretical approaches examining these phenomena.

Taking into account the historical context, the Cold War era, marked by a stark division of the world into two opposing poles, epitomizes a period where the notions of power and military

¹⁹ Ken Booth, "Alliances," in *Contemporary Strategy* (New York: Routledge, 2021), p. 172.

²⁰ Stefan Bergsmann, "The Concept of Military Alliance," in *Small States and Alliances* (New York: Physica-Verlag Heidelberg, 2001), p. 27; Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems," *American Political Science Review* 59, no. 3 (1965).

threat held sway in both the formation of alliances and the interpretation of states' positions.²¹ For instance, classical realism, which links states' material capabilities with the concept of power, argued that states' primary objective is to maximize power and ensure survival. Consequently, it explained alliances' formation and countries' positioning as driven by states' desire to either surpass or balance power with other states.²² Similarly, structural realism has developed its interpretations around concepts that emphasize maintaining the balance of power in international politics, or in other words, ensuring the status quo²³ or the balance of threats, which prioritize ongoing power dynamics and survival.²⁴ Parallel to these, during the Cold War period, alliances were predominantly structured around military considerations, with definitions centered on power, threat, survival, and shared interests.²⁵ They were often described as “*a limited group of states cooperating to enhance mutual military security at a given time.*”²⁶ or “*a treaty binding two or more independent states to provide armed assistance to each other under specified circumstances outlined in the treaty's casus foederis article.*”²⁷

²¹ Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism,” *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (1994).

²² Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).

²³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 15-126.

²⁴ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987) ; Stephen M. Walt, “Formation and the Balance of World Power,” *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985).

²⁵ Kajsa Ji Noe Oest, “The End of Alliance Theory?” *Institut for Statskundskab Københavns Universitet* (Copenhagen, 2007).

²⁶ Edwin H Fedder, “The Concept of Alliance,” *International Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 1 (1968), p.68.

²⁷ Paul W Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in *Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 195; to see similar definitions in research conducted during the Cold War: Robert Endicott Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968); Melvin Small and J. David

It is observed that the relationships among members within alliances and the potential conflicts among them are also conceptualized within the same realm of the relations between power and interests. For instance, James D. Morrow discussed the power disparity among members within alliances using the concept of "asymmetry," relating many aspects such as decision-making processes, determining strategic objectives and resource allocation, with this power difference. In this regard, the problematic relations that may arise within alliances are associated with situations where there is a significant power imbalance (asymmetry) among states. In contrast, alliances characterized by closer power parity (symmetry) are proposed to be more successful and seamless.²⁸ Similarly, Glenn H. Snyder introduced the concept of the "bargaining process," aligning issues such as the determination of interests, the distribution of resources, and the formulation of strategic objectives within alliances with negotiations among members with differing power levels. He argued that the problems within alliances are a direct reflection of the unsuccessful "bargaining process" among members with varying power capacities.²⁹

The historical period marking the beginning of the end of the bipolar structure of international politics, or in other words, the end of the Cold War, can be considered as heralding a new era in interpretations concerning alliances. During this period, dominant interpretations have significantly shifted away from the concept of power, external military threats, and states' survival efforts toward examining different factors as the central

Singer, "Formal Alliances, 1816-1965: An Extension of the Basic Data," *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969).

²⁸ James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4 (1991): 904-33.

²⁹ Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," *Journal of International Affairs* 44, no. 1 (1990); see also: Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability," *International Organization* 45, no. 1 (1991): 121-42; Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (1984): 461-95.

focus. At this juncture, it can be said that norms, rules emphasized by liberal institutionalism, and elements such as identity, values, and ideology highlighted by constructivists have come to the forefront.³⁰

For instance, liberal institutionalists have based the formation of alliances and the relationship among member states on the absolute gains of states and the influence of shared norms and agreements created by the institutional structure of alliances. Accordingly, alliances create an environment where all member states adhere to values and mechanisms, facilitating transparent collaboration.³¹ Thus, these shared values facilitate the coming together of similar states, while failure to adhere to these created values leads to conflicts where the legitimacy and reputation of states within the alliance are questioned.³²

On the other hand, constructivists have examined the impact of shared identity, values, and ideologies on states' perceptions by associating states' interests and material conditions with identity. Therefore, they perceived alliances as complex structures where cognitive factors come into play beyond an international power struggle.³³ Consequently, they emphasize the cognitive structures of actors such as state leaders and diplomats, claiming that those are the primary agents involved in international politics. Constructivists argue that actors perceive concepts such as interest and threat through ideologies

³⁰ Edward A. Kolodziej, *Security and International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 127-175; Emanuel Adler, "Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates," in *Handbook of International Relations* (New York: SAGE Publications, 2013), 112-144.

³¹ Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics* 38, no. 1 (1985): 226-54.

³² Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 485-507.

³³ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 139-193.

emerging from their identities and beliefs, and they acknowledge that states' behaviours result from this perception.³⁴ Thus, from the constructivist perspective, alliances and foreign policymaking are reflections of constructed identities and beliefs, and the changing nature of these factors over time and space (reconstruction) also leads to challenges in relationships among member states in alliances.³⁵

Due to the influence of this emerging perspective deviation (departing from the realist tradition), some scholars have argued that states with similar regime types or common norms, such as democracy, can quickly come together, while states diverging on these aspects tend to conflict with each other over time, even if they are part of the same alliance.³⁶ Researchers like Michael N. Barnett or F. Gregory Gause has discussed elements such as ideology and identity at the unit level of state agents, namely autocratic and powerful state leaders, in states (Middle Eastern states) where democratic values are not strong. At this point, they have evaluated perceptions formed within the frame of state leaders' ideologies as a fundamental element of foreign

³⁴ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992), p. 394–398.

³⁵ David L. Rousseau, *Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities: The Social Construction of Realism and Liberalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 12–13; see also: Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–200.

³⁶ Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, "Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 1 (1994); Michael W. Simon and Erik Gartzke, "Political System Similarity and the Choice of Allies: Do Democracies Flock Together, or Do Opposites Attract?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 4 (1996); Randolph M. Siverson and Juliann Emmons, "Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 2 (1991).

policy and as the primary cause of the formation of alliances or crises arising within alliances.³⁷ On the other hand, some studies have attempted to generate new concepts that consider not only cognitive elements but also various factors within the state. For example, in his research focusing on third-world countries (developing nations where democracy has not fully taken root), Steven R. David examined governments' perceptions regarding elements such as opposition groups, ethnic minorities, and economic interest groups. He argued that in formulating foreign policies and alliance relations of these countries, governments operate within the concept of political survival (sustaining power).³⁸ Similarly, Thomas Risse-Kappen also evaluated the concept of political survival of governments for democratic countries, advocating that public opinion pressure is a key element for states' foreign policies and, consequently, their alliance relations.³⁹

When we evaluate the perspectives of existing studies in the literature on foreign policymaking and alliances in a historical context, we observe that studies are divided into two main periods: the Cold War period and the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, when we assess the literature from a mere perspective standpoint, we discover that it is divided along two fundamental axes. One of the primary axes in perspective is influenced by the concept of power, focusing on security centered around military threats and a concentration on international politics, in other words, the international system level. In this axis, it is

³⁷ Michael N. Barnett, "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 400–441; F. Gregory Gause, "Ideologies, Alignments, and Underbalancing in the New Middle East Cold War," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 50, no. 3 (2017): 672–75.

³⁸ Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics* 43, no. 2 (1991): 233–56.

³⁹ Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics* 43, no. 4 (1991): 479–512.

evident that the situations concerning states' foreign policies and alliances are explained with a *from outside to inside* understanding. Another primary axis is a perspective that diverges from the international political level and delves into the unit level, in other words, scrutinizing aspects at the state's domestic layer. In this regard, cognitive factors and various elements of domestic politics have been assessed as critical components and have consequently become central to explanations. In essence, this axis takes a position contrary to the approach that prioritizes the international political level, adopting an understanding that proceeds *from inside to outside*.

The bifurcation into two main axes within the foreign policy and alliances framework has also permeated research specifically focused on NATO. Accordingly, the perspective that considers the concept of power in international politics and military security placed the emergence of the NATO alliance during the Cold War period at the centre of the power struggle between the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc. As a parallel, this perspective associated the foreign policymaking of countries within the orbit of this alliance with the military threat posed by the Soviet Union.⁴⁰ In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the diversification of security threats (such as terrorism and civil wars) has underscored NATO's role as a security shield against these threats⁴¹, along with the danger posed by the Russian Federation in the context of the former Soviet territories.⁴² Consequently, NATO's existence continues to be

⁴⁰ David N. Schwartz, "The Role of Deterrence in NATO Defense Strategy: Implications for Doctrine and Posture," *World Politics* 28, no. 1 (1975): 118–33; Mary Ann Heiss, *NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conflicts* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2008).

⁴¹ Adrian Hyde-Price, "NATO and the European Security System: A Neo-Realist Analysis," in *Theorising NATO* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 41–60.

⁴² Luca Ratti, "Back to the Future? International Relations Theory and NATO-Russia Relations since the End of the Cold War," *International Journal* 64, no. 2 (2009): 399–422; Richard D Sokolsky, "The New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications for European Security," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* 13, no. 1 (2017): 1–19.

associated with evolving security threats, while member states' relations within the alliance are also assessed within the scope of the new structure of international politics (multipolar) and the changing security concepts.⁴³

The perspective focusing on cognitive factors and unit-level elements has reframed NATO's existence and core objectives beyond military security, relying instead on norms and identity-based new challenges. According to Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in the post-Cold War era, high military security is no longer NATO's primary concern. From this point onwards, NATO operates to promote democratic norms that contribute to maintaining international peace and ensure the integration of countries into these democratic values.⁴⁴ According to Emanuel Adler, NATO seeks to strengthen cooperation among countries based on democratic principles rather than military competition through its flexible structure established in the post-Cold War era. In this context, the alliance forms a security community where different actors (members) share common norms and values.⁴⁵ Similarly, other studies have indicated that NATO's expansion through acquiring new members is associated with the "Western identity"⁴⁶ and states aspiring to be part of this identity structure their security and foreign policy

⁴³ Erdem Özlük, "Dengeleme Mi Peşine Takılmak Mı?: Dış Politika Stratejilerini Yeniden Düşünmek," *Gazî Akademik Bakış* 10, no. 20 (2017), p. 233.

⁴⁴ Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," *Security Studies* 3, no. 1 (1993): 3–43.

⁴⁵ Emanuel Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post—Cold War Transformation," *European Journal of International Relation* 14, no. 2 (2008): 195–230.

⁴⁶ Frank Schimmelfennig, "NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation," *Security Studies* 8, no. 2–3 (1998): 198–234; Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," in *Domestic Politics and Norm Diffusion in International Relations: Ideas Do Not Float Freely* (New York: Routledge, 2017).

perceptions within the confines of this identity.⁴⁷ In other words, explanations on this central axis discuss member states' foreign policymaking and relations with NATO based on the Western identity and whether actors embrace the values that this identity entails.

Cases with contentious areas, such as the current Turkey-NATO and Hungary-NATO relations, are not interpreted independently of this axis division. The majority of interpretations put forth within the context of the international political structure and the concept of power have focused on changes in the existing power balances and states' material interests in these cases. For instance, according to Tarık Oguzlu, the source of discord in Turkey-NATO relations stems from Turkey's growing power, which has led the country to reshape its foreign policy and security strategies, pursue independent policies with increased influence in the Middle East and the Caucasus, thereby conflicting with NATO's shared interests.⁴⁸ At this point, the positive orientation in Turkey-Russia relations and the problems arising with NATO are articulated by different researchers as a result of changes in global power balances, indicating the increasing political influence of Turkey and Russia in the region and the convergence of interests in many areas requiring cooperation between these two countries.⁴⁹ Similarly, in discussions concerning Hungary, the increasing global influence of actors such as Russia and China stands out, along with debates regarding Hungary's divergent foreign policy from

⁴⁷ Alexandra Gheciu, "Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 'New Europe,'" *International Organization* 59, no. 4 (2005): 973–1012.

⁴⁸ Tarık Oğuzlu, "Turkey's Eroding Commitment to NATO: From Identity to Interests," *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 3 (2012): 153–64.

⁴⁹ Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "Turkey and Russia in a Shifting Global Order: Cooperation, Conflict and Asymmetric Interdependence in a Turbulent Region," *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 1 (2016): 71–95; Levent Yiğittepe, "Nato ve Rusya Arasında Türkiye'nin Güvenlik Algılaması: S-400 Krizi Örneği," *Journal of Management and Economics Research* 16, no. 1 (2018): 276–89.

NATO, which considers the new balance of power in line with its national interests.⁵⁰ Examples of interpretations that focus on power balances and interests within the scope of international politics may increase, and it is undeniable that these interpretations have significant explanatory power based on the points they address.

However, the discussion at this point revolves around the areas that this perspective leaves ambiguous or does not focus on, namely, the need for an assessment at the unit level and the consideration of cognitive elements. Various studies stemming from these ambiguous points have turned to cognitive elements and delved into the unit level to reinterpret these problematic relationships. The fundamental conclusions reached by these studies are primarily centered on the ideologies of the current right-wing conservative governments of Turkey and Hungary, which are experiencing disagreements with NATO. For instance, Alper Kaliber and Esra Kaliber argue that due to the AKP government, Turkey operates with anti-Western populism, leading the country to perceive itself as a regional power and pushing it towards a tendency of conflict with Western allies.⁵¹ Similarly, Hakki Taş also claims that the government shapes its foreign policy strategies with populist rhetoric, emphasizing Turkey's perception of itself as a regionally independent power.⁵² In comments on Hungary, similarly, attention is drawn to the FIDESZ government and its critical approach towards Western values, suggesting that this anti-Western

⁵⁰ István Tarrósy and Zoltán Vörös, "Hungary's Pragmatic Foreign Policy in a Post-American World," *Politics in Central Europe* 16, no. 1 (2020): 113–34; András Deák and Csaba Weiner, "Hungary: Leveraging Political Influence," in *The Russian Economic Grip on Central and Eastern Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2019), 136–50.

⁵¹ Alper Kaliber and Esra Kaliber, "From De-Europeanisation to Anti-Western Populism: Turkish Foreign Policy in Flux," *The International Spectator* 54, no. 4 (2019): 1–16.

⁵² Hakki Taş, "Continuity through Change: Populism and Foreign Policy in Turkey," *Third World Quarterly*, 2022, 1–19, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2108392>.

perception reinterprets Hungary's foreign policy and places the country in strategic competition with NATO in various areas.⁵³ At this point, while unit-level interpretations regard the current governments and ideologies as the main reasons, they also consider disagreements with NATO as a consequence of the anti-Western stance.⁵⁴ Therefore, while this perspective addresses significant factors at the unit level, it, like the perspective focusing on international politics and the concept of power, leaves some areas incomplete and ambiguous.

Firstly, the absence of an evaluation concerning the changes occurring in international politics overlooks questioning the interaction between the international political structure and governmental actors. In this context, reducing disagreements between the mentioned states and NATO to the notion of anti-Westernism may not be sufficient in terms of explanatory power. As Helene Sjursen also pointed out, while NATO represents identities such as democracy and the West, it is also an alliance that repositions itself according to changes in international politics and acts against emerging security threats.⁵⁵ Therefore, solely providing an explanation based on values and ideologies is akin to leaving the other half of the apple missing. Secondly, foregrounding the current governments (AKP and FIDESZ) and their ideologies in the unit-level assessment creates uncertainties regarding the role and impact of other domestic factors. These uncertainties raise questions about whether the ideologies of the current governments are the sole

⁵³ Visnovitz and Jenne, "Populist Argumentation in Foreign Policy: The Case of Hungary under Viktor Orbán, 2010–2020"; Mihai Varga and Aron Buzogány, "The Foreign Policy of Populists in Power: Contesting Liberalism in Poland and Hungary," *Geopolitics* 26, no. 5 (2021): 1442–63.

⁵⁴ Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove, "Populism and Foreign Policy," in *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 489–514; Angelos Chrysosgelos, "Populism in Foreign Policy," *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 6.

⁵⁵ Helene Sjursen, "On the Identity of NATO," *International Affairs* 80, no. 4 (2004), p. 702.

and definitive rationale and about the influence of other domestic actors or institutions in foreign policymaking.

In light of all this, the proposition of a robust alternative approach, distinct from the perspectives fundamentally divided into two main axes and the areas they leave uncertain, allows NCR to serve as the theoretical perspective utilized in this study. Because the interrogation of traditional realist theories such as classical realism and structural realism, which focus on the concept of power and treat states as monolithic entities at the international political level, cannot penetrate the domestic layer (state-level) of Turkey and Hungary. Therefore, while these interrogations make significant contributions to international politics, they will leave ambiguities by not only failing to respond to claims regarding the impact of current governments' ideologies but also omitting elements related to countries' societal dynamics and domestic politics. Interrogation of theories that directly focus on normative and cognitive elements, such as liberal institutionalism and constructivism, will overlook factors such as regional dynamics and geographic security concerns, leaving them incomplete in their explanations. Consequently, aspects of NATO's operation and strategy shaped and influenced by international politics, and the points where Turkey and Hungary do not align with these factors may not be fully understood. Moreover, these theoretical inquiries will be weak in detailing developments related to domestic politics, such as political conflicts between parties and military coups. Therefore, neoclassical realism, with its multi-layered structure, can provide a comprehensive explanation by focusing on both the international political level and the unit level, while also allowing for a broader consideration of intervening variables and unit-level factors (in other words, addressing elements related to societal dynamics and domestic politics) and can also respond to questions regarding their impact on foreign policymaking.

1.2. Theoretical Structure: Neoclassical Realism

This study posits that neoclassical realism offers an alternative perspective, providing a multi-layered and comprehensive outlook that addresses the ambiguities left by current approaches. Therefore, this study draws upon the theoretical inquiry of NCR and operates by embracing the theory's fundamental assumptions. At this point, it is essential to delve into the fundamental assumptions of the theory in detail, elucidate the benefits that the theory brings in explaining the cases of Turkey-NATO and Hungary-NATO, and identify the areas where the theory falls short in order to delineate the theoretical framework of the research.

Gideon Rose, who coined the term NCR and first used it, provides the initial starting point for addressing the basic assumptions of NCR. According to Rose, within the discipline of International Relations, there are two dominant theoretical approaches, both of which have shortcomings in explaining states' foreign policy and security behaviours. Rose identifies the first of these dominant approaches as traditional realism (classical and structural realism), focusing on the international politics/system level, while he refers to the other dominant approach as the *Innenpolitik* perspective, which solely focuses on the internal structures/levels of states. Traditional realist approaches (especially structural realism) explain the motivations of interstate relations through the structure of international politics within the international system. However, according to Rose, this approach does not provide a comprehensive explanation because it does not examine the political behaviours of states individually. Therefore, when states with similar structures, similarly influenced by international system stimuli, exhibit different foreign policy behaviours, these traditional realist approaches will be inadequate in generating interpretations. Similarly, *Innenpolitik* theories will also fail to explain why states with similar domestic structures in the same international system adopt different foreign policies. Additionally, when states with different domestic structures occasionally produce similar

foreign and security policies, the interpretations provided by the *Innenpolitik* perspective also fall short.⁵⁶ In line with Rose's assertions, Fareed Zakaria also categorizes perspectives on states' foreign policy into two groups.⁵⁷ According to him, an analysis based on the domestic level can help explain an event, a trend, or a specific policy in detail. However, the anarchic nature of the international system is the factor that broadly explains the behaviours of states' foreign policy over a significant period. From this perspective, a theoretical approach dealing with the foreign policy and security strategies of states should encompass both systemic and unit levels and should be able to identify which factors play particularly influential roles.⁵⁸

At this point, neoclassical realism emerged to address the shortcomings of existing dominant theoretical approaches and to demonstrate an approach to foreign and security policy that encompasses both the international system and domestic political peculiarities of states. However, while the theory establishes a position that encompasses factors at both the systemic and unit levels, it assigns different levels of importance to these two layers. Neoclassical realism fundamentally opposes treating domestic political factors of states as independent variables. According to this perspective, states' foreign policies must respond to pressures created by the international system and should entail behaviours that meet the system's requirements. In this regard, domestic factors are of secondary importance and cannot be considered primary determinants.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998), p. 145-150.

⁵⁷ Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition," *International Security* 17, no. 1 (1992), p. 198.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, "Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy," in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 7.

From the perspective of NCR, the positions of states in the international system and their relative material powers are of primary importance in terms of their foreign policies. However, contrary to what traditional realist approaches claim, the international system is not considered the sole determinant shaping the behaviours of states. While international politics creates pressures that constrain and shape the policies of states, domestic factors also play a role in determining the fundamental motivations of a state in responding to these systemic pressures.⁶⁰ In this framework, Rose defines neoclassical realism theory as follows:

“It explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought. Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.”⁶¹

Drawing on Rose’s definition, the nuanced description of how NCR is influenced by and diverges from traditional realist approaches (classical and structural realism) can be elaborated as follows: Classical realism approaches the political behaviours of states within a framework of power from the top-down rather than through a systemic analysis. Within this framework, policymakers determine states’ national interests and formulate their foreign policies based on assessments of the relative distribution of power in international politics and the intentions of other states. Moreover, states’ foreign policies and security strategies vary depending on their ability to effectively utilize their national power, encompassing geography, culture, population, military capacity, and natural resources. The effective

⁶⁰ Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” *International Security* 29, no. 2 (2004), p. 164.

⁶¹ Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” p. 146.

utilization of this national power can manifest differently across various historical periods for states. In this regard, the resemblance of NCR to classical realism lies in its ability to incorporate elements of classical realism, such as state leadership, factors constituting national power, and the fluctuation of state power across different states and historical epochs.⁶² However, on the other hand, neoclassical realism diverges from classical realism by considering the anarchic structure of the international system as a primary factor and employing systemic analysis in its theoretical inquiry.

NCR and structural realism share a common ground regarding the centrality of international politics (the system). According to NCR, while pressures and incentives in the international system do not possess absolute dictatorial power over states' foreign policies and security strategies, they influence the general orientation of states' policies. In other words, international politics offers limited policy options to states and restricts their behaviours within these options. However, the critical point is that NCR argues that the international system's stimuli and states' material capabilities cannot be directly transmitted to foreign policymaking with *the perfect transmission belt*.⁶³ Thus, the international system cannot entirely dictate how states' foreign and security policies should be; the internal dynamics of states come into play and intervene in the interaction between system stimuli and implemented policies. Consequently, neoclassical realism diverges from structural realism, and it "*occupy a middle ground between pure structural theorists and constructivists.*"⁶⁴

⁶² Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource- Extractive State," *Security Studies* 15, no. 3 (2006), p. 472-180.

⁶³ Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.," p. 146.

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 152.




Figure 1: Neoclassical Realism and Formation of Foreign Policy and Security Strategies⁶⁵

As stated by Rose, neoclassical realism positions itself between structural theories and constructivism, thus shaping the concept of the state emphasized by this theory as one that integrates both the international system and domestic factors. Therefore, NCR's emphasis on autonomous governments and domestic political characteristics not only rejects the notion of states as holistic actors but also designates governments and state leaders as an intervening variable influencing foreign and security policies. In this direction, particularly Thomas J. Christensen and Zakaria are notable figures who extensively discuss the impact of governments on foreign and security policy as intervening variables.

According to Christensen, the actors representing states in the international arena are governments; therefore, they are indispensable in shaping foreign policy.⁶⁶ However, Christensen points out that the concept of government is a broad structure divided into various sections and subgroups, and he states that the limited number of elites within the government are the ones who directly shape foreign policy.⁶⁷ Similarly, Zakaria also emphasizes the fundamental role of governments in foreign policy

⁶⁵ Based on the source: Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998).

⁶⁶ Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 15.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

and security strategies, focusing on leaders and the limited number of elites within a government. Another point highlighted by Zakaria is the relationship between governments/leaders and *state power* in making and implementing policy decisions. Here, by state power, Zakaria refers to the national power that a government can harness and utilize. In other words, Zakaria directly correlates the process of formulating foreign and security policy with governments and their ability to utilize *national power*.⁶⁸ Christensen also shares the same view as Zakaria, using "*national political power*" instead of state power. While state power is calculated based on material parameters such as the country's population, number of troops, weapons capacity, and economy, what is essential for policymaking is the ability of leaders/governments to mobilize these elements when necessary. Therefore, the ability of a government to utilize elements of state power and persuade the public directly influences the creation of foreign policy objectives.⁶⁹

Another essential aspect to consider for government leaders/elites besides the use of state power or national power is their cognitive domains. Being directly engaged with international politics, statesmen observe the international system, assess signals from there, and form ideas for various policy moves.⁷⁰ This reflects not only the impact of the international system on the state's foreign and security policies but also the possibility that state leaders may be detached from objective reality while perceiving and evaluating systemic stimuli. During evaluation signals regarding international politics, cognitive factors such as leaders' beliefs, biases, views on the international system (worldviews), identities, and ideologies become crucial. In other words, signals from the system are interpreted through

⁶⁸ Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 9.

⁶⁹ Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958*, p. 11-12.

⁷⁰ Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, p. 32-33.

these cognitive filters. Therefore, while the international system offers limited policy opportunities to states through the signals it sends, leaders' perceptions also emerge as another factor that constrains states' foreign and security policies.⁷¹ At this point, while NCR evaluates governments/leaders as an intervening variable influencing foreign and security policies, it also incorporates the cognitive structures of leaders/elites into the equation and integrates cognitive elements related to constructivism into a realist perspective.

Alongside signals from the international system and leaders' perceptions, Randall Schweller introduces four fundamental concepts that influence/constrain governments regarding foreign and security policies. These are elite consensus, government strength or weakness, social cohesion, and cohesion among elites.⁷² With slight nuances, elite consensus and elite cohesion share a common meaning. Schweller refers to elites, encompassing both government leaders and decision-makers with veto power over state policies. Accordingly, the converging perceptions of these elites regarding international politics and their evaluation of signals from the system on common ground facilitate a swift response. However, on the other hand, the absence of a shared view among elites, i.e., the lack of elite consensus, can lead to a struggle of differing ideas in policy-making. Consequently, this situation can restrain government leaders from implementing their preferred foreign and security strategies. Polarization/dissonance among elites in terms of identity, culture, and ideology filters signals from the international system differently, thereby giving rise to disagreements.⁷³

On the other hand, consensus among elites also enables the formulation of a grand strategy for a state. A grand strategy

⁷¹ Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 20-23.

⁷² Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," p. 169.

⁷³ *Ibid*, 180-181.

determines a state's foreign policy priorities and security strategies; it plans how the state will achieve these objectives. Although decision-makers may change over time, an established grand strategy sets the general direction of the state's foreign and security policy and indicates the path for successors (incoming governments) to follow. Even if the interpretations of new leaders regarding the international system do not align with the state's existing grand strategy, they may only rarely be able to change it. This is because restructuring the grand strategy leads to primary changes in the state's foreign policy and security strategies (such as identifying a new threat, reordering existing threats, and revising the state's foreign policy objectives) and eliminating the status quo. It could result in potential consequences such as the breakdown of consensus among elites, the emergence of divisions, and the loss of political power for the government due to the reactions of veto players, making new governments/leaders reluctant to make such changes. With these characteristics, grand strategy is considered by proponents of neoclassical realism, such as Nicholas Kitchen and Colin Dueck, as an intervening variable that influences/limits foreign and security policy.⁷⁴

A government's ability to change its current foreign policy and security strategy, i.e., its capacity to transcend the status quo, also reflects its power. This power is linked to the success of the government's relations with other actors within the state. All governments must engage with other domestic actors. While the nature of this interaction varies depending on the regime type, fundamentally, governments seek to preserve their

⁷⁴ Nicholas Kitchen, "Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation," *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 1 (2010); Colin Dueck, "Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy, 2000–2004," *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 4 (2004).

power by considering actors' demands.⁷⁵ Governments that can maintain their power and meet the demands of other domestic actors, garnering their support, can find leeway in a free political arena and implement revisionist foreign and security policies without stringent constraints. At this juncture, a dilemma arises. Being a strong government is a prerequisite for being revisionist and making changes in foreign and security policies. However, on the other hand, meeting the demands of other domestic actors and gaining their support is also a requirement for being a strong government, and this requirement, in a sense, limits the government's foreign policy options. From this perspective, Balkan Devlen and Özgür Özdamar consider governments' efforts to survive in political life, i.e., to avoid falling into a weak government position by preserving their political power, as an intervening variable.⁷⁶ They argue that the demands of domestic actors shape the government's policy perceptions, which in turn compel state leaders to act within a cost-benefit calculation. They suggest that governments generally refrain from foreign and security policy moves that could lead to conflict in their relations with other actors within the state and undermine their existing power base.⁷⁷⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Norrin M. Ripsman, "Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups," in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 171.

⁷⁶ Balkan Devlen and Özgür Özdamar, "Neoclassical Realism and Foreign Policy Crises," in *Rethinking Realism in International Relations: Between Tradition and Innovation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), p. 143–144.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ The position of Putnam's two-level game theory, in terms of its emphasis on domestic dynamics in foreign policymaking, can raise a question of whether it should be incorporated into the theoretical framework of NCR. The similarity between the two-level game theory and NCR lies more in the analytical realm than ideological proximity. TLG has liberal origins, while NCR is realist. Furthermore, these two theories diverge in the following areas: In TLG, the theoretical connection between the levels of domestic and international politics is not fully established. In Putnam's model, the role of the negotiator serves as the sole theoretical link

The influence of domestic actors on the government also raises another matter: which domestic actors can impact the formulation of governments' foreign and security policies. While it is possible to speak of many political or non-political actors within a state, it is evident that not all will have the same influence. At this point, Norrin Ripsman divides states into two groups, democratic and non-democratic states, considering different actors' influence in these two types of regimes. According to him, well-organized and single-purpose interest groups, legislative bodies, and the entirety of society constitute influential domestic actors in democratic states. On the other hand, the military, social groups with the power to form governments, public dynamics, and bureaucratic-economic centers are essential actors in terms of influence in non-democratic states.⁷⁹ However, categorizing domestic actors into sharp groups based on regime type may not be the most accurate approach. For example, even in countries considered democratic, actors associated with non-democratic regimes, such as the armed forces, are sometimes observed to be politically influential and exert pressure on governments (as seen in the political histories of various countries considered democratic, such as Turkey and Greece).

On the other hand, governments must have smooth relations with society, regardless of whether states are democratic or not. Discord between the government and society can increase the risk of losing elections in democratic states, thereby affecting the government's political survival, while in non-democratic

between the two levels. The importance of domestic and international levels in TLG is ambiguous. TLG's two levels are described as "additive," meaning that one level is not explicitly prioritized over the other. Additionally, the role of leaders' perceptions and multilateral negotiations is not addressed in TLG. Therefore, I did not incorporate TLG into the NCR theoretical framework. See: Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60.

⁷⁹ Ripsman, "Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups," p. 185.

states, it can lead to political processes that escalate to the extent of civil war and even the forced removal of the government. However, social harmony does not necessarily imply that all sectors of society have a political consensus with the existing government and share a standard political view. All societies have certain conflict areas, including divisions based on class interests, economic inequalities, and different political beliefs.⁸⁰ On the other hand, the transformation of social discord into a structural problem poses a real danger for governments. For example, questioning the legitimacy of a government by society, abandonment of allegiance to the state by a segment of society, and consequently attempting to overthrow/change the existing state order can be considered a transformation of social discord into a structural problem. In light of all these, governments must consider factors such as the population's general identity, cultural values, and beliefs in their political behaviour. Therefore, foreign policy moves of governments do not prefer conflict with these elements.⁸¹

The fundamental assumptions put forth by the NCR approach indicate that, in general, the theory conceptualizes the process of foreign policymaking as a multi-layered structure formed by the interaction of international politics and domestic factors. However, the lack of a common ground regarding what the intervening variables are and how they exert influence highlights one of the most notable weaknesses of this theory. Due to the diversity of intervening variables, it is almost as if *"there is no single neoclassical realist theory of foreign policy, but rather a diversity of neoclassical realist theories."*⁸² The absence of a systematic presentation of internal factors creates a perception that these factors are determined ad hoc. Moreover, this situation can lead to

⁸⁰ Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," p. 175.

⁸¹ Devlen and Özdamar, "Neoclassical Realism and Foreign Policy Crises," p. 175-176.

⁸² Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman, "Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy," p. 10.

criticisms of the theory's explanatory power being severely limited.⁸³

Aware of this deficiency, researchers such as Norrin Ripsman, Jeffrey Taliaferro, and Steven Lobell attempt to model intervening variables within a systematic framework. They construct this systematic framework by identifying stages of responding to signals from international politics (at the systemic level). According to them, forming foreign policy by responding to signals from the international system consists of three fundamental processes: perception, decision-making, and policy implementation. Intervening variables, on the other hand, comprise four main factors that encompass these three processes. Two of these four main factors, namely leader images and strategic culture, influence the perception process stage. On the other hand, decision-making and policy implementation processes are shaped by strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic political institutions. According to the model proposed by Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, the concept of leader images includes elements such as the identity, ideology, and character of elites who have authority in foreign policymaking. Strategic culture is the overall direction of a state's foreign and security policy, based on factors such as revisionist policies of national governments or significant events in a nation's history. In other words, it represents a state's grand strategy. State-society relations reflect the harmony or disharmony between society and the state and indicate whether the government receives sufficient support from the public to make foreign policy moves. Finally, domestic political institutions refer to the relationships and political positions of veto.⁸⁴

⁸³ Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*, p. 60.

⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 60-80.




Figure 2: Domestic Factors (Intervening Variables) Model of Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell⁸⁵

Besides identifying intervening variables, the NCR could attract criticism and be considered its weak point by incorporating various elements associated with liberal and constructivist perspectives into the overall realist framework. According to researchers like Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, the use of these elements by NCR undermines the realist tradition. They argue that realism is ontologically materialist and methodologically positivist and accepts states as holistic rational actors. They claim that NCR violates these assumptions. Consequently, NCR is inadequate in explaining the international political system and its outcomes as a theory from realist tradition.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Based on this source: Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

⁸⁶ Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999), p. 5-35.

However, what these critics overlook is that NCR is fundamentally a theory focused on foreign policymaking.⁸⁷ In this regard, NCR does not attempt, like traditional realist approaches, to provide prescriptive policy recommendations or to offer guidance on how states should behave in international politics. Instead, it seeks to understand and classify a complex political situation descriptively. It aims to provide more information about an emerging political reality and to establish a starting point. At this point, it incorporates elements of liberalism and constructivism within its framework.⁸⁸ However, NCR does not treat these elements as independent variables. It regards the structure of the international system as significant and considers states as the dominant actors in international politics. Thus, it does not abandon the ontological essence of realism.⁸⁹

Although NCR receives criticism from various points of view, its ability to provide a consistent deductive framework by integrating international politics and unit-level factors constitutes the strongest aspect of this perspective.⁹⁰ Thus, NCR can address the shortcomings of system theories that have successfully predicted policy outcomes over long periods but fall short in explaining changes occurring in the short and medium terms, as well as various anomalies. Additionally, by shifting away from the single-layered perspective prevalent in approaches that ignore the systemic level and mainly provide explanations at the unit level, NCR alters this narrow view and examines

⁸⁷ Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman, "Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy," p. 21.

⁸⁸ Kitchen, "Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation," p. 139.

⁸⁹ Tudor Onea, "Putting the 'Classical' in Neoclassical Realism: Neoclassical Realist Theories and US Expansion in the Post-Cold War," *International Relations* 26, no. 2 (2012), p. 139–164.

⁹⁰ Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*, p. 11.

states' foreign policies and security strategies within a complex framework alongside elements of international politics.⁹¹

In light of the fundamental assumptions put forth by NCR, the theory's multi-layered structure will significantly contribute to explaining the emergence of contentious areas in Turkey's and Hungary's relations with NATO during the periods of the AKP and FIDESZ governments. Evaluating the internal political characteristics of these states as intervening variables and considering them as complementary factors in foreign policymaking will eliminate the ambiguous areas left by current explanations. However, on the other hand, the lack of a definitive judgment regarding the identification of intervening variables constitutes the most significant deficiency in theoretical inquiry when examining these cases. Although the model proposed by Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell claims to provide a systematic framework for identifying intervening variables, it still harbors some fundamental shortcomings. While this model categorizes intervening variables into four basic concepts, it leaves them somewhat empty, as if they need further elaboration. For example, in the concept labelled as "leader images," it is not specified which decision-making elites will be examined and how the perceptions of these elites will be measured in terms of their impact on foreign policymaking. Similarly, the same can be said for domestic political institutions. Therefore, this study should present a new synthesis model that addresses the shortcomings in identifying intervening variables while benefiting from the theoretical inquiry of NCR. The existing theoretical debates and suggestions regarding intervening variables within the framework of NCR will serve as the foundational starting point for creating this model, and it will be synthesized accordingly.

⁹¹ Samet Yılmaz, "Neoklasik Realizm: İlerletici Mi? Yozlaştırıcı Mi? Lakatosyan Bir Değerlendirme," *Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 46, no. 1 (2015), p. 15.

1.3. Methodology and Structure of the Research

According to Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, research puzzles in IR studies can be classified into three types. The first type arises from entirely new problems not previously addressed in the literature, seeking answers to these novel issues. The second type aims to explain various anomalies that have emerged within topics already addressed and answered by the existing literature. The third type pertains to political situations already discussed and explained in the current literature but without anomalies. Even though these situations are explained from different perspectives, the gaps and ambiguities left by these explanations generate research puzzles that need to be solved.⁹²

As detailed in the literature review section, the broader context of state-alliance relations, and more specifically, the relations between Turkey- Hungary, and NATO, have already been examined in various studies using different perspectives. However, as noted in that section, the gaps and ambiguities left by these studies constitute within this context what Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell describe as a third-type research puzzle that needs to be solved: namely, the identification of the problematic aspects and conflicts in the relations between these two states and NATO during the tenures of the AKP and FIDESZ governments, and an understanding of their underlying causes. This study posits that the theoretical inquiry of NCR will help solve this research puzzle, arguing that apart from international politics, the domestic political characteristics of states also serve as complementary factors. While employing NCR's theoretical guidance, this research is also aware of NCR's shortcomings, particularly regarding intervening variables. Therefore, it aims to synthesize a new model to address these shortcomings and conduct a thorough theoretical inquiry. Consequently, the methodological framework to be applied during this research is

⁹² Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*, p.102.

shaped by the existing research puzzle and the soft positivist nature of NCR.

In light of all these considerations, this study adopts a qualitative methodological approach, functioning as both a theory testing and a case study. The choice of the qualitative methodological principle allows for a detailed analysis of cases involving the interaction of structural and agent-based variables and the complex, multi-layered strategic relationships of numerous actors.⁹³ Unlike quantitative approaches, which deal with large data sets and employ formal models based on numerical data, the qualitative approach facilitates understanding contextual and cultural differences within cases.⁹⁴ It enables an in-depth examination of societal and individual (state leaders) perceptions and beliefs. Consequently, this approach serves the inductive purpose of explaining the reasons behind the research findings and demonstrating the underlying causes of the observed outcomes.⁹⁵

Considering Turkey and Hungary as separate case studies is essential for understanding the situations, actors, and contextual relationships that emerged during a specific period (the AKP and FIDESZ governments).⁹⁶ The case study approach, with its capacity to delve into the details, will elucidate how the interplay between international politics and domestic political

⁹³ Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield," *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 2 (2007), p.171.

⁹⁴ Udo Kelle and Christian Erzberger, "Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Not in Opposition," in *A Companion to Qualitative Research* (London: SAGE Publications, 2004), p. 175; Uwe Flick, Ernst Von Kardorff, and Ines Steinke, "What Is Qualitative Research? An Introduction to the Field," in *A Companion to Qualitative Research* (London: SAGE Publications, 2004), p. 9.

⁹⁵ Christopher Lamont, *Research Methods in International Relations* (London: SAGE Publications, 2015), p. 94-95.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 149.

characteristics of states leads to their conflicts with NATO.⁹⁷ Additionally, examining these two cases will test the relations and variables predicted by NCR alongside the new model detailed below. That will allow for assessing NCR's theoretical propositions' practical applicability and validity.

As discussed in detail in the theory section, identifying intervening variables in the context of NCR is a contentious issue with various perspectives. It presents a critical weakness when applying theoretical inquiry to the cases of Turkey and Hungary. Therefore, the new model proposed in this study aims to synthesize these differing viewpoints into a cohesive framework. Within the scope of this synthesis, the different viewpoints on intervening variables that are already discussed in the previous chapters are categorized based on their content and implications (such as including cognitive elements, influencing the perceptions of political elites, or being directly related to the power dynamics of political elites) and grouped under conceptual frameworks.

Within the framework of NCR, the intervening variables addressed and proposed by previous researchers such as Zakaria, Christensen, Kitchen, Devlen and Özdamar should be divided into two main concepts. The first concept is ideational factors. This is because governments that play an active role in policy-making evaluate international policy signals within a cognitive structure encompassing the ideologies, thoughts, and perceptions of leaders/decision-makers.⁹⁸ The second central concept is political survival. This is due to the interactions that governments, as the primary actors in policymaking, have with other actors within the state. Governments can adjust policy

⁹⁷ Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (London: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 54.

⁹⁸ See; Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*; Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958*; Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing."

decisions and maintain a balance through these interactions.⁹⁹ In other words, it is understood that governments perform calculations within the context of acquiring and sustaining power.¹⁰⁰ Accordingly, the new model proposed in this study evaluates all intervening variables under these two fundamental concepts to bring them together and structure them in a logically elaborated form.

Under these two main concepts, all domestic factors proposed by prominent NCR scholars such as Schweller, Kitchen, Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell can be categorized based on their cognitive nature or their involvement in the relationships between domestic actors. In this regard, the intervening variables identified in the model proposed by Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell are instrumental as they encompass the majority of existing judgments in the literature under four main headings.¹⁰¹ Although these authors assess domestic factors, divided into four primary categories, within a three-stage process of foreign policy-making, these domestic factors gain a more systematic structure when considered as subcategories that fill out the two main concepts (political survival and ideational factors).

Two of the four headings, leader images, and strategic culture, are cognitive-based due to their implications. The term leader image refers to the influence of factors such as the political perceptions, beliefs, and worldviews of state leaders and decision-makers (governments).¹⁰² Similarly, strategic culture refers to a country's grand strategy shaped by historical, cultural, and

⁹⁹ See; Kitchen, "Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation"; Onea, "Putting the 'Classical' in Neoclassical Realism: Neoclassical Realist Theories and US Expansion in the Post-Cold War"; Ripsman, "Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups"; Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*.

¹⁰⁰ Devlen and Özdamar, "Neoclassical Realism and Foreign Policy Crises.", p. 176.

¹⁰¹ See; Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*.

¹⁰² Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, p. 61-66.

perceptual factors (perceptions of leaders and society).¹⁰³ These two domestic factors are part of the ideational concept in this context. The remaining two headings represent the relationships between governments and other domestic actors. These domestic actors can be further divided into society and institutions. The interactions, expressed separately as state-society and state-domestic institutions relations, fundamentally indicate the positive or negative balance between actors and the political power of governments concerning their smooth relations with these actors.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, these two factors fall within the scope of the concept of political survival.

The model proposed in this study organizes the intervening variables, or domestic factors, into four subcategories grouped under two main concepts. To conduct an analysis using these intervening variables, it is necessary to make them detailed. Accordingly, the state-society relation and domestic institutions encompassed by the political survival concept, as well as the leader image and strategic culture under the ideational concept, are expounded upon as follows:

The state-society relation refers to the interaction between the government and society within a country. This interaction focuses on the alignment or divergence between society and the government. Accordingly, it is necessary to determine the current government's public support level. To achieve this, the evaluation of public opinion polls and voting trends in general elections, in parallel with the policies implemented by the government, will make it possible to understand public support for the government.

The heading of domestic institutions focuses on the interactions and positions between governments and influential internal state institutions. The alignment or misalignment between a government and domestic institutions reflects the government's power and policy-making capacity. Detailing this

¹⁰³ Ibid, p. 66-70.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, p. 70-79.

alignment in the cases is feasible by assessing the government's strength over the parliament and the military. The number of seats a government holds in parliament, its legislative capability, the political positions and veto power of opposition parties, and the government's relationship with and control over the armed forces indicate the extent of the relationship between the government and these internal actors. Thus, it helps us understand the impact of political power of government and its survival efforts on foreign policy making. At this point, the parliament, as the primary institution for legislation and policy formulation, and the military, due to its potential political influence and direct relevance to military alliances, are the domestic institutions considered for evaluating their relationship with the government.

The impact of the leader image, which encompasses the perceptions, thoughts, and ideologies of state leaders/decision-makers, and strategic culture, which refers to the grand strategy shaped by a state's historical, cultural, and collective perceptions, on foreign policy can be analysed by evaluating the interaction between these two elements. To provide a detailed analysis of the ideational factor in these cases, the analysis is based on the power of state leaders. In this regard, the ability of the primary decision-makers, namely state leaders, to reshape the country's grand strategy according to their ideology and to implement it, will clarify the ideational factors in these cases. This approach allows for a better understanding of the impact of this concept (intervening variable) on foreign policy.

This study employs the process tracing method of analysis to operationalize this model, which renders intervening variables logical and measurable. The use of process tracing offers two significant contributions to this research. First, process tracing helps explain the transformation of a case from its inception to its outcome by examining the sequence of events and the decision-making process.¹⁰⁵ In other words, it demonstrates the

¹⁰⁵ Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, p. 64.

causal process and mechanisms intervening between independent and dependent variables.¹⁰⁶ This provides a deep perspective on the cases, incorporating all relevant details.

The second contribution of this analysis method is its ability to reveal whether the causal mechanisms proposed by the theoretical inquiry are evident in the cases. It validates the theory if the data obtained from historical documents, archives, and other sources align with the sequence and values of the causal process implied by the theory (including the roles of intervening variables).¹⁰⁷ Thus, this method not only enriches the analysis of the cases but also tests the theoretical guidelines applied in the study.

Within this framework, This study initially examines the relationship between international politics (independent variable) and the conflict areas between Turkey-NATO and Hungary-NATO (dependent variable) through process tracing. This initial section will provide a comprehensive overview of NATO's transforming strategy, fundamental principles, and objectives from its inception to 2020. The essential purpose of this section's detailed examination of NATO's historical development is to assist in acquiring findings related to disputes and identifying conflict areas in the Turkey-NATO and Hungary-NATO cases. By detailing the trajectory of the alliance as it evolved in response to international political developments, this section aims to clarify how NATO strategies' frame and core pillars emerged. Assessing whether the states in question align with these essential pillars will, in turn, highlight areas of contention between the states and the alliance.

¹⁰⁶ Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices," in *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p.6.

¹⁰⁷ Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019), p. 69.

Subsequently, the study will analyse the international political landscape from 2002 to 2020 for Turkey under the AKP administration and from 2010 to 2020 for Hungary under the FIDESZ administration. This analysis will elucidate the specific areas and underlying reasons for these two countries' divergences from NATO's strategies and objectives in the context of international political dynamics. By the end of this section, the conflict areas between the two countries and NATO will be clearly delineated.




Figure 3: Diagram of the Intervening Variables Model¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ Created by the author.

Following the completion of this section, the subsequent analysis segment will focus on the impact of **intervening variables (domestic dynamics) as complementary factors**. In line with this purpose, Turkey (2002-2020) and Hungary (2010-2020) will be examined to align with the proposed intervening model framework. To analyse the impact of political survival, the study will look at relations between state-society and state-domestic institutions during these historical periods. In this regard, examining public opinion and election results over time, alongside assessing the governments' influence over the parliament and military, will help determine whether these factors influenced the foreign policies that led to conflicts with NATO. To examine the impact of the ideational factor, the perceptions, and ideologies of Erdoğan and Orbán (under the AKP and FIDESZ governments) during the specified periods will be analysed, along with the development and transformation of the countries' grand strategies. Hence, results will reveal whether and how the leaders reshaped and implemented their countries' grand strategies according to their ideologies and whether this influenced foreign policies that led to conflicts with NATO.

Official documents and archival research are utilized as primary sources to examine the cases discussed in This study and to collect empirical data. This approach ensures that the author analyses non-commented data, free from the judgments and evaluations of secondary parties. Sources have been accessed from various archives, including NATO, the United States National Security Agency, the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, the Prime Ministry of Hungary, and the Presidential Office of the Russian Federation. These archives have been searched using digital search masks and case-specific keywords within specific timeframes. Thus, the elements obtained are included in the study, considering their basic information and interconnections. The sources include documents such as NATO summit declarations, public speeches by state leaders, official reports, foreign policy-national defence strategy documents, and official statistical records.

Another critical factor for producing successful results in this research is ensuring data triangulation. In this context, secondary sources are also employed to support data analysis obtained from primary sources. The secondary sources used in this research include academic articles, books, policy papers, international or local media articles, newspapers, and statistical data from non-governmental organizations.

The significant concerns that may arise regarding the sources used and their examination is handling data in an impartial and unbiased manner. Given that I, as the author, am from Turkey and have particularly utilized Turkish sources for the Turkey case, this necessitates an explanation regarding how objectivity has been maintained.

For both cases (Turkey and Hungary), the primary data utilized is already based on official sources (such as documents published by state bodies) and archival research, meaning that this data is raw and free from the intervention or interpretation of secondary parties. This significantly contributes to maintaining objectivity in the study and prevents the emergence of potential bias. In selecting secondary sources to support the primary data, studies conducted by various academics and institutions were utilized for both cases. In this regard, sources that are not affiliated with any specific ideological stance or institution and that have already been cited in other international academic works were employed.

To provide a specific example, in the Turkey case, while books and articles written by former Foreign Minister and former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu of the AKP government were utilized, works by Turkish journalist/researcher Cengiz Çandar, who has no ideological affinity with the AKP government and whose studies have received numerous international citations, were also used. Similarly, the newspaper articles utilized were diversified without relying on a single publication, and the data presented was subjected to cross-verification before being included in the research.

In the case of Hungary, sources in Hungarian were used after being translated, as the author does not speak Hungarian. Moreover, the data was enriched by using sources in English. Although the inability to delve the deepest points into the Hungarian literature due to the author's lack of Hungarian language proficiency may be a limitation, the collection of key sources and their use after translation, when necessary, does not affect the flow of the study or the validity of the findings and does not diminish the explanatory power of the research.

1.4. Research Questions and Hypotheses

This study originates from the conflicts and problematic areas in the relations of Turkey and Hungary with NATO during the AKP and FIDESZ governments. Considering NATO's consensus-based decision-making mechanism, the disputes of member states with the alliance are crucial for the alliance's coherence, strategy, and missions. Additionally, rifts within the alliance can influence the foreign policy strategies of states outside the alliance. In this context, uncovering the causes and nature of the conflicts between these two member countries and NATO constitutes one of the primary objectives of the research. Noting the findings of existing studies, it becomes evident that the research must go beyond the perspectives used in previous works to illuminate incomplete and ambiguous areas. To this end, the research employs the theoretical framework of NCR, which allows for an evaluation that simultaneously considers international politics and domestic factors.

Guided by NCR, this study posits that domestic factors play a role as intervening variables and should be considered complementary factors in states' foreign policies, particularly in their disagreements with NATO. Recognizing the need to address NCR's shortcomings in identifying intervening variables, the study aims to develop a logical model that integrates these domestic factors. Consequently, another objective of this research is to apply this new model to the cases at hand, thereby testing

both the model itself and the theoretical inquiries of NCR in practice.

Aligned with these objectives and the assertion that domestic factors act as complementary elements in foreign policy and disagreements with NATO, This study seeks to answer the following research questions:

Q1: In what way do political survival and ideational factors constrain and affect Turkey's and Hungary's relationship with NATO?

Q2: Is there any affiliation between the concepts of political survival and ideational factors? If yes, how? What are their relative impacts on each other?

The examination of these research questions and the corresponding answers will be tested through the following hypotheses:

H1: Both in Turkey and Hungary's respective cases regarding their NATO disputes, political survival concerns are as effective as ideational factors.

H2: There is a causal link between political survival and ideational factors. Political survival concerns affect the ideational base.

In the following sections, empirical findings related to the cases of Turkey and Hungary will be examined within a qualitative methodological approach framework. Accordingly, after identifying the areas of disagreement between NATO and the states above, the complementary impact of domestic dynamics on these areas of disagreement will be analysed under the headings of Turkey and Hungary. In the conclusion section, a comprehensive evaluation of the findings will be provided, answers to the research questions will be offered, and the validity or falsity of the proposed hypotheses will be determined. Furthermore, the contribution of the study, its limitations, and future research recommendations will also be addressed in the conclusion.

CHAPTER 2

International Political Developments and Emerging Conflict Areas in Turkey-Nato and Hungary-Nato Relations

Neoclassical realism posits that developments in international politics are fundamental and initial factors in shaping a state's foreign policy and security strategy. Although international political dynamics do not directly impose any specific policies on states, they exert pressure by presenting a limited range of policy options, compelling states to navigate their foreign and security policies within these constraints. In this context, it is imperative to prioritize an assessment of the problematic areas in Turkey and Hungary's relations with NATO, focusing on the international political situation (system level) as the predominant factor.

This section of the study focuses on the international political level, providing a general overview of Turkey and Hungary's foreign and security policies during the AKP and FIDESZ governments, respectively, and identifying the specific areas and reasons for their disagreements with NATO. It examines how developments in international politics influenced Turkey and Hungary's foreign policy-making processes and why these policies led to conflicts with NATO. In other words, this section elucidates how international political developments transformed into conflict areas with the alliance. By the end of this detailed analysis, the boundaries of the disagreements between the two states and the Euro-Atlantic alliance will be clearly delineated. The following section will explore and discuss whether, and if so, how the domestic political characteristics of these states have impacted this process. Thus, the general overview/description and identification of conflict areas presented in this section serve as a foundation for accurately understanding the cause-and-effect relationship in the research.

Within the scope of the mentioned objectives and goals, the first focus of this chapter is the evolving and transforming strategies of NATO from its inception to 2020. The rationale behind tracing and explaining this period is to facilitate an understanding of the founding philosophy of the alliance over seventy years and to identify NATO's current political-military objectives in parallel with the changing international political landscape. This ensures that the political and military strategies, which the member states of the Euro-Atlantic alliance must collectively adhere to, are clearly identified. When one or more member states act outside of these strategies and produce policies that not reliable with these objectives, it highlights the areas of conflict between the member state(s) and NATO.

This section begins outlining NATO's transforming strategies and missions by discussing the new phase initiated by the London Declaration in the context of the post-Cold War international order. It examines NATO's constructive relations with former adversaries under its expansion policy and the missions it carried out until the year 2000. Subsequently, the period from 2000 to 2020 is analyzed in detail. In this context, the increasing prominence of Russia in international politics is considered, with a detailed examination of Russia-NATO relations. Additionally, NATO's perspective on terrorism as a new security issue post-9/11 and the impact of political instability in the MENA region on NATO's strategies and missions are discussed. This comprehensive framework ultimately elucidates the fundamental pillars of the Euro-Atlantic alliance's current strategy.

After providing a general overview of NATO's transforming strategies and missions, the chapter then focuses on Turkey and Hungary under separate headings, examining the foreign policies of these countries shaped by international political developments. In this regard, the period covering the AKP administration in Turkey from 2002 to 2020 and the FIDESZ administration in Hungary from 2010 to 2020 is designated as the historical boundary. Detailing the developments in international

politics, this section clarifies the emergence of countries' foreign policy maneuvers within the context of cause-and-effect. Lastly, the discussion centers on which fundamental pillars of NATO's current strategies these emerging foreign policy moves contradict, thereby concretely identifying the areas of conflict between the two states and the alliance.

2.2. Transforming NATO: Strategies and Missions

2.2.1. End of the Cold War and New Relations with Former Adversaries (1990-2000)

The Cold War Period had divided the world into two blocs: West and East, on an ideological basis. This bipolar world system and period of confrontation between the two blocs were the first phases of NATO's strategic perspective and missions. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the beginning of the second phase of the strategies for the North Atlantic Alliance.

During the Cold War (the first phase), the primary strategy of the alliance was the defence and deterrence of the Euro-Atlantic region against the Soviets' military threats. In fact, at the beginning of the Cold War, the flexibility of the alliance's defence and deterrence strategy against to Soviets was at the minimum level. "*Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area*" (MC 14/2) and "*Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept*" (MC 48/2) documents issued by NATO in 1957 show that the alliance accepted any hostile actions from Soviets towards territories of NATO's members as not a limited conflict. In that kind of situation, all members of the alliance were made obliged to react to the enemy by using all military power, including nuclear weapons.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ NATO, "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area MC 14/2," 1957, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a570523a.pdf>; NATO, "Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept MC 48/2," 1957, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a570523b.pdf>.

After the Harmel Report in 1967, the strictness of the alliance's defence and deterrence policy shifted, and the strategy was conducted with two layers: military and politics. Thus, apart from the collective military strategy, the path of the political mission of NATO toward the Communist Bloc had opened. This political détente increased the dialogs and collaborations between the two blocs on the limitation of nuclear arms. In this regard, the predictions for the changes in the balance of nuclear power between the two sides became possible, and the bases such as Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (later, it evolved Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE) for removing the security risk and dividedness in Europe continent had been laid.¹¹⁰ In addition to increasing political relations with the Eastern Bloc, the new two layers strategy of the alliance had been influential in resolving problems among member states and consolidating the United States' military and political supremacy in the Western and Southern Europe. With two layers strategy, NATO enabled the permanent institutional relations between the United States and Europe and integrated the United States with the European states' system. Thus, the possible reasons for structural disputes among European states had been removed. The military supremacy of the United States and its commitments to the security of Europe overcame the concerns of European states (even if they had been members of the same alliance) toward each other in terms of the break down the military balance and enabled the stability. Under this stability, Europe's economic and political revival showed up.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ NATO, "The Future Tasks of the Alliance Report of the Council - 'The Harmel Report,'" 1967, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_26700.htm; NATO, "Harmel Report," 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67927.htm. (Accessed on 13 September 2022).

¹¹¹ Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "NATO'nun Dönüşümü," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 10, no. 40 (2014), p. 7-9.

The first phase of NATO's strategic perspective and missions had been formed around one enemy, which was Soviets, conventional military confrontation between two blocs, and nuclear warfare. After the Harmel Report, although it was seen that a political strategy had been developed to solve the deadlock between the two camps, this strategy was limited, and the Soviets stayed as the sole threat to the North Atlantic Alliance. During this phase, the United States' leadership role and dominance in the alliance tightened.

On the other hand, the processes that start at the beginning of the 1990s led to the downfall of NATO's main enemy and changed the international system. While the developments, such as forsaking of the Brezhnev Doctrine by Mikhail Gorbachev, his Glasnost (openness)- Perestroika (restructuring) policies, the political independence of countries in Eastern Bloc, and the demolition of the Berlin Wall announced the victory of the Euro-Atlantic Bloc against its adversary, the disappearance of the main threat based on ideological separation had led NATO's future and direction to be interrogated.

The essential question for NATO's future was about the *raison d'être* of the alliance after the Soviets' threat. At this point, the decline of a superpower (the Soviets) could have allowed the increase of the other major powers in Europe and led to the withdrawal of another superpower (the United States) from the continent. The increase in numbers of major powers and lesser powers in Europe without the threat would have made redundant staying together of the alliance's members and would have limited the days of existence of the North Atlantic Alliance.¹¹² From another aspect, it would have been said that NATO's *raison d'être* had not entirely disappeared because of the two layers structure of NATO, which combined security and politics

¹¹² John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (1990), p. 5-7; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (1993), p. 75-76.

during the last two decades of the Cold War. During the Cold War, NATO had exhibited its political success by providing unity in Western and Southern Europe apart from its security objectives. In this regard, NATO also could have served in newly shaped Europe after the bipolar system for resolving potential political disputes and integration of collective security perceptive in the continent. After achieving these objectives in five-ten years, NATO's *raison d'être* could have been questioned.¹¹³

The London Declaration of NATO in 1990 was the first official announcement of the alliance that its *raison d'être* would not have disappeared with the end of the bipolar world order. With this declaration, NATO also introduced the direction of the new term in its strategies and missions. According to the declaration, NATO underlined its new constructing role in Europe parallel with the consistent new order. Furthermore, it indicated the importance of the dialogues and presented its new friendship vision on the Central and Eastern European countries (former adversaries).¹¹⁴ The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, issued one year after the London Declaration, was the official start of the second phase of NATO's strategies and missions. Articles 7, 8, and 9 of this new concept were referring to the new security threats and challenges for the North Atlantic Alliance. According to those, instant conventional military attack risk to the NATO allies had disappeared. On the other hand, new threats were multi-directional. With the rising new political structure in Central and Eastern Europe, economic, political, and ethnic problems had emerged as potential conflict risks. Non-prevention of these risks could have led to destabilization in the continent and the propagation of these conflicts

¹¹³ Clifford A. Kupchan, Charles A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," *International Security* 16, no. 1 (1991), p. 154; Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "What Is NATO For?," *Survival* 43, no. 4 (2001), p. 111-113.

¹¹⁴ NATO, "Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance," 1990, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23693.htm.

into the allies' territories. In this context, articles 31, 32, and 33 were clarifying the alliance's new missions. According to these articles, NATO could have intervened in this risk through dialogue channels or using other instruments, including military actions. Thus, NATO also attached crisis management and peacekeeping missions to its existing defence mission. From this point, NATO's main contribution to the security of its members evolved to preserve the peaceful environment in the system using dialogue and cooperation channels firstly without applying a high level of military force.¹¹⁵

NATO's declaration of a new approach towards former adversaries and thrusting out friendship hand with the London Declaration, even if had been welcomed by Russia; at the same time, it had not entirely removed critical questions that the Russian side had on how these relations would have been conducted. In the London Declaration, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe had been pointed out by NATO for the conductions of the relations and emphasized dialogue and cooperation without referring to any subject of expansion. Nevertheless, on the other hand, Russia's concerns were about ending these new relations between NATO and former Eastern Bloc countries as an expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance. In 1991, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic's (RSFSR) delegation's visit to NATO's headquarters in Brussels and their report given to Boris Yeltsin (president of RSFSR) can be seen as important to reflect those apprehensions. During this official visit, the RSFSR delegation had remarked concerns of Russia to NATO's Secretary Manfred Wörner regarding the future direction of new relations. According to this meeting, a decrease in NATO's military effort was the key to Europe's democratization progress from Russia's perspective. The expansion of NATO with new members would have been received negatively. In return for these apprehensions,

¹¹⁵ NATO, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept (1991)," 1991, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm.

NATO's Secretary General had informed the delegation about the opposition of NATO's Council to the alliance's possible expansion towards Central and Eastern Europe.¹¹⁶ After the declaration of the 1991 New Strategic Concept of NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established in the same year by not including the expansion aim, and NATO started to carry out new constructive relations with its former adversaries under this structure.¹¹⁷

Even though Russia, under Yeltsin's presidency, had focused its democratization movements at the beginning of the 1990s, it did not want to lose its political and military influence entirely on the former Soviet space and tried to make political moves in this respect. On December 8, 1991, the Minsk Agreement, then the same month signed, the Alma Alta Protocol, were the reflection of this aim. When these agreements were announced the dissolution of the Soviet Union; on the other hand, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established with the participation of some former Soviets states.¹¹⁸ Even though the CIS announced the relations among members under the equality basis, Russia had the only one who had a legacy of leadership coming from the Soviets among the other members. In this regard, Russia was expecting the clustering of the countries of CIS around itself and aiming to preserve its

¹¹⁶ Sergey Stepashin, Konstantin Kobets, and Dmitry Volkogonov, "MEMORANDUM about Results of the Delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR's Visit to Belgium on Invitation of the NATO Headquarters," 1991, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/4390815/Document-01-Memorandum-to-Boris-Yeltsin-about.pdf>.

¹¹⁷ NATO, "North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991-1997)," 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69344.htm. (Accessed on 9 July 2022).

¹¹⁸ The Minsk Agreement was signed by three states: Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. Alma Alta Protocol was signed by participated new eight states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, addictingly to the signators of the Minsk Agreement.

political, economic, and social engagements in these countries. Especially articles 5, 6, and 7 of the Minsk Agreement, which was the establishment document of CIS by declaring the transparency of borders among CIS states, free travel of citizens, and joint defence of CIS states' borders, overlapped those aims of Russia.¹¹⁹

However, the aim of Russia to sustain its influence in the former Soviets field and the establishment of CIS within that framework were not fully supported by all parties in the Russian political sphere at the beginning of the 1990s. It is possible to mention an emerging sharp identity crisis in Russia in that period. Russian political sphere had been divided into two camps as Atlanticists (pro-Western) and Eurasianists (not pro-Western). From the perspective of Atlanticists, Russia's relations with former Soviet states by using CIS to preserve its military, social and economic influence could have hindered Russian integration into democracy. This ambition of Russia could have put forward its imperial past and damaged reforms toward Westernization. In this respect, Atlanticists had been critical and did not fully support Russia's approach toward CIS.¹²⁰ For instance, Andrei Kozyrev's, who was the first foreign minister of the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, words were a reflection of this Atlanticist perspective at the government level. According to Kozyrev, the revolution period with the dissolution of Tsarist Russia had not resulted in success. On the other hand, the dissolution of the Soviets had given another chance to Russia for a successful revolution,

¹¹⁹ The European Commission for Democracy through Law, "Agreements Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States [Done at Minsk, December 8, 1991, and Done at Alma Alta, December 21, 1991]," 1994, [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL\(1994\)054-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(1994)054-e); Hümbet Aslanov, "Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu Üyesi Devletlerin Topluluğa Farklı Yaklaşımlarının Karşılaştırılması" (Istanbul University, 2009), p. 16-17.

¹²⁰ Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (1993), p. 26-31.

and this opportunity must have been used properly. In this regard, NATO and the West must not have been accepted as adversaries. Russia must have focused only on collaboration with its new friends and its reforms toward Westernization. Russia did not have any military responsibilities outside of its borders. Russia's world policeman role had over.¹²¹

Even though there was a sharp division in the Russian political sphere, this contention between Atlanticists and Eurasianists did not last long and changed to favour Eurasianists after 1993. Two main reasons are seen for the loss of power of the Atlanticist perspective in Russia after the 1991-1993 period. The first reason is the failure of the liberal market reforms and the devastating effects of this failure on the public's life. The applied economic reforms with the assistance of international financial institutions aimed privatization of state resources within the market liberalization framework. With the suggestion of the International Monetary Fund, the floating exchange regime started to be applied. However, the privatization of the state's resources emerged as an imbalance in wealth sharing, and it created an oligarch class that quickly became rich. Moreover, the total production level in country decreased by 23 percent from 1991 to 1992. The inflation rate reached 2.500 percent in 1992, and Russian ruble depreciated radically. 1 US dollar became equal to 572 rubles in January 1993. Russian society faced a real famine crisis because of decreased food production.¹²²

The second reason for the loss of power of the Atlanticism in Russia is the signals that came from NATO about expansion to Central and Eastern Europe despite Russia's concern about it. Both expressions of Central European countries' aspirations to join NATO and the positive rapprochement of the United

¹²¹ Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia: A Chance for Survival," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 2 (1992).

¹²² Anders Aslund, "Russia's Collapse," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 5 (1999), p. 64-67; Emek Yıldırım, "Boris Yeltsin ve 1993 Anayasa Krizi," *Birikim* 23, no. 1 (2017), <https://birikimdergisi.com/guncel/8229/boris-yeltsin-ve-1993-anayasa-krizi>.

States on NATO's enlargement with Bill Clinton's government were strong signals of the North Atlantic Alliance's future enlargement policy perceived by Russia at that period. In fact, these signals perceived by Russia were correct. In 1993, with Bill Clinton's new administration, the United States had already planned NATO's expansion and possible membership dates of former Eastern Bloc states. For instance, 1993 dated *Strategy for NATO's Expansion and Transformation* report of the United States Department of State indicated the joining of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and possibly Bulgaria and Slovenia by 1998 as the first expansion of NATO towards former Soviets space. As the second phase of expansion, Romania, Albania, and the Baltics' participation by 2000 were predicted. As the third phase of the alliance's expansion, membership of Ukraine, Belarus, and even Russia by 2005 was planned.¹²³

These two main reasons' effects were negative on Yeltsin's high popularity and increased dramatically the voices of nationalists and communists (anti-Western) in Russia. The tangible reflection of the decrease in Atlanticism could clearly be seen in the 1993 elections. Public votes redesigned the majority of the parliament in favour of anti-Western political parties. Thus, Yeltsin was forced to revise the policies on the optimistic predictions toward the West and based on their economic support, with the increasing weight of anti-Western opposition. In parallel to this, Russia's foreign policy hardened towards the West, and more nationalistic, critical tones started to be used against NATO and the United States' policies. In 1996 foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev was replaced with Yevgeny Primakov, who had an anti-Western perspective. On the other hand, Russia's relations with the West were not interrupted entirely, even though there were partial changes in its policy direction.

¹²³ United States Department of State, "Strategy for NATO's Expansion and Transformation," 1993, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16374-document-02-strategy-nato-s-expansion-and>.

However, the liberal perspective became a minority in Russia's political sphere.¹²⁴

While the downtrend of Atlanticism in Russia started in 1993, the signals of the United States with Clinton's administration about the enlargement of NATO started to be put into practice by the Euro-Atlantic side. The Brussels Summit of NATO in 1994 was the essential step in NATO's enlargement policy realization. Article 11 of the Declaration of the Brussels Summit frankly indicated NATO's new relations with its former adversaries in Central and Eastern Europe on the membership basis. According to this article, NATO's relations with democratic states of Eastern Europe would have been conducted based on Article 10 of Washington Treaty of the alliance. Thereby, with NATO's open-door policy, the participation of new states in the alliance to contribute Euro-Atlantic region's collective security was opened as a path. In parallel, the launch of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was announced to accelerate the integration process of states which were in the former Soviet space into NATO's military and political bodies. With PfP, the partner states of the alliance were invited to send permanent liaison officers to NATO's headquarters for political integration and were invited to participate in joint military training and peace-keeping exercises in the field.¹²⁵

Apart from being one of the most critical steps of the NATO enlargement process toward Central and Eastern Europe, PfP was important to the penetration of NATO into Caucasian and Central Asia's military and political sphere. Countries from these regions, such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, got involved

¹²⁴ Paul Marantz, "Russian Foreign Policy During Yeltsin's Second Term," *Communist and Post Communist Studies* 30, no. 4 (1997), p. 346-350.

¹²⁵ NATO, "The Brussels Summit Declaration," 1994, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24470.htm?mode=pressrelease.

in PfP in 1994.¹²⁶ According to NATO data, in 1993, the CIS countries, covering many of the Caucasian and Central Asian former Soviets states, were supplying 20 percent of the natural gas energy of the alliance's members in West Europe. Also, according to the predictions, the gas demand of NATO members in Europe would have increased by 40 percent in a decade. Therefore, cooperation with states in these regions was vital for securing and varying the energy resources of NATO members' future.¹²⁷ In this direction, PfP came into prominence as an effort to preserve stability in Caucasia and Central Asia during the consisted power vacuum with the dissolution of the Soviets by spreading political and military cooperation.

In opposition to the developments on the Euro-Atlantic side, during the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1994, Yeltsin reflected on Russia's disapprobation of the open-door policy of NATO by saying that this enlargement policy could bring a "cold peace" in Europe.¹²⁸ However, NATO's Study on Enlargement, published in 1995, showed the alliance's stability in the continuity of the enlargement process towards the East. With this study, NATO declared the requirements for states that aspired to join the alliance. In this direction, working democracy, a liberal market system, military ability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security, and commitment to institutional structure in civil-military relations presented the

¹²⁶ NATO, "Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document," 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_82584.htm. (Accessed on 9 July 2022).

¹²⁷ NATO, "Economic Developments in Cooperation Partner Countries From a Sectoral Perspective," 1993, <https://www.nato.int/docu/colloq/1993/eco9320.txt>.

¹²⁸ Los Angeles Times, "Broader NATO May Bring 'Cold Peace,' Yeltsin Warns : Europe: Russian President Accuses U.S. of Being Power Hungry. Speech Comes as Nations Finalize Nuclear Treaty," 1994, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-12-06-mn-5629-story.html>. (Accessed on 9 July 2022).

states who aspired to join NATO.¹²⁹ The states that could fulfil these key requirements would have been part of the alliance. At this point, essential criteria of NATO, which were emphasized in this document, once again referred to the transformed mission of the alliance to spread democracy and a liberal market system in Europe besides providing members security.¹³⁰

Although Russia protested NATO's Study on Enlargement by refusing to sign the PfP agreement, finally, it signed this agreement in the same year, 1995. According to Yeltsin, the only way to minimize the negative consequences of NATO's enlargement policy for Russia after this point was to collaborate with the North Atlantic Alliance. It was an admission of reality by Yeltsin that even though Russia was totally against NATO policies toward former Soviet space, on the other hand, it did not have enough power to resist.¹³¹ The foreign policy doctrine, which was announced by the new foreign minister of Russian Federation after Kozyrev leaned on this admitted reality by Yeltsin. In 1996, Yevgeny Primakov, who was the new foreign minister of Yeltsin government, presented a new foreign policy doctrine that changed Russia's existing strategy to struggle with the United States and NATO single-handedly. According to the Primakov Doctrine, Russia would have followed policies by considering a multipolar world system instead of the unipolar one (dominance of the United States). In line with this objective, Russia would have developed its political relations with rising powers such as China, India and balanced the power of the West by collaborating with these actors. These collaborations could have increased the veto power of Russia in the

¹²⁹ NATO, "Study on NATO Enlargement," 1995, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm.

¹³⁰ Erdem Özlük and Duygu Özlük, "NATO'yu Anlamak: Dönüşümü, Yeni Kimlikleri ve Uyum Süreçleri," *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 31, no. 1 (2014), p. 217.

¹³¹ Elias Götz, "Explaining Russia's Opposition to NATO Enlargement: Strategic Imperatives, Ideas, or Domestic Politics?," in *Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security after the Cold War* (Washington DC: Johns Hopkins Press, 2019), p. 484.

international community for key issues, preserved Russia's power as a polar of the multipolar world system, and strengthened Russia's influence in the former Soviet space against NATO's expansions.¹³² In this regard, the Russian Federation's National Security Concept, which was adopted in 1997 by the signature of President Yeltsin reflected the main bases of the Primakov Doctrine. The National Security Concept emphasized the multipolar world, and Russia was indicated as a significant power in this new multipolar international order. Besides these, NATO's expansion, the weak influence of Russia on CIS states, existing economic problems in the country, and terrorism issues in the Caucasia region that affect the territorial integrity were determined as the main threats for Russia to overcome.¹³³

When Russia worked to determine new routes for its foreign policies, NATO carried out its progress in line with its new strategies and missions as it was announced. In 1995, NATO practicalized its new mission in the field (in Bosnia and Herzegovina), which aimed to preserve the security of Europe by intervening in conflicts with peacekeeping missions. After the announcement of the 1991 Strategic Concept by NATO, the United Nations (UN) had already given signals to use the alliance's military assets for UN peacekeeping operations.¹³⁴ In this direction, after 1992, NATO's support had started on the UN enforcements such as monitoring arms embargo to former Yugoslavia or implication of a no-fly zone on Bosnia and Herzegovina due to ethnic conflicts. On the other hand, after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed between Serbians and Bosnians in 1995, NATO launched its Implementation Force mission and took military responsibility completely from the

¹³² Eugene Rumer, "The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action" *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (Washington DC, 2019), p. 4-5 .

¹³³ The Russian Federation, "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation," 1997, <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/11782/page/1>.

¹³⁴ Şafak Oğuz, "The Evolution of Peace Operations and the Kosovo Mission," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 13, no. 51 (2016), p. 102.

UN in Bosnia and Herzegovina to maintain the peace agreement.¹³⁵ Thus, for the first time, NATO appeared as a fully responsible peacekeeping force in a crisis region.

Besides NATO put into practice its new peacekeeping missions in the field; in 1997, it took a significant step to realize its enlargement policy toward Central and Eastern Europe with Madrid Summit. Article 6 of the Madrid Declaration announced the beginning of accession talks between Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Also, another critical point in the declaration was the announcement of a required new strategic concept for the alliance. The changing structure of international politics and new threat types were indicated as issues that needed to be overcome by NATO with a new strategic concept.¹³⁶ With Madrid Summit, NATO also launched a distinctive Partnership with Ukraine. In this respect, the alliance emphasizes Ukraine's significant role in the security of Europe. NATO declared to endorse the democratization and independence process in Ukraine entirely.¹³⁷

By considering the revealed issue at the Madrid Summit about the necessity of a new strategic concept, NATO declared its new strategies in 1999 at its Washington Summit. The new strategic concept generally emphasized the same points which were put forward strategic concept in 1991. In this direction, NATO again touched on the importance of its new mission, which aims to intervene in political, military, and ethnic crises in Europe to prevent possible security threats. Also, it mentioned the

¹³⁵ NATO, "Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2004)," 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52122.htm. (Accessed on 19 July 2022)

¹³⁶ NATO, "Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation," 1997, <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm>.

¹³⁷ NATO, "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine," 1997, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25457.htm.

improvement of relations with partner states for collaboration. On the other hand, these new strategic concepts had two salient points. The first was the pointing out of terrorism as a new threat type. Article 24 of the new strategic concept declared that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which focuses collective defense of members, could also be implemented against terrorism threats toward member states. The second salient point was the invitation of all European states that could meet the alliance's requirements for membership. Article 39 of the new strategic concept announced the launch of a Membership Action Plan for all European states who had aspirations to join the alliance.¹³⁸ After the membership of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic in 1999, the alliance's new strategic concept officially informed that NATO's doors were open for all of Europe.

In the same year, for the second time, NATO implemented its no-Article 5- crisis management mission in Kosovo after Bosnia and Herzegovina. After 78 days of the air campaign against the Milosevic regime, NATO sent its forces to Kosovo to maintain peace and security of people based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244.¹³⁹ On the other hand, the alliance's 78-day air campaign was highly criticized by Russia. According to Russia, NATO's using military force was violation of international law. From the Russian side, there was no joint decision of the UN Security Council for Kosovo, and NATO's military actions in the field against Serbians, which were not based on the UN decision, were illegal.¹⁴⁰ However, NATO defended its military action by considering the violation of human rights and forced migration in Kosovo that were

¹³⁸ NATO, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept (1999)," 1999, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm.

¹³⁹ NATO, "NATO's Role in Kosovo," 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm. (Accessed on 19 July 2022)

¹⁴⁰ Vladimir Brovkin, "Discourse on NATO in Russia during the Kosovo War.," *Demokratizatsiya* 7, no. 4 (1999), p. 548.

accepted as crimes in the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Convention.¹⁴¹ At this point, it can be evaluated that Russian Federation's approach to the Kosovo issue was an effort to implement its foreign policy strategy announced by the Primakov Doctrine. Russia's emphasis on the joint decision of the UN Security Council overlaps with its effort to become a pole of the multipolar world and a compelling actor in international politics. On the other hand, despite Russia's opposition, NATO's actions in Kosovo shows that Russia was still not strong enough to implement its policies in the international political arena at the end of the 1990s.

The political and military developments from the London Declaration to Strategic Concept announced at the Washington Summit demonstrate that new specific strategies and missions such as positive relations with former adversaries or peacekeeping actions became NATO's indispensable components. Also, thanks to these components, NATO transformed itself and removed the appeared questions at the beginning of the 1990s about its dissolution. Contrary to the arguments that NATO had limited days and the United States' dominance on European security would have disappeared, the alliance increased its influence and capability in Central and Eastern Europe by drawing its former adversaries (Eastern Bloc states) into its side. In addition, NATO carried its sphere of influence out of Europe, such as Caucasian and Central Asia, with partnership programs. At this point, it can be said that the unsuccessful transition process of the Russian Federation after the Soviet Union and its feebleness in the international political arena as the critical factor that availed NATO's successful transformation. Another important point during this period was that the United States sustained its leadership role in the alliance. Besides preserving its leadership in Euro-Atlantic, the United States filled the power vacuum in Eurasia through NATO after

¹⁴¹ Zeynep Selin Acar, "Doktrinleşme Sürecindeki İnsani Müdahale: Nato'nun Kosova Müdahalesi ve Koruma Sorumluluğu Kavramı," *Ege Strategic Research Journal* 6, no. 1 (2015), p. 120.

the Soviets and got the advantage on the chessboard which was Zbigniew Brzezinski's allegory refers to the importance of this region for global superiority.¹⁴²

Considering the developments, I examined on during that decade, it can be said that two main indispensable components of NATO's new strategies and missions came into prominence when redesigning the alliance's political expectations from its member states. The first component was NATO's enlargement policy based on democracy and liberal market values. NATO emphasized this issue by accepting it as one of its primary missions after the Cold War. In this respect, complying with and supporting NATO's enlargement that covers all European states became an expected political behavior from the alliance's members. The second component was the intervention into crises that occurred on European soil to stabilize the continent, even if crises were unrelated to member states' territorial integrity. For this purpose, member states collaborations and active involvement in crisis management operations became another expected policy from members. In other words, these two components constituted the new primary essences of the alliance. Since this decade, NATO has given member states limited policy options based on these essences. However, the developments after 2000 also made some contributions and changes in the political expectations of the alliance from its members.

2.2.2. Fight against Terrorism after 9/11 and Reset in Relations with Putin's Russia (2000-2020)

NATO had established its strategies and missions for a new decade (after the 2000s) based on its last strategic concept declared at Washington Summit in 1999. This strategic concept presented terrorism as the new security threat type. On the

¹⁴² Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1998).

other hand, it did not reflect fighting against terrorism as one of the primary missions of the alliance.

However, on 11th September 2001, World Trade Center in the United States was targeted by hijacked airplanes, and this terrorist activity resulted in many civilian casualties. It was the deadliest terrorist activity in the United States' history on its soil.¹⁴³ Also, this offensive was directly aimed at the leader country of NATO. One day after the terrorist attack, on 12th September, the NATO council declared that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty could be invoked on the condition of the determination that the terrorist attack was directed from abroad to the United States. According to the declaration, terrorism was the security issue that NATO had to deal with, and the collective defense mission of the alliance could be activated against armed offensive from abroad through terrorism to any member state, as stated in the 1999 Strategic Concept.¹⁴⁴ In this direction, the investigation of this terrorist activity started in September and resulted on 2nd October. Frank Taylor, the US Ambassador at Large and Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism, presented that Al-Qaeda committed this attack under the leadership of Osama bin Laden. According to the investigation, Al-Qaeda and Laden were protected by the Taleban regime in Afghanistan. In this way, Article 5 was activated in October 2001 by the NATO Council for the first time in the alliance's history to fight against the Taleban regime and Al-Qaeda terrorist organization.¹⁴⁵

After the terrorist attack on 11th September, the George W. Bush administration in the United States had already legislated

¹⁴³ VOA News, "US Pauses, 21 Years Later, to Remember 9/11 Terrorist Attacks," 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-marks-21st-anniversary-of-9-11-terror-attacks-/6739972.html>. (Accessed on 11 September 2022)

¹⁴⁴ NATO, "Statement by the North Atlantic Council," 2001, <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm>.

¹⁴⁵ NATO, "Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed," 2001, <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm>.

a joint resolution that allowed the use of the US Army in Afghanistan on 18th September.¹⁴⁶ Thus, the United States launched its military actions named Operation Enduring Freedom at the beginning of October without waiting for the collective military response of NATO. When the United States started to conduct its operation, NATO launched Operation Active Endeavour in October 2001 within the frame of NATO's decision to invoke Article 5. In this respect, NATO ships started patrolling in the Mediterranean to detect possible terrorist activities. Also, Airborne Warning and Control System aircrafts were sent to help the United States' Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.¹⁴⁷ However, NATO's Operation Active Endeavour had limited characteristics and a supportive role to the United States' military actions at the beginning instead of collective combat involving all NATO allies. Because although terrorism threat was mentioned in the last strategic concept of the alliance, there were insufficiencies in determining how to operate a fight against terrorism within the framework of Article 5. Moreover, the source of this terrorist threat and combat area involved a country out of the Euro-Atlantic periphery, which was new for the alliance. Those points revealed the necessity of new arrangements in NATO's existing strategic concepts on the terrorism issue with the soonest.¹⁴⁸

In 2002, at the Prague Summit of NATO, essential steps were taken to overcome those insufficiencies of the alliance on terrorism subject after the 9/11 attack. In the summit's declaration, NATO clearly showed that the fight against terrorism was determined as one of its new missions. In this direction, article

¹⁴⁶ The United States Congress, "Public Law 107–40 Joint Resolution," 2001, <https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf>.

¹⁴⁷ NATO, "Operation Active Endeavour (2001-2016)," 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_7932.htm. (Accessed on 19 July 2022)

¹⁴⁸ Brian Collins, "Operation Enduring Freedom and the Future of NATO," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 3, no. 2 (2002): 51–56.

4 of the declaration only focused on the adjustments of NATO's military forces to respond to terrorism threats adequately. In this frame, the decision was taken to create a NATO Response Force to handle immediate threats. Also, a plan was approved to create a more efficient and deployable command structure that meets the operational requirements of the alliance's missions. For this purpose, it was decided to reduce headquarters and Combined Air Operations Centres. The establishment of two strategic commands, one operational and one functional, was planned. Besides these, the improvement of intelligence sharing and the initiation of a new NATO Missile Defence project to defend allies' territory were mentioned in the same article (4). Furthermore, article 14 of the declaration put forward NATO's mission in Afghanistan in the frame of assisting the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).¹⁴⁹ With Prague Declaration, NATO adjusted its security concept and attached the fight against terrorism officially as its new mission. Also, this declaration presented the alliance's new strategies and missions in different areas of the world which are out of the Euro-Atlantic region. In this regard, NATO indicated that it started focusing on military and political stabilization of MENA besides the Euro-Atlantic. After one year of the Prague Declaration, in 2003, NATO took the lead in ISAF operation in Afghanistan and put its new mission on MENA into practice in the field.

Apart from the fight against terrorism subject, the enlargement of the alliance and acclamation of a new period for NATO's relations with Russia were critical points in the Prague Summit. With the Prague Declaration, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were invited for accession talks. On the other hand, the alliance expressed its contentedness with the deepening relations with Russia that would be conducted on an equal basis after the NATO-Russia Council.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ NATO, "Prague Summit Declaration," 2002, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19552.htm.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

It can be said that NATO prepared for its most extensive enlargement, but also it tried to redesign its relations with Russia before this enlargement happened.

In May 2002, before the Prague Summit, NATO and Russia had already agreed on establishing the NATO-Russia Council in Rome. According to this agreement, NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, founded in 1997, was terminated and replaced with NATO-Russia Council. In this respect, the NATO and Russia relations based on the NATO+1 bilateral character were transformed into equal ones. NATO and Russia relations adjusted on an equal partner basis in the common interests. In this direction, the Council was designed to enable consultation, joint decisions, and joint action mechanisms between member states and Russia. However, the veto power for NATO decisions was not given to the Russian Federation.¹⁵¹ The policies conducted by Vladimir Putin as President of the Russian Federation by 2000 contributed to the readjustment of NATO-Russia relations in 2002 in favour of Russia. Especially after 9/11, Russia's supportive approach to the United States' actions that aimed to fight against Taleban in Afghanistan shifted the United States' standpoint positively. After the terrorist attack, Putin declared that Russia would have shared intelligence with the United States and helped the coalition forces as humanitarian and military during their missions. Russia's this approach softened the Bush administration's evaluation of Russia's military actions in Chechnia. In Canada, during the G-8 meeting in 2002, Bush expressed that he views President Putin as an important ally in fighting against terrorism.¹⁵² In this regard, it can be said that the rapprochement between the United

¹⁵¹ NATO, "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality. Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation," 2002, https://www.nato.int/nrc-website/media/59487/2002.05.28_nrc_rome_declaration.pdf.

¹⁵² Erel Tellal, "Zümrüdüanka: Rusya Federasyonu'nun Dış Politikası," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 65, no. 3 (2010), p. 216.

States and Russia at state level led to the readjustment of relations at the NATO level in 2002.

Putin implemented a centrist approach, which was the combination of Eurasianism and positive relations with the West in policies after he took over the presidency of the Russian Federation after Yeltsin in 2000. In this regard, Russia had Eurasianist aims to restore a new Russian Empire that absorbs former Soviets states such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan or revive its role as the leader of the Orthodox Christian Church. However, on the other hand, it also focused on non-confrontations with the West to avoid possible negative consequences of these on its interests before Russia increased its power. Therefore, it preferred to avoid bringing Eurasianist aims to the forefront straight off. In this respect, the non-confrontation with the West policy pursued by Russia resulted in positive relations with the United States and NATO at the beginning of the 2000s.¹⁵³

This centrist approach of Russia has been identified as the fundamental political mentality to be pursued in the National Security Concept and Foreign Policy Concept declared by the state in the year 2000. According to the Russian Federation's National Security concept in 2000, the international political situation was complex and influenced by two conflictual trends. One of these influential trends in international politics was the strengthening of many countries in economics and politics to improve the multilateral mechanism for managing the international processes based on the multipolar system. On the other hand, another trend was the creation of the West's domination under the leadership of the United States and found unilateral solutions to the important issues of world politics by using military forces. In this complex political situation, Russia had to overcome the economic, social, and terrorism issues within its territories and support the success of the multipolar trend in

¹⁵³ Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), p. 64-68.

world politics. Thus, danger towards Russia from countries who try to dominate international politics and damage the influence of Russia on Europe, Central Asia, and Caucasians could have been removed.¹⁵⁴ In this regard, Russia would have increased its positive foreign policy relations with significant powers regarding mutual interests and focused on benefiting from the multipolar character of international politics without confrontation with the West. However, Russia would have prioritized reGulating its relations with the West on the basis of equality.¹⁵⁵

While Russia implemented a balanced approach in its foreign policy behaviours at the beginning of the 2000s, it started to take political steps to simultaneously realize its aim to revive the Russian Empire based on Eurasianism. The energy field was the most crucial component in these steps to increase the state's economic and political power. In the Energy Strategy of Russia adopted in 2003, the hegemon role of the country in the global energy market was determined as the key to the future political influence of Russia in international politics.¹⁵⁶ In this direction, Putin's government completely controlled oil and gas production in the country and increased production levels. Besides this, Russia increased its control on the pipelines carrying its natural energy by various agreements with countries of geographical importance.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ The Russian Federation, "The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation," 2000, <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/14927>; Jakub M. Godzimirski, "Russian National Security Concepts 1997 and 2000: A Comparative Analysis," *European Security* 9, no. 4 (2000): 73–91.

¹⁵⁵ The Russian Federation, "The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation," 2000, <https://nuke.fas.org/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm>.

¹⁵⁶ Nina Poussenkova, "The Global Expansion of Russia's Energy Giants," *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 2 (2010), p.108.

¹⁵⁷ Randall Newnham, "Oil, Carrots, and Sticks: Russia's Energy Resources as a Foreign Policy Tool," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 2, no. 1 (2011), p. 137.

For NATO, the fight against terrorism sustained as a dominant agenda after 2002. In this regard, the Euro-Atlantic side reviewed the sustainability of positive relations with Russia favourably and did not prioritize the Russia subject until the second half of 2000s. For example, remarkably, the Iraq case in 2003 demonstrated the high level of importance that the United States, which is the driving force of the alliance, placed on focusing on counterterrorism. However, the disagreement on military intervention in Iraq among NATO allies disallowed the alliance to appear in the Iraq field for military actions.¹⁵⁸ Although coalition forces led by the United States intervened in Iraq, NATO only got involved in the Iraq War after the dissolution of Saddam Hussain's regime to establish a new order in the country. In this respect, in the 2004 Istanbul Summit, the deployment of NATO forces in Iraq for the educational purpose of the Iraq Army was decided. Besides this, the other prominent points at the summit were the enhancement of NATO forces in Afghanistan and the establishment of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative for broader cooperation in the MENA region.¹⁵⁹ With these decisions, NATO declared that the political stabilization of MENA region and the fight against terrorism would remain another essential focus of the alliance for the Euro-Atlantic region's peace and security.

In the same year, another significant development for NATO apart from the fighting against terrorism and MENA issues was the acceptance of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia as new members of the alliance after they were invited to begin accession talks in 2002. Thus, NATO successfully implemented again its strategy of expanding its alliance to encompass all European countries that embraced democracy and liberal market values, which it had established during the first decade after the end of the Cold War, with the

¹⁵⁸ Philip H. Gordon, "The Crisis in the Alliance," *Brookings*, (2003), <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-crisis-in-the-alliance/>.

¹⁵⁹ NATO, "Istanbul Summit Communiqué," 2004, <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>.

participation of these countries in the alliance in 2004. A year later, at the 2005 Brussels Summit, the alliance started to carry out a policy that strengthened the relations with Ukraine for the accession of this country to the North Atlantic Alliance. With the Orange Revolution and the election of Viktor Yushchenko as president, Ukraine had planned reform movements that would bring it closer to NATO. According to Yushchenko, *“Ukraine has made its position clear about joining the Membership Action Plan.”* In this regard, the alliance announced at the 2005 Brussels Summit that they fully supported this reform agenda aimed at Ukraine’s NATO integration and expressed their desire to see this country as part of the alliance.¹⁶⁰ After the Brussels Summit, NATO and Ukraine launched an Intensified Dialogue for the achievement of the reforms and accession of this country to the Euro-Atlantic side in the same year at a meeting in Vilnius.¹⁶¹ Another significant step taken by NATO for enlargement was the initiation of the Intensified Dialogue between the Alliance and Georgia in 2006, like the Ukraine case. In this direction, NATO declared that it would support this country’s political, economic, and military transformation for accession.¹⁶² It can be expressed that NATO mainly focused on its enlargement strategy successfully and implemented it in Europe besides its strategies and missions in MENA in the first half of the 2000s. Apart from its enlargement to the Baltic, which was a significant success for the alliance to become an influential power in former Soviets space, NATO could enhance its sphere of influence at the highest level, even in Caucasasia, by talking to Georgia about its accession process during that period.

¹⁶⁰ NATO, “Alliance Ready to Deepen Partnership with Ukraine,” 2005, <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/02-february/e0222b.htm>.

¹⁶¹ NATO, “NATO Launches ‘Intensified Dialogue’ with Ukraine,” 2005, <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/04-april/e0421b.htm>.

¹⁶² NATO, “NATO Offers Intensified Dialogue to Georgia,” 2006, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_22173.htm?selectedLocal e=en. (Accessed on 20 July 2022)

The enlargement of NATO had accepted a significant threat to Russia since the Yeltsin administration. On the other hand, the Russian Federation's political and military power was not strong enough before the 2000s to prevent the alliance's policy. However, by the mid-2000s, the Putin administration had been able to provide serious solutions to the country's core issues, such as the Chechen conflict and economic crisis, which had been dragging down Russia's power. For instance, starting from the mid-2000s, Russia had been able to expand its trade volume with European states to 200 billion euros and had been able to render European states dependent on itself in this field by pursuing its energy policy.¹⁶³ In addition to effectively utilizing its energy reserves, Russia had also advanced its investments in areas such as arms and technology, thereby modernizing its military power and creating different export items and political spheres of influence outside the energy sector.¹⁶⁴ In this regard, the response of Russia under the Putin administration to NATO's expansion and increasing influence entailed offensive political maneuvers, considering its own growing power. Russia opposed military intervention in Iraq at the UN, but despite this, following the intervention carried out by the United States, NATO began to demonstrate its presence in Iraq. While the expansion of Western influence in the Middle East unsettled Russia, particularly the accession of the Baltic countries to NATO in 2004 and the alliance's increasing influence in key countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, which are part of Russia's Eurasianist objectives, led to Putin administration used its energy monopoly as a bargaining chip against the West to block NATO's policies. In this direction, in 2006, Russia cut off Ukraine's gas supply and disrupted the flow of gas to Europe.¹⁶⁵ In the same year that Russia began using its energy leverage as

¹⁶³ Emre Erşen, "Neo-Eurasianism and Putin's 'Multipolarism' in Russian Foreign Policy," *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies* 4, no. 1 (2004), p. 147.

¹⁶⁴ A. Sait Sönmez, "Moskova'nın Kutuplaşma Çabaları: Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikası," *Avrasya Etüdleri* 37, no. 1 (2010), p. 41-42.

¹⁶⁵ Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*, p. 146-148.

a political tool against the West, energy security was discussed as an important subject for the alliance for the first time at the Riga Summit of NATO. The declaration of the Riga Summit called for member countries to diversify their energy supply, increase energy efficiency, and protect energy infrastructures.¹⁶⁶

One of the events that further escalated the confrontation between Russia and the West occurred the following year. The United States' plan to deploy a missile defense system in Central European countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic, citing security threats from Iran and North Korea, was strongly criticized by Putin. According to Putin, these moves were contrary to the partnership between Russia and NATO, and he commented on the situation as follows: *"Our partners are arming Eastern Europe with new weapons. A new base in Bulgaria, another in Romania, a missile defense system in Poland, and a radar in the Czech Republic... What are we supposed to do? We cannot just sit and watch all this happen."*¹⁶⁷ In 2007, at the Munich Security Conference, Putin continued to criticize NATO's enlargement by stating, *"I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?"* Putin also addressed the impossibility and unsustainability of a unipolar world order in today's world and emphasized that the North Atlantic Alliance extends its influence over other countries through economic, educational,

¹⁶⁶ NATO, "Riga Summit Declaration," 2006, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_37920.htm?mode=pressrelease.

¹⁶⁷ Deutsche Welle, "Putin ABD'ye Meydan Okudu," 2007, <https://amp.dw.com/tr/putin-abdye-meydan-okudu/a-2574806?fbclid=IwAR1x9LY80FyEcceK-nVEU2B78wLmcrrOmK0vgf3mNbBNVjjzPyImDNHHbba>. (Accessed on 20 July 2022)

cultural, and political means in accordance with its own interests and objectives.¹⁶⁸

Despite the strong criticisms of the Russian Federation and its' use the energy reserves as a threat, the 2008 Bucharest Summit of NATO demonstrated that the alliance would not deviate from its enlargement policy. With the Bucharest Summit Declaration, NATO invited Albania and Croatia to begin accession talks. Moreover, the decision was made to advance the process for Ukraine and Georgia to become part of the alliance and maintain relations with these states within the framework of the Membership Action Plan.¹⁶⁹ Following the declaration by NATO, the Russian Federation intervened militarily in Georgia, citing the issue in South Ossetia. In 2008, the Russian Federation's newly accepted foreign policy concept stated that all economic and political tools of the country would be used to protect Russia's interests. Additionally, the new concept placed significant emphasis on protecting the rights of Russian citizens living outside Russia's borders and ethnic communities that felt a sense of loyalty to Russia.¹⁷⁰ In this context, Putin based Russia's intervention in Georgia on the protection of the rights of pro-Russian Ossetians, as emphasized in the country's new foreign policy concept.¹⁷¹ Within this framework, it can be said that Russia, which followed a centrist policy from the beginning of the 2000s, abandoned this policy and pursued a Eurasianist line from the mid-2000s. Russia's use of hard power within another country's territory for the first time after the Cold War

¹⁶⁸ President of Russia, "Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy," 2007, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>.

¹⁶⁹ NATO, "Bucharest Summit Declaration," 2008, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm.

¹⁷⁰ The Russian Federation, "The Foreign Policy Concept of The Russian Federation," 2008, <http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116>.

¹⁷¹ Guy Faulconbridge, "Putin Criticizes U.S. over South Ossetia," Reuters, 2008, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-ossetia-usa-idUSN0850115420080811>. (Accessed on 21 July 2022)

led NATO's focus, which had turned towards the terrorism issue, to also intensify towards Russia after 2008.

In 2010, NATO revised its strategic concept at the Lisbon Summit in light of international politics and changing security environments. This new concept emphasized counterterrorism and security threats outside the Euro-Atlantic region, unlike the strategic concept, declared in 1999. According to NATO, terrorist activities beyond the Euro-Atlantic borders, extremist regimes in different regions, and political instability directly threatened the alliance's members. In this regard, NATO's direct intervention against such threats was officially announced in Lisbon within the framework of the alliance's new strategic concept. In addition to conventional warfare threats such as weapons of mass destruction, cybersecurity was also defined and accepted as a new security issue. The noteworthy point is that NATO did not undergo a radical change in its relationship with Russia in the new strategic concept. The alliance emphasized that Russia was an important partner, and NATO aimed to further develop strategic relations with this country. On the other hand, NATO announced that it would not step back on its expansion policy, which Russia criticized and saw as a security threat. The alliance revealed that its relations with Georgia and Ukraine would be maintained, considering these countries' desire to become alliance members. NATO reiterated that the open-door policy was one of the alliance's fundamental missions.¹⁷²

Following the new strategic concept announced in Lisbon, NATO conducted a military intervention against the Muammar Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011. The alliance's new strategy had identified combating extremist regimes outside the Euro-Atlantic region as a mission. Accordingly, NATO's intervention in Libya was an important step toward implementing this

¹⁷² NATO, "Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation," 2010, <https://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>.

strategy and mission on the ground. Resolution 1973, adopted by the UN Security Council in March 2011, proposed measures such as an arms embargo and establishing a no-fly zone to counter the systematic human rights violations committed by the Gaddafi regime in Libya. Based on this decision, NATO carried out tasks such as the arms embargo and establishing a no-fly zone and then launched military operations against the Gaddafi regime in March 2011.¹⁷³ NATO had previously conducted military operations outside the European-Atlantic region under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as in the case of Afghanistan. However, the military intervention in Libya marked the first instance in which NATO led a military intervention that did not invoke Article 5 and was aimed at a regime in the MENA region that did not pose a direct threat to NATO member states. In this way, the alliance demonstrated its new mission to act also outside the European-Atlantic boundaries to prevent human rights violations and maintain peace within the framework of UN resolutions.

On the other hand, in line with the decision taken at the Lisbon Summit, NATO's strengthening of the Ballistic Missile Defense system in 2012¹⁷⁴, also the continuation of the alliance's expansion policy, further disturbed the Russian Federation and increased their perception of the threat. In 2014, with the overthrow of the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich government in Ukraine, Russia decided that the balance of threat had been disturbed at their disadvantage and began a military intervention in the east of Ukraine and Crimea, annexing these regions.¹⁷⁵ The 2014 NATO Summit in Wales primarily focused on

¹⁷³ NATO, "NATO and Libya (Archived)," 2015, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_71652.htm. (Accessed on 21 July 2022)

¹⁷⁴ NATO, "Ballistic Missile Defence," 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm. (Accessed on 21 July 2022)

¹⁷⁵ Andreas M Bock, Ingo Henneberg, and Friedrich Plank, "If You Compress the Spring, It Will Snap Back Hard": The Ukrainian Crisis and the Balance of Threat Theory," *International Journal* 70, no. 1 (2015).

Russia's aggressive military moves. The summit declaration stated that Russia had violated international law and called on Russia to end its military operations. In this regard, the alliance announced that it had suspended its relationship based on the strategic partnership with the Russian Federation. This situation indicated that all civil and military partnerships between NATO and Russia had been terminated. NATO expressed its support for the sanctions imposed by member states on the Russian Federation in the military, economic, and technological domains. However, on the other hand, the alliance also declared that dialogue channels would remain open for the peaceful resolution of the current crisis in Ukraine. Thus, the alliance reduced its relations with the Russian Federation to a minimum level for the first time after the Cold War. In response to the military threat posed by Russia, NATO announced the activation of the Readiness Action Plan. In this context, the alliance decided to establish the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force to strengthen its Response Force. Additionally, the capabilities of NATO forces stationed in Poland would also be increased. Besides plans to strengthen its eastern flank, NATO decided to increase the military defense spending of all member countries in the frame of conventional warfare threat. Accordingly, member countries would spend a minimum of 2% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on military defense. At least 20% of the budget allocated for military defense would be used for major military equipment by member states.¹⁷⁶ Within the framework of the decisions announced at the Wales Summit, it can be seen that the alliance focused on a conventional war threat for the first time after the Cold War. With this summit, the Russian Federation has once again become a military threat to NATO after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Another critical subject emphasized at the Wales Summit, aside from the Russian issue, was the civil war that began in Syria in

¹⁷⁶ NATO, "Wales Summit Declaration," 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.

late 2011 and the security threat it posed. The alliance declared the Bashar al-Assad regime as a threat to peace and security in the Middle East based on the human rights violations committed by the regime. Furthermore, the alliance identified the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which emerged after the civil war and became active in the Syria-Iraq region, as a terrorist organization that the alliance needed to struggle in the frame of the fighting against terrorism strategy.¹⁷⁷

In 2016, NATO's summit in Warsaw also focused on Russia and terrorism issues. The summit declaration emphasized that NATO, similar to the declarations made at the Wales Summit, highlighted that political dialogue channels with Russia remain open. Additionally, the alliance reported successfully implementing the Readiness Action Plan initiated two years ago. It was announced that the military forces and activities in NATO's eastern flank would be further strengthened in the face of the Russian threat. Besides the Russia subject, after terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS in the territories of NATO's European allies, the alliance officially announced in the Warsaw Declaration its active involvement in countering ISIS within the framework of the counterterrorism strategy. The Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, which has been participated by all NATO allies and partners since 2014, was already on duty. NATO was to send Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft to support the operations of this coalition and to provide assistance to the training of Iraqi forces.¹⁷⁸ A year later, NATO expanded its decisions on counterterrorism announced at the Warsaw Summit. Within this framework, the alliance decided to establish the Hub for the South in Naples, Italy, aiming to enhance the detection and combat capabilities against terrorism threats from the alliance's southern flank. Additionally, the military

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ NATO, "Warsaw Summit Communiqué," 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.

support given to the Global Coalition in its fight against ISIS was increased in the same year.¹⁷⁹

The Brussels Declaration announced by NATO in 2018 remarkably indicated that the danger posed by the Russian Federation had gone beyond the military dimension. Russia not only threatened the security of the Euro-Atlantic region militarily but also used hybrid methods. For instance, interference in election processes in some countries, spreading misinformation, and cyber-attacks were the hybrid methods used by the Russian Federation. The alliance countries also had to be ready to combat these hybrid threats. Another significant issue in the declaration was the migration problem resulting from instability and terrorist activities in the MENA region. NATO announced for the first time that the migration issue stemming from the MENA region was a threat to alliance members.¹⁸⁰ In a similar vein, NATO's 2019 declaration in London, marking its 70th anniversary, indicated that the alliance was surrounded by many threats, led by Russia and terrorism issues. The threats took on a hybrid form with the changing international political environment. The most notable point in this declaration was that China was mentioned for the first time in an alliance declaration. It was reflected that the increasing influence of China in international politics created both opportunities and various challenges for the NATO.¹⁸¹

As can be observed, the changes in international politics and the political and military developments that have occurred in this context after the year 2000 have led to the emergence and effectiveness of two important components in the transformation of NATO's strategy and missions. These components

¹⁷⁹ NATO, "Countering Terrorism," 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm. (Accessed on 21 July 2022)

¹⁸⁰ NATO, "Brussels Summit Declaration," 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm.

¹⁸¹ NATO, "London Declaration," 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm.

are the fight against terrorism and the threat posed by the Russian Federation toward the Euro-Atlantic region.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the two main pillars that constituted the transformation of NATO's strategy and missions, namely NATO's enlargement and crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic region, remained the essential characteristics of the alliance after 2000. On the other hand, the process that began after the September 11 terrorist attacks turned the fight against terrorism into another central pillar for NATO. Notably, NATO's concept of countering terrorism has been focused on terrorist organizations linked to Islamic fundamentalism. In this regard, the stability of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region outside the Euro-Atlantic region has become an important issue for the alliance. In other words, while the fight against terrorism has become a separate central pillar for the alliance after 2000, crisis management which was one of the central pillars, has expanded to include the areas beyond the Euro-Atlantic borders.

From the mid-2000s, the policy based on Eurasianism pursued by the Russian Federation must also be considered another central pillar that changes NATO's strategies. However, an important point regarding the Russian issue is that this matter does not rely solely on a conventional military threat but also involves a hybrid structure such as energy security, economy, and technology. The tension in relations with Russia since the mid-2000s has transformed into inclusive of a conventional military threat with Russia's annexation of Ukraine in 2014. As of that year, for NATO, Russia has become a threatening country where relations have been minimized and a problem that must be resolved decisively for the security of the Euro-Atlantic region.

As a result of all these developments, it is possible to base NATO's transforming strategies and missions on four main pillars. The alliance's main framework is formed by collective deterrence and defence, which has remained constant since its establishment and is constituted by Article 5 of the Washington

Treaty. The four central pillars that support this overarching framework are as follows.

- Enlargement of the alliance to include all European states that accept its democratic values and meet the necessary criteria.
- Crisis management covers not only the Euro-Atlantic region but also the MENA region. To achieve stabilization by intervening in military or political crises in these regions.
- Fight against terrorism (combating all terrorist activities that could threaten member states by mainly focusing on Islamic extremist terrorist organizations).
- A collective political and military stance aimed at overcoming Russia's behaviours that includes various components such as military, economic, and energy security, which endangers the security of the Euro-Atlantic region.




Figure 4: NATO's Transforming Strategies and Missions¹⁸²

¹⁸² Created by the author.

The main pillars forming the alliance's transforming strategy and missions also reflect the NATO's political expectations from its member states. In other words, the alliance restricts member states' foreign policy and security strategies within these fundamental components and offers limited policy options to its members. In this context, the policies of Turkey and Hungary that diverge from the central pillars mentioned above constitute problematic areas in their relations with NATO during the AKP and FIDESZ administrations.

2.3. Turkey-NATO Relations During the AKP Government: Emergence of Conflict Areas in the Context of International Political Developments (2002–2020)

The AKP period from 2002 to 2020 encompasses an eighteen-year process of Turkey-NATO relations, but Turkey's ties with the North Atlantic Alliance date back to the establishment of NATO in 1949. Therefore, the AKP government inherited a longstanding network of relations between Turkey and the alliance when it came to power in 2002. In this context, it is necessary to briefly touch upon the relationship between Turkey and NATO before the AKP administration.

The Soviet Union's policies towards Turkey following the end of World War II in 1945 constituted the main reason for Turkey's efforts to become a part of NATO. In this frame, the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, which came into effect in 1925, being attempted to be abolished by the Soviets starting from 1945, is an important point. The Soviets pointed to the changing international political landscape with World War II and expressed their desire to make various revisions to that treaty by giving a diplomatic note to Turkey. These revisions included surrendering cities belonging to Turkey, such as Ardahan and Kars, to the Soviets and the establishment of Soviet military bases in the Turkish Straits by going

beyond the Montreux Convention.¹⁸³¹⁸⁴ Although the Turkish government rejected this demand by the Soviets at the time, the Soviets gave Turkey another diplomatic note in 1946. This diplomatic note also addressed the Turkish Straits issue, with demands contrary to the Montreux Convention, such as the opening of the Straits to Soviet military ships and the control of the Straits by Russia and Turkey. When this proposal was rejected, the Soviet Union began to build up military forces targeting Turkey in Bulgaria and the Caucasus. In response to this rising threat, the Turkish government pursued a policy of further integration with the West.¹⁸⁵ The path to Turkey's NATO membership is a yield of the successful implementation of this integration policy.

On the other hand, Turkey's geostrategic importance during a potential conventional war with the Soviet Union has always been significant for the Euro-Atlantic community. In this context, the construction of military bases in Turkey to be used by NATO began with the support of the United States in 1950. Turkey's application for NATO membership in 1950 was approved by the alliance in 1952, and Turkey was formally included in the Euro-Atlantic trajectory.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³ The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits is a treaty signed on July 20, 1936, in Montreux, Switzerland, which regulates the passage of commercial and military vessels through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, collectively known as the Turkish Straits. The treaty grants Turkey control over the straits and allows Turkish authorities to close them to foreign warships in times of war or political tension. It also sets limits on the size and number of warships that can pass through the straits, based on their tonnage and the number of guns they carry.

¹⁸⁴ Mehtap Başarır, "The Reflections of The Notes Given to Turkey by Soviet Russia, for Dissolution of '1925 Nonaggression and Neutrality Treaty' in Turkish Press," *Belgi Dergisi* 2, no. 18 (2019), p. 1420-21.

¹⁸⁵ Çağatay Benhür, "Stalin Dönemi Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri," *Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi* 15, no. 1 (2004), p. 333-34.

¹⁸⁶ Selin M Bölme, "Soğuk Savaş'ta NATO-ABD-Türkiye Üçgeninde Askeri Üsler: Süreklilik Ve Değişim," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 9, no. 34 (2012), p. 56-57.

After this membership, the political disagreement over the Cyprus issue in 1964 created the first significant problem between the alliance and Turkey. Turkey, as one of the guarantor countries on the island of Cyprus, attempted to intervene militarily by referring to the conflicts between Turks and Greeks on the island, but this was prevented by the United States and led to a deep political disagreement. In 1964, US President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a letter to the Turkish government, stating that if Turkey were to intervene militarily on the island, its relations with the Euro-Atlantic community would be reconsidered. The letter also clearly stated that NATO would not provide support in the condition of military tension between Turkey and the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁷ In this respect, the decision of Turkey to intervene in Cyprus was suspended for a while, but military operation towards Cyprus launched in 1974 resulted in damaged relations between Turkey and NATO at that time. While Turkey's deployment of troops in Cyprus received great criticism from NATO countries, the United States began to impose an arms embargo on Turkey and cut off the financial aid provided to the country. In response, Turkey suspended various military collaborations with NATO. However, in 1978, the embargoes and restrictions were lifted by the US government, and the problematic area in Turkey-NATO relations was resolved before it deepened any further.¹⁸⁸

Except for the problematic area of the Cyprus dispute, there has not been a noticeable negative trend in Turkey-NATO relations during the period prior to the AKP era. It can be said that Turkey acted in parallel with NATO's transforming strategies and missions following the end of the Cold War. In this direction, Turkey has supported NATO's enlargement policy.

¹⁸⁷ Mustafa Özalp, "Fayda ve Zararlar: Çıkmakla Kalmak Arasında Türkiye-NATO İlişkileri," *Bilecik Şeyh Edebali Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 3, no. 2 (2018), p. 417.

¹⁸⁸ Gökhan Eşel, "DARBELER ARASINDA (1960 - 1980) TÜRKİYE – NATO İLİŞKİLERİ," *The Journal of Academic Social Science Studies* 56, no. 1 (2017), p. 414.

Turkish military units have participated in NATO's peacekeeping program in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Turkish soldiers have been seen on duty in the field as part of NATO's presence in Kosovo. Furthermore, following the terrorist attack on the United States in 2001, Turkey supported the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and assumed leadership of the second phase of ISAF's operations on the field with a contingent of its 1300 military personnel as per NATO's mandate.¹⁸⁹

While seen to act within the transforming strategies and missions of NATO, Turkey became part of the Iraq crisis within the alliance in 2003, a few months after the AKP government took office. This crisis did not create a problematic area in the overall relationship between Turkey and NATO, but it negatively affected the relations between Turkey and the leading state of NATO, the US. At this point, the prominent issue is that the AKP government tried not to display a policy of opposition to the US during the crisis. Instead of taking an opposing stance, it is observed that the AKP administration supported the US military intervention plan in Iraq and avoided potential problematic areas in its foreign and security policies.

After the 9/11 attacks, the US approach of military intervention in Iraq under the "fight against terrorism" strategy did not receive support from all NATO countries and triggered a crisis within the alliance. As a result of this crisis, the decision by the US to conduct a military intervention in Iraq with the coalition forces made Turkey's geographic location significant. In this regard, the Bush administration planned to use Turkish territory during the military intervention in the north of Iraq region. Additionally, another desired aspect by the US was the active participation of Turkish soldiers in the military operation against Saddam regime. In exchange for Turkey's support for this military operation, the US pledged to provide military and

¹⁸⁹ Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "NATO Genel Bilgi Notu," 2021, p. 8, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/nato-bilgi--notu.pdf>.

economic assistance to Turkey and declared its full support for Turkey's membership in the European Union.¹⁹⁰

The positive reception of the US plans for Iraq by Erdoğan and the majority of the AKP government was reflected in the resolution submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly by the AKP government. According to this resolution, Turkish soldiers would be deployed in Iraq, and Turkey's territory would be made available for use by US military forces.¹⁹¹ However, on March 1, 2003, the resolution was rejected in parliament after debates and voting. Despite 264 votes in favour of the resolution, all opposition parties and some AKP deputies took an opposing stance, with 250 votes against its approval. As a result of failing to achieve the required majority, the resolution did not pass, and the coalition forces were not permitted to use Turkish territory.¹⁹² On March 19, 2003, the AKP government submitted a renewed resolution to the parliament. This resolution did not include using Turkish territory by coalition forces but only allowed for the opening of Turkish airspace to coalition aircraft. Additionally, Turkish soldiers would be deployed in northern Iraq but would not engage in active combat.¹⁹³ Although the parliament passed this second resolution, it led to a significant revision of the US military intervention plans for Iraq, causing disappointment for the US towards

¹⁹⁰ George W. Bush, *Decision Points* (New York: Crown, 2010), p.154.

¹⁹¹ Grand National Assembly of Turkey, "Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanakları 24. Dönem 3. Yasama Yılı 73. Birleşim 05/Mart /2013 Salı," 2013, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=21904&P5=H&page1=53&page2=53.

¹⁹² Habertürk, "1 Mart Tezkeresi'nin Tutanakları Açıklanacak Mı?," 2013, <https://www.haberturk.com/polemik/haber/819489-1-mart-tezkeresinin-tutanaklari-aciklanacak-mi>. (Accessed on 25 July 2022)

¹⁹³ Grand National Assembly of Turkey, "TÜRK SİLAHLI KUVVETLERİNİN KUZZEY IRAK'A GÖNDERİLMESİNE; BU KUVVETLERİN GEREKTİĞİNDE BELİRLENECEK ESASLAR DAİRESİNDE... KARAR," 2003, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tbmm_kararlari/karar763.html.

its NATO ally Turkey.¹⁹⁴ As a result, Turkey took a position among the countries within NATO that did not have a fully supportive attitude towards the military operation in Iraq.

Despite the process that unfolded, it can be argued in the frame of drafting and acceptance of the second resolution after the rejection of the first one that the AKP government made efforts not to arrange Turkey's foreign policy and security strategies in opposition to the United States. The lack of complete unity within the party on this matter, despite the positive views of the AKP government's top management and Erdoğan, can be considered as the root cause of the crisis between Turkey and the US over the Iraq issue.

Except for the Iraq crisis with a NATO ally (the US), the AKP government has made efforts to conduct the country's foreign and security policies in a manner compatible with the Euro-Atlantic, particularly until the mid-2010s. In this context, AKP policies were oriented towards the West, pursuing further integration and seeking to eradicate historically problematic areas that had arisen in Turkey's policies. For instance, the AKP government pursued a foreign policy that supported UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's peace plan to resolve the problem in Cyprus.¹⁹⁵ Similarly, the initiation of a new process with Armenia in 2008 and the signing of the Zurich Protocols to resolve political crises between the two states were also within this framework.¹⁹⁶

Besides policies based on further integration with the West, AKP's policies also aimed to increase Turkey's influence in the MENA region, where the former territories of the Ottoman

¹⁹⁴ Bush, *Decision Points*, 154.

¹⁹⁵ VOA News, "Erdoğan: 'Kıbrıs Konusunda Referandum'a Hazırız,'" 2004, <https://www.voaturkce.com/a/a-17-a-2004-01-24-10-1-87939227/821449.html>. (Accessed on 25 July 2022)

¹⁹⁶ Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Türkiye - Ermenistan Siyasi İlişkileri," 2022, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-ermenistan-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>.

Empire are located. A plan was pursued to make Turkey a regional dominant actor by establishing positive relations with the states in these regions.¹⁹⁷ For example, the dialogue initiated between Ankara and Damascus in 2008 to improve the long-standing, problematic relationship between Turkey and Syria, mainly because of the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK) terrorism issue, can be evaluated within the framework of these policies.¹⁹⁸ Similarly, the political dialogue initiated with the Gaddafi regime in Libya during the same period was also within this framework. Erdoğan's visit to Libya in 2009 was the first official visit by a Turkish Prime Minister to Libya in approximately after 15 years.¹⁹⁹ It can be said that the AKP government's foreign policy was two-layered until the mid-2010s, aiming both for integration with the West and for Turkey to become a regional power in the MENA region through initiatives.

Although this dual-layered policy overall aimed to resolve existing problematic areas and create positive relations with other countries, the MENA pillar of that policy also led to significant crises in Turkey's foreign policies and security strategies on the one hand. In this respect, the political crisis between Turkey and Israel, which began with a focus on the Palestine issue in 2009 and peaked with the "Mavi Marmara" incident in 2010, was one of the negative reflections of Turkey's steps to expand its sphere of influence in the Middle East.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁷ Karabekir Akkoyunlu, "The Five Phases of Turkey's Foreign Policy under the AKP," *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 88, no. 2 (2021), p. 247-250.

¹⁹⁸ Hürriyet, "Başbakan Erdoğan, Suriye'ye Gitti," 2008, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/basbakan-Erdoğan-suriyeye-gitti-8792220>. (Accessed on 25 July 2022)

¹⁹⁹ Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Türkiye - Libya Siyasi İlişkileri," 2022, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-libya-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>.

²⁰⁰ Bayram Sinkaya, "Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Politikası ve Batı Etkisi," *Adam Academy Journal of Social Sciences* 1, no. 1 (2011), p. 94.

The disagreement that emerged between NATO and Turkey regarding military intervention in Libya in 2011 can also be evaluated as a negative reflection of Turkey's MENA policy. However, this disagreement was resolved without creating a problematic area in the relationship between the alliance and Turkey. In this issue, the main source of the disagreement was Turkey's confrontational approach to NATO's leadership in military intervention against the Gaddafi regime and Turkey's announcement that it would veto such intervention. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoğlu, announced that Turkey favoured a non-violent resolution of the events in Libya. In this context, while supporting NATO operations to calm the conflicts in Libya, such as establishing a no-fly zone, Turkey opposed military intervention against the regime.²⁰¹ On the other hand, the legitimacy gained by NATO's military intervention, especially in the context of the United Nations Resolution 1973, led to a change in Turkey's veto decision. From this point on, the internationalization of the crisis and the perception that Turkey's influence in Libya would be limited as a regional actor alone prompted the AKP government to act in parallel with NATO.²⁰² In this direction, the statements of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Erdoğan, regarding NATO's operation in Libya overlapped with that situation. According to Erdoğan, only a military-focused solution was not possible in Libya. However, even though Turkey did not favour military intervention, it would not oppose a NATO operation carried out following the United Nations' decision and would fulfil its responsibilities

²⁰¹ Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Sayın Bakanımızın Libya Konusundaki Açıklaması, 21 Mart 2011, Ankara," 2011, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-libya-konusundaki-aciklamasi_-21-mart-2011_-ankara.tr.mfa.

²⁰² Jonathan Head, "Libya: Turkey's Troubles with Nato and No-Fly Zone," *BBC*, 2011, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12864742>.

within the mission of the alliance.²⁰³ The disagreement between Turkey and NATO regarding Libya was resolved; however, this disagreement demonstrated that the AKP government's MENA-focused policy could contradict NATO's transforming strategies and missions. The problematic area where this contradiction turned into a crisis was the Syrian civil war.

The policy pursued by the AKP government in response to the civil uprisings against the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria in 2011 was parallel to its approach to the crisis in Libya. Turkey sought to intervene in this crisis as a dominant actor in the context of its regional power ambitions. To this end, Prime Minister Erdoğan emphasized, at the outset of the uprising in 2011, that the Syrian issue was not a foreign problem for Turkey but an internal matter. According to Erdoğan, both the 850-kilometer land border with Syria and the historical-cultural ties made the situation in Syria too essential to be ignored by Turkey. Therefore, Turkey had to intervene in response to the potential negative impacts of the uprisings in Syria.²⁰⁴ In this policy framework, Turkey initially approached the crisis in Syria through soft power, attempting to persuade the Assad regime to undertake democratic reforms. The Turkish foreign ministry engaged in talks with the Damascus with this purpose.²⁰⁵ However, these diplomatic efforts proved to be unsuccessful.

²⁰³ Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Sayın Başbakanımızın Libya'ya İlişkin Olarak Yaptıkları Açıklama, 3 Mayıs 2011, İstanbul," 2011, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-basbakanimizin-libya_ya-iliskin-olarak-yaptiklari-aciklama_-3-mayis-2011.tr.mfa.

²⁰⁴ Can Izbul, "Erdoğan: 'Suriye İç Meselemiz, Gereğini Yapmak Durumundayız,'" *VOA*, 2011, <https://www.voaturkce.com/a/Erdoğan-suriye-ic-meselemiz-geregini-yapmak-durumundayiz-127078293/898713.html>.

²⁰⁵ Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun Bahreyn, Katar ve Suriye'deki Temaslarına İlişkin Yaptığı Basın Toplantısı, 6 Nisan 2011, Şam," 2011, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu_nun-bahreyn_-katar-ve-suriye_deki-temaslarina-iliskin-yaptigi-basin-toplantisi_-6-nisan-2.tr.mfa.

Besides this, the Assad regime's downing of a Turkish military aircraft in 2012 caused a breakdown in relations between the two sides. Turkey called for an urgent NATO meeting by pointing out that a Turkish warplane was shot down and attacks were made on Turkish territories within the Syrian border. In this context, the alliance issued a joint solidarity decision under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, and NATO-owned Patriot air defense systems were deployed on Turkish soil to prevent attacks against Turkey.²⁰⁶

As a result of the developments, Turkey declared that the regime in Syria had become a threat to both Turkey and the region. The overthrow of the Assad regime was emphasized as a necessity for ensuring stability in the region.²⁰⁷ Although Turkey's MENA policy primarily aims to expand Turkey's sphere of influence within the framework of soft power, it is seen that Turkey revised this policy against the Assad regime in Syria. Within this revision, the Free Syrian Army, which fights against the regime, began to be supported by Turkey.²⁰⁸ Another notable point is that the United States, which criticizes the Assad regime in Syria and considers it a regional threat, had a position parallel to Turkey. In 2013, the US officially began providing military aid to the Free Syrian Army and gave solid support for the fight against Damascus.²⁰⁹ On the other hand, starting in 2014, the fight against ISIS in Syria became a crucial issue for

²⁰⁶ Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "NATO Genel Bilgi Notu.", p. 7.

²⁰⁷ Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun TBMM Genel Kurulu'nda Suriye'deki Olaylar Hakkında Yaptığı Konuşma, 26 Nisan 2012," 2012, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu_nun-tbmm-genel-kurulu_nda-suriye_deki-olaylar-hakkinda-yaptigi-konusma_-26-nisan-2012.tr.mfa.

²⁰⁸ Francesc D'Alema, "The Evolution of Turkey's Syria Policy," *Istituto Affari Internazionali*, 2017, p. 7.

²⁰⁹ Josh Rogin, "U.S. Delivers First Aid Shipment to Free Syrian Army," *Foreign Policy*, 2013, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/01/u-s-delivers-first-aid-shipment-to-free-syrian-army/>.

the members of the North Atlantic Alliance, especially for the United States. In this direction, the divergence in adopted policies in the fight against ISIS context led to the emergence of problematic areas in the relations between Turkey and NATO.

In 2014, when ISIS advanced and gained control over a large area in Syria and Iraq, the US withdrew its support to the Free Syrian Army and decided to support Kurdish groups in the region against ISIS. These Kurdish groups were Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD) and its armed wing, Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG), which Turkey accepts as terrorist organizations. The supports provided to these armed groups strongly criticized by Turkish government. The main emphasis of the criticisms was that the PYD/YPG is linked to the separatist Kurdish terrorist organization PKK and that Turkey's NATO ally, which is the United States, must not distinguish between ISIS and PYD/YPG in the fight against terrorism.²¹⁰ In this context, the AKP government took some actions to prove that it sees only the PYD/YPG as being linked to terrorism, not all Kurds in the region. For example, the Kurdish armed forces (Peshmerga) affiliated with the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq were allowed to pass through Turkish territory to participate in the fight against ISIS in the city of Ayn el-Arab/Kobani in Syria.²¹¹ Furthermore, to demonstrate its willingness to fight against ISIS, the AKP government also allowed the Incirlik military airbase in Adana to be used by anti-ISIS coalition aircraft.²¹² However, on the other hand, statements

²¹⁰ BBC NEWS TÜRKÇE, "Erdoğan: 'PYD'ye Silah Göndermeye 'evet' Diyemeyiz," 2014, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/10/141019_Erdoğan_pyd. (Accessed on 28 July 2022)

²¹¹ The Guardian, "Turkey to Allow Kurdish Peshmerga across Its Territory to Fight in Kobani," 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/20/turkey-allows-peshmerga-forces-to-travel-to-kobani>. (Accessed on 28 July 2022)

²¹² Merve Aydoğan, "Turkey Gives US-Led Coalition Access to Incirlik Air Base in Fight against ISIS," *Daily Sabah*, 2015,

from the US State Department indicated that the PYD/YPG would not consider a terrorist organization, and military support for these armed groups would continue in the context of the fight against ISIS. In addition to the US, other NATO member states had shared views on supporting PYD/YPG on the ground.²¹³

In 2015, the decision of the US, and Germany to withdraw the Patriot air defense systems, which were sent to Turkey under NATO's resolution, was significant to deepen the problem in the fight against ISIS between Turkey and the alliance. While technical problems were shown by these countries as the reason for withdrawing the air defense systems, Turkish side had opinion that the disagreements between Turkey and member states regarding the PYD/YPG and the fight against ISIS issues were influential on that decision.²¹⁴ As Turkey experienced a crisis with its NATO allies regarding the fight against ISIS, on the other hand, its plans to topple the Assad regime in Syria were also hindered by the technical, military, and political support provided by Russia and Iran to the regime in Damascus. In particular, Russia's presence in Syria since 2015 and its support for the Assad regime is the main point that put the AKP government in a deadlock regarding its Syria policy.²¹⁵ In the same year, Turkey's downing of a Russian warplane on the Syrian border (on the grounds of violating Turkish airspace) threw Turkey-Russia relations, which were progressing in a balanced manner based on trade and energy, into a major crisis. In

<https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2015/07/23/turkey-gives-us-led-coalition-access-to-incirlik-air-base-in-fight-against-isis>.

²¹³ BBC NEWS TÜRKÇE, "YPG: Yerel Bir Örgütten, NATO Ülkelerinin Desteklediği Bir Güce Nasıl Dönüştü?," 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-50180068>. (Accessed on 28 July 2022)

²¹⁴ Yeni Şafak, "Cılız Savunma," 2015, <https://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/ciliz-savunma-2229774>. (Accessed on 28 July 2022)

²¹⁵ Anton Lavrov, "Russia in Syria: A Military Analysis," *ISSUE, Chaillot Paper* 148 (2018), p, 52-55.

addition, a series of terrorist attacks that began in 2015 and continued until the end of 2016, mainly as suicide bombings in different cities of Turkey, arose a major security crisis that Turkey faced during this period. These attacks were carried out by ISIS and PKK militants who were related to Syria.²¹⁶

It can be observed that the AKP government changed again its policies towards Syria in 2016 by indicating the security problems Turkey has faced. In this context, the first move was the initiation of diplomatic contacts to improve the strained relations with the Russian Federation, which the aircraft crisis had damaged. Because the crisis in Turkey's relations with the Russian Federation reduced Turkey's potential for making a military move in the region to a minimum level, apart from its adverse effects in terms of the economic, such as damage to agricultural product imports or tourism. In this regard, the normalization of political relations with the Kremlin was considered by the AKP government both in terms of its economic benefits and its potential to help resolve the political impasse that Turkey faced in Syria.²¹⁷

With the normalization of relations between Turkey and the Russian Federation, the AKP government which gained the opportunity to make a military move in Syria, demonstrated the second component of change in its Syria policy with the Turkish Army's military operation named Euphrates Shield in 2016. With this military intervention, Turkish Army declared its goal was to eliminate the security problems caused by terrorist elements PYD/YPG and ISIS in northern Syria.²¹⁸ After this initial operation, Turkish Army also carried out the Olive Branch

²¹⁶ Murat Yeşiltaş, "6 Soruda Ankara'daki Terör Saldırısı," *SETA*, 2016, <https://www.setav.org/6-soruda-ankaradaki-teror-saldirisi/>.

²¹⁷ Emre Erşen, "Suriye Sorunu Gölgesinde Türkiye-Rusya İlişkilerinde Normalleşme Süreci," *Marmara Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi* 3, no. 2 (2016), p. 161-162.

²¹⁸ Turkish Land Force Command, "Fırat Kalkanı Harekâtı," accessed July 29, 2022, <https://www.kkk.tsk.tr/firat-kalkani.aspx>. (Accessed on 29 July 2022)

operation in 2018, targeting the Afrin region of Syria, and the Peace Spring operation in 2019 in northern Syria, both based on the same justifications. On the other hand, the perception that Turkey's military operations against the PYD/YPG pose an obstacle to the fight against ISIS, became the prevailing view within NATO. Accordingly, many alliance member countries began to impose arms embargoes on Turkey within the context of these operations.²¹⁹ At this point, it can be said that the disagreements between Turkey and NATO regarding the fight against ISIS became a practically problematic area in the relations due to Turkey's use of its military force in Syria.

As the issue of counterterrorism became a problematic area in the relations between Turkey and NATO, Turkey's political approach towards the Russian Federation, in the context of its Syria policy, created another problematic area. Since 2016, implemented Turkey's foreign policy has not only normalized its relations with the Russian Federation but also has led to the development of political, energy, economic, and military partnerships between the two countries. For example, the peace agreement signed in December 2016 in Syria under the guarantee of Turkey and Russia, and the subsequent launched Astana peace process, reflected a developing political partnership.²²⁰ Besides this, the signing of the TurkStream natural gas pipeline project by two sides and Russia's construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in Turkey were prominent partnerships in the energy sector.²²¹ In 2017, Turkey's decision to purchase S-400 air defense systems from the Russian Federation meant a new cooperation area between these two states. However, on

²¹⁹ Aykan Erdemir and Ryan Brobst, "Engines of Influence: Turkey's Defense Industry Under Erdoğan," *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*, 2022, p. 1-20.

²²⁰ Zehra Ayvaz, "Astana ve Soçi Süreçlerinin Türk-Rus İlişkilerine Etkileri," *Diplomasi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 2, no. 2 (2020), p.56.

²²¹ Presidency of Republic of Türkiye, "Türk Akımı Doğal Gaz Boru Hattı Projesi Anlaşması İmzalandı," 2016, <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/53547/cumhurbaskani-Erdogan-rusya-devlet-baskani-putin-ile-gorustu>.

the other hand, it also led to further questioning of Turkey's position with the Euro-Atlantic trajectory. In this direction, the US' strong criticisms of Turkey's foreign policy and security strategy on the Russia subject reflected this mistrust. For instance, it was put forward by the US Defense Secretary that Turkey did not act in line with the spirit of the NATO alliance and spun into Russia's orbit.²²² Moreover, the White House indicated that Turkey's pro-Russia policies, especially S-400 purchase could harm the alliance's interests, and Turkey was removed from the F-35 fighter jet project led by the United States, which includes many NATO states.²²³ On the contrary, from the perspective of the AKP government, the negative stance taken towards Turkey was inequitable. In this direction, Erdoğan emphasized the obligation of Turkey to ensure its own security. For example, according to Erdoğan, the responsible party in the S-400 crisis was the US, which did not sell Patriot air defense systems to Turkey and acted incompatible with the manner of an alliance.²²⁴ At this point, it can be said that the crisis that reached its peak between the AKP government and the US administration in the form of the S-400 issue reflected the overall fundamental disagreement in Turkey and NATO policies regarding the political stance towards Russia; in other words, the reflection of a problematic area.

In the light of Turkey's foreign and security policy during the AKP administration period (2002-2020) and the process of the country's relations with NATO, it is seen that two problematic

²²² RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, "Turkey Isolated At NATO Meeting, Slammed For Syria Incursion," 2019, <https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-ministers-to-meet-amid-disagreements-over-turkish-syria-operation/30233926.html>. (Accessed on 29 July 2022)

²²³ The White House, "Statement by the Press Secretary," 2019, <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-64/>.

²²⁴ Presidency of Republic of Türkiye, "NATO'nun S-400 Alımına Müdahale Yetkisi Yok," 2017, <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/83489/natonun-s-400-alimina-mudahale-yetkisi-yok>.

areas emerged in the mid-2010s. Remarkably, both problematic areas were related to the Syrian civil war and the AKP's MENA policy. First of the problematic areas arose as the divergence between Turkey and the alliance in the fight against terrorism policies since 2014. Although the fight against terrorism became one of the central pillars of the alliance's transforming strategies and missions, the subjects of Kurdish armed groups and combating ISIS were interpreted differently by Turkey and its NATO allies. In this regard, the policies implemented by the AKP government regarding terrorism and security factors stemming from Syria do not align with the policy options put forth by the alliance.

The second problematic area in the relations surfaced with the policy pursued by the AKP government towards Russia since 2016. NATO's strategy and political expectations from its member states towards Russia, due to the security of the Euro-Atlantic, conflicted with Turkey's adopted policies. At this point, it must be considered that the factor of Russia's position as a substantial power base in Syria influenced Turkey's political direction to this country. Furthermore, Turkey's rapprochement with Russia, which started on Syria issue-based, spilled over into various areas in the relations, including military cooperation. According to these developments, Turkey took a position outside the alliance's policy options on the Russia subject, and another problematic area emerged in Turkey-NATO relations.

CONFLICT AREAS	
FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM	COLLECTIVE POSTURE AGAINST RUSSIA
Divergence: Combat Against ISIS	Divergence: Turkey's positive political stance towards Russia and collaborations between the two countries in various fields
International Political Dynamics: • Turkey's MENA Policy and the Syrian Civil War • Becoming of PYD/YPG as an actor in Syria by combating ISIS • Turkey's security concern that covers both PYD/YPG and ISIS	International Political Dynamics: • Syrian Civil War • Arising discrepancy between Turkey and Euro-Atlantic in Syria • Becoming of Russia as a significant actor in Syria in terms of Turkey's policies

Figure 5: International Political Dynamics and Emerging Conflict Areas in Turkey-NATO Relations²²⁵

2.4. Hungary-NATO Relations During the FIDESZ Government: Emergence of Conflict Areas in the Context of International Political Developments (2010-2020)

When the FIDESZ government came to power in 2010, there were no significant problematic areas in the relations between Hungary and NATO. Relations with NATO, which began with the country's first free elections in 1990 and have constantly progressed, had been advanced within the framework of

²²⁵ Created by the author.

Hungary's Euro-Atlantic integration policy. The first significant political objective set by the Jozsef Antall government, which came to power in 1990, was to build the country's foreign and security policy on independence and to position Hungary in the new international political order in a way that would serve its interests. In this regard, integration with Euro-Atlantic was seen as an entailment. The end of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 and the inclusion of the country in NATO's Partnership for Peace program in 1993 were steps that reflected this aspiration.²²⁶ The Gyula Horn government, which came to power in 1994, pursued the same integration policy with Euro-Atlantic and even took relations further. NATO's announcement of its enlargement policy and putting forward the principles within this enlargement in 1995 led the government to adjust its armed forces. In the same year, the Hungarian Parliament decided to revise the Hungarian Defense Forces as parallel to the principles of the North Atlantic Alliance. In this context, an increase in the defense budget was planned, and the goal was set to make the army capable of getting involved in crisis management missions as appropriate with NATO's new strategy.²²⁷ In 1995, with NATO's intervention in the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary participated for the first time in a peacekeeping operation under NATO command. Its participation in this operation contributed to Hungary's invitation for accession talks with the alliance in 1997.²²⁸

In 1998, following the Horn government, a coalition government led by Viktor Orbán took over the leadership in Hungary.

²²⁶ Imre Varga, "Development of the Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Last Ten Years," *National Security and the Future* 1, no. 2 (2000), p. 120-121.

²²⁷ Parliament of the Republic of Hungary, "88/1995. (VII. 6.) OGY Határozat a Magyar Honvédség Hosszú, Valamint Középtávú Átalakításának Irányairól És Létszámáról," 1995, <https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=995h0088.OGY>.

²²⁸ Külügyminisztérium, "Magyarország a NATO-Ban," 2013, https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/download/0/7b/20000/magyarorszag_a_NATO-ban.pdf.

In 1999, as Hungary became a part of NATO, the government faced a significant dilemma regarding NATO's military intervention in Kosovo. NATO's decision to intervene against the Milosevic regime in Kosovo raised expectations of the alliance for Hungary to participate in this military operation as a new member. However, on the other hand, there was no consensus among Hungarian political elites. The opinion that this operation could have a negative impact on the Hungarian minority living in the Vojvodina region within Serbian borders and could damage the relationship between Serbia and Hungary had led to polarization in political field. Although some opposition parties objected to Hungary's participation in this military intervention on security grounds, the Orbán government decided to support NATO's intervention in Kosovo. Accordingly, Hungarian airspace was used for NATO operations, and Hungarian military forces were deployed to Kosovo for the KFOR mission.²²⁹ It is noteworthy that the Orbán government followed NATO policies during this period, and despite the polarization among Hungarian political elites over the Kosovo intervention, the country did not deviate from the Euro-Atlantic line. After the Kosovo issue, another issue where Hungary acted in line with NATO strategy and mission was the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent period. Following the decision made by NATO, the Orbán government sent some military and sanitary personnels to Afghanistan. Hungarian military units were also involved in the ISAF mission under NATO.²³⁰

At the beginning of the 2000s, it was also observed that Hungary supported the US' Iraq policy even though there was no consensus in the alliance. For instance, in 2003, while all NATO members did not accept the US decision to intervene militarily in Iraq, Hungary supported this operation. At the request of the US, the government led by Peter Medgyessy, who

²²⁹ Balázs Kiss and Csaba Zahorán, "Hungarian Domestic Policy in Foreign Policy," *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* 16, no. 2 (2007), p. 50-51.

²³⁰ Külügyminisztérium, "Magyarország a NATO-Ban."

came to power in 2002, decided to send 300 military personnel to Iraq. With its Iraq policy, the government also aimed to eliminate criticisms regarding whether Hungary was adequate in meeting NATO requirements and to strengthen the country's position in the Euro-Atlantic trajectory.²³¹

Apart from following the Euro-Atlantic line, it is seen that the government of the mid-2000s tried to diversify the country's foreign policy. The main reason for this was the budget deficit problem and economic crisis that had been effective in the country since 2000. In this context, the government led by Ferenc Gyurcsány started to engage in an economically based political rapprochement with the Russian Federation in 2006. For example, in 2006, Budapest started negotiations with Moscow about joint energy projects. Hungary aimed to reduce its energy expenses by joining Russia's South Stream pipeline plan in 2008.²³² At this point, it can be stated that although these steps did not fully overlap with NATO policies in terms of energy security, they were not yet a problematic area in the relations. Because energy security and diversification of energy sources were emphasized within the framework of the alliance's transforming strategy officially for the first time in 2006. However, the Russian Federation was not identified as a definite threat to Euro-Atlantic security at that period.

On the other hand, the pursued foreign policy by Gyurcsány's government did not have a consensus among the country's political elites due to its potential to deepen Hungary's dependence on the Russian Federation. In this regard, some political elites severely criticized this adopted policy. According to Orbán, who was the main opposition leader at that time,

²³¹ Tibor Farkas and Erika Hronyecz, "Hungarian Defence Forces in NATO Multinational Operations," *Security and Defence Quarterly* 4, no. 3 (2014), p. 81.

²³² Bódis András, "Megvan a Bizonyíték: Nem Őszöd Volt a Gyurcsány-Korszak Legnagyobb Botránya," 2019, <https://www.valaszonline.hu/2019/04/17/gyurcsany-szilvasy-oroszok-titkosszolgalat/>. (Accessed on 01 August 2022)

Hungary resisted the Soviets and Russia throughout its historical process and achieved democracy through challenging struggles. Therefore, Hungary, which determined its direction in democracy and integration with the West, was putting itself in a dangerous position with its policies toward Russia. Although oil came from the East, democracy came from the West. Hungary should not have been a barrack for Russia's energy policies as a democratic country.²³³

In 2010, when FIDESZ took over the government, Hungary's import dependency rate had increased by 4% during the Gyurcsany administration. The country's total import dependency rate was 58%, and the most significant component of this import was the energy sector. Natural gas and oil were the most critical sources of Hungary's energy imports, and 90% of these sources were supplied by the Russian Federation. In other words, the Russian Federation was the sole dominant actor in the energy sector in Hungary. The dependency on Russia in the energy sector also made the country reliant on pipelines that transport energy resources from Russia through Ukraine. In this context, Hungary was one of the prominent countries which were open to the harmful effects of the crises between Russia and Ukraine.²³⁴ In this direction, the dependence on the Russian Federation in the energy sector and the adverse effects of the global economic recession in 2008 constituted Hungary's leading domestic and foreign policy problems in 2010. However, the notable point was that the new Orbán administration began to adopt a stance that did not consider the country's dependence on the Russian Federation as a danger. Although

²³³ 24, "Orbán: Az Olaj Keletről Jön, de a Szabadság Nyugatról," 2007, https://24.hu/belfold/2007/03/30/orban_olaj_keletrol_jon/. (Accessed on 01 August 2022)

²³⁴ European Commission and Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, "Member States' Energy Dependence: An Indicator-Based Assessment" (Brussels, 2013), p. 187-189. https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp145_en.pdf.

Orbán and FIDESZ criticized Russia's influence on Hungary through the energy sector before, they revised their political approach towards Russia positively starting in 2010 to solve the country's economic problems.²³⁵ Parallel to the Gyurcsány government's strategy, the FIDESZ administration decided to follow diversifying foreign policy. According to Orbán, Hungary faced economic-based problems and no middle ground. Hungary must have made foreign policy moves as different from the current status quo to revive its economy.²³⁶

The most important step taken by the FIDESZ government to diversify its foreign policy has been the "Eastern Opening" strategy, which has been emphasized since it came to power in 2010. Within the framework of this strategy, the government aimed to develop economic and political relations with countries representing Eastern civilization outside of the Euro-Atlantic region. While implementing this strategy, the fundamental driving force for the FIDESZ government was the changing global economic balance in the world. Although Hungary was part of Europe, the government pointed to the East as a new source of world economic power. In this context, Hungary's utilization of the positive economic momentum emanating from the East was deemed a necessity.²³⁷ As part of the Eastern Opening, Hungary organized various diplomatic meetings with global actors such as China and Russia in 2011 and signed commercial agreements. In addition to these countries, the Eastern Opening strategy was planned to cover a vast geography extending to the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

²³⁵ Péter Visnovitz and Erin Kristin Jenne, "Populist Argumentation in Foreign Policy: The Case of Hungary under Viktor Orbán, 2010–2020," *Comparative European Politics* 19, no. 6 (2021), p. 688.

²³⁶ Hungary Prime Minister's Office, "Viktor Orbán's State of the Nation Address," 2011, <https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/the-prime-ministers-speeches/viktor-orban-s-state-of-the-nation-address>.

²³⁷ Index, "Orbán: Keleti Szél Fúj," 2010, https://index.hu/belfold/2010/11/05/orban_keleti_szel_fuj/. (Accessed on 02 August 2022)

Therefore, during the same period, Hungary made moves to develop diplomatic and economic relations with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.²³⁸

To elaborate further on the Eastern Opening strategy, it can be described not merely as an economic policy but as a reflection of FIDESZ's firm belief in the decline of the Western world and the government's proactive effort to address the economic aspect of this perceived decline. In this context, Orbán's power comparisons between the West and the East are particularly noteworthy. For instance, his statement, "*We sail under the Western flag, but the wind is blowing in the East of the world economy*,"²³⁹ employs a maritime metaphor to highlight the East's rising economic power and dynamism. Similarly, his remarks below offer a more straightforward comparison, emphasizing the West's loss of its long-standing status as the centre of power and attraction in the face of the East's ascent:

"The old model of globalisation was built on the assumption that the West is where the money is, where profit is generated and where technological know-how is also based; in this model these all flow in the direction of poorer and less developed countries. But in recent decades – and especially over the past ten years – this has changed. The engine room of the global economy is no longer in the West, but in the East – or, rather, the East has caught up with the West. Eastern countries are no longer lag behind their western counterparts in terms of their level of technological development; and nowadays in fact the largest amounts of money are accumulating in Asia and then flowing back from there towards the West."²⁴⁰

²³⁸ István Tarrósy and Zoltán Vörös, "Hungary's Pragmatic Foreign Policy in a Post-American World," *Politics in Central Europe* 16, no. 1 (2020), p. 117-122.

²³⁹ Hungary Today, "Opening to the East May Be More Successful than Previously Expected," 2024, <https://hungarytoday.hu/opening-to-the-east-may-be-more-successful-than-previously-expected/>. (Accessed on 13 November 2024)

²⁴⁰ About Hungary, "Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on Magyar Televízió (Hungarian Public Television) Summarising His Recent Visit to Beijing," 2017, <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-magyar->

In these comparisons and in FIDESZ's approach to the economic decline of the West, one particularly noteworthy aspect is the emphasis on Asia, and specifically China, as the centre of the rising Eastern world. In this regard, it is evident that since 2010, the Orbán government has implemented a new diplomatic relations model focused on China alongside its engagement with Russia. Accordingly, in 2011, Hungary joined the 16+1 cooperation framework, which aims to enhance China's collaboration with Central and Eastern European countries. Hungary was also the first European country to support China's Belt and Road Initiative, inspired by the ancient Silk Road.²⁴¹ As part of these restructured economic and diplomatic relations, the FIDESZ government established the Office of the Government Commissioner for Hungarian-Chinese Bilateral Relations in 2013.²⁴² In 2010, when the FIDESZ government came to power, Hungary accounted for 89% of all Chinese capital inflows into Central and Eastern European countries. By 2013, Hungary had increased this figure to \$2.5 billion, maintaining a significant lead over other countries in the region.²⁴³ Beyond these steps toward economic cooperation, the FIDESZ government has also sought to strengthen cultural ties with China. Notably, it approved plans for a campus of China's Fudan University to be established in Budapest, with an anticipated opening date in 2024.²⁴⁴

televizio-hungarian-public-television-summarising-his-recent-visit-to-beijing.

²⁴¹ Šárka Waisová and Ladislav Cabada, "China's Engagement in Central Europe: Words Speak Louder than Actions," *Politické Vedy* 25, no. 2 (2022), p. 158-159.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ágnes Szunomár, Katalin Völgyi, and Tamás Matura, "Chinese Investments and Financial Engagement in Hungary" (Centre for Economic and Regional Studies HAS Institute of World Economics, 2014), p.3 .

²⁴⁴ Waisová and Cabada, "China's Engagement in Central Europe: Words Speak Louder than Actions.," p. 159.

From China's perspective, the Orbán government's positive approach and enthusiastic stance positioned Hungary as a frontrunner among Central European countries within the framework of a win-win strategy. In China's vision of a new multipolar world order—one not dominated by a single hegemonic power (the United States)—Central and Eastern European countries already held significant importance. These countries' geopolitical role as a gateway to Western European markets, their inexpensive labour force, and their economies' growth trajectories made them particularly attractive to China.²⁴⁵ At this point, under FIDESZ leadership, Hungary emerged as a central partner country for China in Central Europe due to its constructive bilateral relations, strategic geopolitical location, supportive stance toward China's cultural diplomacy policies, and a Chinese diaspora within its territory.²⁴⁶

On the other hand, considering China's ambition to become an international pole of power, the Hungary-China strategic partnership, which gained momentum under the FIDESZ government, began to be viewed with concern by the West after 2010, particularly the EU, even if it did not provoke a strong reaction. In this context, the main criticism from the Euro-Atlantic perspective centred on the potential for countries like Hungary to become puppets of Beijing within Europe and the projection that such partnerships could undermine Europe's economic and trade policies.²⁴⁷

It can be said that the foreign policy based on the Eastern Opening implemented by the FIDESZ government between 2010 and 2014 did not possess components that would create

²⁴⁵ Richard Turcsányi, "Central and Eastern Europe's Courtship with China: Trojan Horse within the EU?" (*European Institute for Asian Studies*, 2014), p. 2-3.

²⁴⁶ Szunomár, Völgyi, and Matura, "Chinese Investments and Financial Engagement in Hungary.", p. 15-18.

²⁴⁷ Tamás Matura, "Chinese Investment in Central and Eastern Europe: A Reality Check" (*Central and Eastern European Center for Asian Studies*, 2021), p. 4.

a profound conflict zone with the Euro-Atlantic. However, starting in 2014, Russia's policies towards Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea made the Russian aspect of Hungary's Eastern Opening problematic. For instance, the Paks nuclear power plant agreement signed between Hungary and Russia in 2014 was significant in reflecting a divergence between Hungary and NATO. With the Paks nuclear power plant agreement, the FIDESZ government dealt with the Russian Federation to expand the plant, which was initially constructed in 1987 and provides 53% of Hungary's electricity production from four units.²⁴⁸ Although the decision to expand the Paks nuclear power plant was legalized by the Gyurcsány government in 2009 and was supported by almost all of Hungary's political elites,²⁴⁹ the FIDESZ government's collaboration with Russia on this matter became the source of the problem. With this agreement, the construction of the nuclear plant was entrusted to Russia's Rosatom company, and Hungary received 10 billion euros in financing from Russia to realize this project. Consequently, Hungary has become dependent on Russia both economically and in terms of electricity generation from nuclear energy until 2085.²⁵⁰ In other words, while NATO declared Russia as a threat to the Euro-Atlantic region in 2014, Hungary, through the Paks nuclear power plant agreement, exhibited a political stance that would enhance Russia's power in the economic field and energy sector.

In 2014, the economic sanctions imposed by the European Union, comprised mainly of NATO member states, against Russia

²⁴⁸ Dániel Hegedűs, "The Kremlin's Influence in Hungary: Are Russian Vested Interests Wearing Hungarian National Colors?," *DGAP Kompakt* 8, no. 1 (2016), p. 4.

²⁴⁹ Áron Kovács and M. István Szabó, "Paks II.: Gyurcsány Pálfordulásától Orbán Nagy Üzletéig," *hvg.hu*, 2014, https://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20140115_Oroszok_Pakson_hogyan_jutott_unk_idaig. (Accessed on 02 August 2022)

²⁵⁰ Attila Juhász and et al., "I Am Eurasian': The Kremlin Connections of the Hungarian Far-Right", *Political Capital and Social Development Institute*, (Budapest, 2015), p. 14.

were strongly criticized by the FIDESZ government. Orbán indicated that an economic sanction against Russia would cause significant harm not only to Russia but also to Europe as a whole, particularly Hungary. The potential deterioration of Hungary's relations with Russia, which was the largest trading partner outside the European Union, was deemed by Orbán as an irreparable mistake. Orbán equated the firm stance of European states against Russia to shooting oneself in the foot.²⁵¹ In the same year, the FIDESZ government halted the transmission of Russian-origin natural gas passing through Hungary to Ukraine. Orbán defended this decision by stating that Hungary could not jeopardize its energy supply by getting involved in the Russia-Ukraine dispute.²⁵² However, on the other hand, it is seen that Hungary did not actively oppose the European Union's and NATO's joint decisions towards Russia. For instance, the annexation of Crimea by Russia was not recognized by Hungary. Similarly, although Hungary initially ceased the gas supply to Ukraine, it reversed its decision just one month later and resumed gas flow in line with the expectations of the European Union. Furthermore, Hungary did not veto the European Union Council's decision to impose economic sanctions on Russia.²⁵³

In 2015, both the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence conveyed messages emphasizing that Hungary would not conflict with the Euro-Atlantic in the context of Russia policies. In line with this, the Hungarian Minister

²⁵¹ Gergely Szakacs, "Europe 'shot Itself in Foot' with Russia Sanctions: Hungary PM," *Reuters*, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-sanctions-hungary-idUSKBN0GF0ES20140815>.

²⁵² The Guardian, "Hungary Suspends Gas Supplies to Ukraine under Pressure from Moscow," 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/26/hungary-suspends-gas-supplies-ukraine-pressure-moscow>. (Accessed on 02 August 2022)

²⁵³ Botond Feledy, "Hungarian Foreign Policy and the Crisis in Ukraine," in *Diverging Voices, Converging Policies: The Visegrad States' Reactions to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict* (Warsaw: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2015), p. 76.

of Foreign Affairs, Peter Szijjarto, highlighted the development of relations with Germany and strengthening alliance ties with the United States as two main objectives of Hungary's foreign policy. Although Szijjarto emphasized that Hungary's relations with Russia would continue on a pragmatic basis, he also ensured their compatibility with Euro-Atlantic policies and international law.²⁵⁴ Similarly, Defence Minister Csaba Hende addressed the same points regarding relations with Russia and the Ukraine crisis at the Munich Security Conference. Hende mentioned that Hungary would not wholly sever its relations with Russia but rather conduct them at a limited level, considering Euro-Atlantic policies.²⁵⁵ During the same period, apart from the Russia issue, the NATO strategy to fight against terrorism, specifically the fight against ISIS, constituted another essential aspect of Hungary-NATO relations. It can be argued that Hungary's approach to combating ISIS did not diverge from the alliance. In 2015, the FIDESZ government presented a resolution to parliament to deploy 150 soldiers from the Hungarian Army to support the US-led anti-ISIS coalition in Iraq. This resolution was approved by parliament and resulted in the deployment of Hungarian military forces.²⁵⁶ The FIDESZ government, particularly in response to the refugee problem arising from the Syrian civil war, adopted a firm stance and considered NATO's fight against ISIS as a key factor for both resolving the refugee crisis and ensuring the security of the Christian minority in the Middle East.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁴ Index, "A Parlamentben Elhangzott Az Ondógép Szó," 2015, https://index.hu/belfold/2015/02/16/teljesulhet_kover_laszlo_alma. (Accessed on 02 August 2022)

²⁵⁵ Ministry of Defence of Hungary, "There Is a Need for Armistice in Ukraine," 2015, <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-defence/news/there-is-a-need-for-armistice-in-ukraine>.

²⁵⁶ Hungarian Free Press, "Hungary Sends Troops to Fight ISIS," 2015, <https://hungarianfreepress.com/2015/04/14/hungary-sends-troops-to-fight-isis/>. (Accessed on 02 August 2022)

²⁵⁷ Tamás Székely, "Hungarian Foreign Minister: Elimination Of ISIS Key To Solving Migration Crisis," *Hungary Today*, 2017,

Within the framework of Euro-Atlantic security, the economic sanctions imposed by the European Union on Russia resulted in substantial damage to the commercial relations between Hungary and Russia. Between 2014 and 2015, the trade volume between the two countries experienced a decline of 43%. Furthermore, NATO's stance and the EU sanctions led to the cancellation of Russia's South Stream pipeline project and negatively impacted Hungary's energy policy.²⁵⁸ Although the Hungarian government conveyed the messages of not conflicting with the EU and NATO on Russia policy, it is observed that the various political moves implemented by the FIDESZ government in response to these adverse economic developments do not overlap with the messages. The diplomatic visit of Russian President Putin to Hungary in 2015 was the most significant example reflecting this situation. Putin's visit to Budapest and the emphasis made by Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán following their bilateral diplomatic meeting had the quality of potentially granting the political sphere to Russia. Orbán strongly criticized the West's stance towards Russia, stating that it lacked a solution-oriented approach, and emphasized the necessity of cooperation with Russia for the security of Europe.²⁵⁹ This bilateral summit between Hungary and Russia, which took place in 2015, was repeated in 2016. During his visit to Moscow, Orbán met with Putin and pointed out that the Paks nuclear power plant project would continue pertinaciously. Orbán described the Paks Nuclear Power Plant agreement as the

<https://hungarytoday.hu/hungarian-foreign-minister-elimination-isis-key-solving-migration-crisis-12531/>.

²⁵⁸ Ada Ámon and András Deák, "Hungary and Russia in Economic Terms - Love, Business, Both or Neither?," in *Diverging Voices, Converging Policies: The Visegrad States' Reactions to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict* (Warsaw: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2015), p. 83–99.

²⁵⁹ Hungary Prime Minister's Office, "Viktor Orbán's Press Conference after His Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin," 2015, <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-orban-s-press-conference-after-his-meeting-with-russian-president-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin>.

agreement of the century.²⁶⁰ Prime Minister Orbán's visits to Moscow continued unabated in 2017, 2018, and 2019. According to Orbán, Hungary's relations with Russia had represented a significant instance of cooperation between the West and the East.²⁶¹ Another noteworthy aspect was Hungary's support for the TurkStream project, which gained official status in 2016 following the cancellation of the South Stream project. The FIDESZ government indicated the country's need for Russian natural gas and announced its interest in this energy project. In line with this, another area where Orbán sought partnership with the Kremlin was the extension of the TurkStream pipeline to Hungary.²⁶² At this point, it can be said that Hungary did not encounter a problem in reaching joint decisions with NATO toward Russia; however, there was a divergence regarding implementing these decisions. The FIDESZ government's pursuit of joint steps in the energy sector with Russia, its efforts to maintain economic cooperation, and its approach that provides a positive political space for the Kremlin were not in line with NATO's Russia strategy. In other words, this led to a problematic area in Hungary-NATO relations.

Another problematic area in Hungary-NATO relations emerged in 2017 with Ukraine's political move toward NATO membership. Russia's occupation of Ukrainian territories in 2014 led the Ukrainian government to make serious political moves to elevate its relations with the alliance to membership status. In this direction, the approval of a law by the Ukrainian parliament transformed the country's NATO membership into a foreign policy and security strategy, thereby incorporating

²⁶⁰ Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation, "News Conference Following Russian-Hungarian Talks," 2016, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/51352>.

²⁶¹ Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation, "Press Conference on Russian-Hungarian Talks," 2018, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58586>.

²⁶² Jo Harper, "Hungary Eyes Moscow for Gas," *Deutsche Welle*, 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/hungarian-gas-devil-or-deep-blue-sea/a-46614746>.

NATO membership into a legally binding framework.²⁶³ While NATO perceived it positively within the framework of the alliance's enlargement strategy and mission, Hungary's blocking of meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the ministerial level reflected a political divergence between Hungary and the alliance. The FIDESZ government justified this veto decision based on the new education law that came into effect in Ukraine in 2017. The FIDESZ government claimed that this education law negatively affected the rights of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Ukraine.²⁶⁴

In the historical process following the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the First World War, approximately one-third of the Hungarian population became ethnic minorities within the territories of the USSR and its satellite states (for example, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia). After the disintegration of these multinational states, they remained as Hungarian minorities in the successor states, such as Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, Ukraine and Romania. The rights and integration issue of the Hungarian minority in these regions became particularly significant in the Hungarian state after the collapse of the Soviet Union.²⁶⁵ At this point, it is seen that the FIDESZ government also prioritized the Hungarian minorities issue from 2010. For instance, one of the initial actions taken by the FIDESZ government upon coming to power was to make

²⁶³ Defense News, "Ukraine Parliament Restores NATO Membership as Strategic Target," 2017, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2017/06/09/ukraine-parliament-restores-nato-membership-as-strategic-target/>. (Accessed on 02 August 2022)

²⁶⁴ RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, "Hungary Sets Condition For Ukraine's Participation In NATO Meeting," 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/hungary-sets-condition-for-ukraine-participation-in-december-nato-metting/29609366.html>. (Accessed on 02 August 2022)

²⁶⁵ Valér Veres, "The Minority Identity and the Idea of the 'Unity' of the Nation: The Case of Hungarian Minorities from Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine," *Identities* 22, no. 1 (2015), p. 90-91.

amendments to the Hungarian Citizenship Act, granting citizenship and voting rights to approximately 2.2 million Hungarian origin people living in these regions.²⁶⁶ On the other hand, the roots of the Hungary-Ukraine issue regarding minorities during the FIDESZ government leaned in 2014. During his victory speech after winning the 2014 elections, Orbán emphasis on the Hungarian minority living in Ukraine became the first move that problematized the relations between Hungary and Ukraine within the context of minorities. In this speech, Orbán made remarks regarding the dual citizenship and self-governance rights of the 200,000 Hungarians living in Ukraine.²⁶⁷ However, this stance was strongly condemned by the Ukrainian government, and the Hungarian ambassador to Ukraine was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide an explanation. The Ukrainian government interpreted Hungary's position as interference in the country's internal affairs.²⁶⁸

Until 2017, the minority issue between Hungary and Ukraine remained relatively subdued; however, a change in Ukraine's education law brought the minority problem between the two countries back to the forefront. This legislative change placed restrictions on the Hungarian minority, who already had significant freedom in education in their native language. The new law designated the languages of minority communities as optional subjects in education and only allowed their use in pre-school education. While the Ukrainian government portrayed the primary motivation behind this decision as preventing Russification in the country, the FIDESZ government considered

²⁶⁶ Balázs Majtényi, Alíz Nagy, and Péter Kállai, „„Only Fidesz” – Minority Electoral Law in Hungary,” *VerfBlog*, 2018, <https://verfassungsblog.de/only-fidesz-electoral-law-in-hungary/>.

²⁶⁷ Hungary Prime Minister's Office, “Prime Minister's Speech after Taking the Oath of Office,” 2014, <https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/the-prime-ministers-speeches/prime-minister-s-speech-after-taking-the-oath-of-office>.

²⁶⁸ Euobserver, “Orban Upsets Neighbours by Call for Hungarian Minority Self-Rule,” 2014, <https://euobserver.com/world/124145>. (Accessed on 03 August 2022)

it an unacceptable political stance by Ukraine, infringing upon the fundamental rights of the Hungarian minority.²⁶⁹ In this regard, the veto by Hungary on Ukraine's integration steps with the alliance met with concern and criticism, especially from the United States, the leading country in NATO. Political signals from the United States urged Hungary to lift this veto promptly and not endanger Europe's security. The United States emphasized that Ukraine's failure could potentially turn Hungary into a frontline against Russia's aggressive policies.²⁷⁰ Despite these reactions, in a statement made in 2019, the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs clearly indicated that there would be no change in this decision. The Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Szijjarto, underscored that the Hungarian community in Ukraine would not be sacrificed to such political pressures.²⁷¹ At this point, the FIDESZ government's veto on Ukraine's NATO integration pointed out not only a mutual crisis between Hungary and Ukraine but also as a reflection of a political divergence or, in other words, a problematic area between Hungary and NATO.

During the FIDESZ government's tenure (2010-2020), Hungary's foreign and security policy reveals the emergence of two problematic areas in the country's relations with NATO. The first problematic area is the divergence between Hungary's policies and the alliance's strategies within the context of Russia. Although Hungary had already developed deep economic and energy relations with the Russian Federation before the FIDESZ government, the post-2014 approach toward these relations became the basis of the problem. It can be observed that

²⁶⁹ Andrzej Sadecki and Tadeusz Iwański, "Ukraine–Hungary: The Intensifying Dispute over the Hungarian Minority's Rights", *Centre for Eastern Studies*, no 280, (Warsaw, 2018).

²⁷⁰ Reuters, "U.S. Urges Hungary Not to Block Ukraine's NATO Engagement," 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-hungary-idUSKBN1OC1KB>. (Accessed on 03 August 2022)

²⁷¹ Reuters, "Hungary Vetoes NATO Statement on Ukraine over Minority Rights: Minister," 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-nato-ukraine-idUSKBN1X91ZI>. (Accessed on 03 August 2022)

the Hungarian government did not actively oppose the joint decision or sanctions imposed by NATO and the EU on Russia. However, the factor of Hungary's dependency on Russia in the energy sector, coupled with the economic development policies of the FIDESZ government, resulted in Hungary adopting a two-tiered Russia policy. In this regard, while Hungary continued collaborations with Russia in areas such as the economy and energy sector, it also pursued a foreign policy behaviour that provided a political influence sphere for the Kremlin through high-level diplomatic contacts. At this point, Hungary's failure to fully comply with NATO's limited policy options on Russia subject created the first problematic area in the relations between Hungary and the alliance.

The second problematic area in the relations emerged due to the political crisis between Hungary and Ukraine caused by the changes in Ukraine's education law in 2017. The factor of the Hungarian ethnic minorities in Transcarpathia region negatively impacted the relations between the two countries and also influenced Hungary's position towards Ukraine at the NATO level. In this context, Hungary's veto on Ukraine's efforts for NATO integration diverged seriously from the alliance's post-Cold War enlargement strategy. In other words, Hungary took a position outside of the political constraints set by the alliance based on enlargement, and this led to a second problematic area in the relations. Furthermore, Hungary's political stance on Ukraine, touched to the first problematic area, by not aligning with the general frame of the alliance's strategy on Russia subject.²⁷²

²⁷² The primary reason for focusing on the Hungarian minorities living in Ukraine and, in this context, on Hungary-Ukraine relations in this study is the direct impact of this issue on Hungary-NATO relations. The topic of Hungarian minorities is not limited to Ukraine but has a geographic scope that involves several countries. In this regard, Romania hosts the largest population of Hungarian minorities, with approximately one and a half million individuals. Similarly, Hungarian minority populations exist in countries such as Slovakia, Serbia, Austria, and

CONFLICT AREAS	
COLLECTIVE POSTURE AGAINST RUSSIA	ALLAINCE'S ENLARGEMENT
Divergence: Hungary's positive political stance towards Russia and collaborations between the two countries in the economy and energy fields.	Divergence: Hungary's blocking of Ukraine's integration effort with Euro-Atlantic
International Political Dynamics: • Hungary's dependency on Russia in the energy field. • Economic development plan built on cooperation with Eastern countries	International Political Dynamics: • Ethnic Hungarian identity in the Transcarpathia region • Concerns on Hungarian minority rights in Ukraine after education law

Figure 6: International Political Dynamics and Emerging Conflict Areas in Hungary-NATO Relations²⁷³

2.5. Remarks on the Chapter

The section has addressed the transformation of NATO's strategy and missions from its inception to the present day. In this context, it has been highlighted that, particularly with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new international political reality, the structure of the Euro-Atlantic alliance's

Slovenia. However, since the issue of Hungarian minorities in these countries does not directly influence the NATO-related topic addressed in this study, regions outside Ukraine have not been included in the research.

²⁷³ Created by the author.

strategy and missions evolved into a framework consisting of four main pillars.

During the AKP administration, examining the impact of international political developments on foreign policy revealed two significant foreign policy behaviours directly affecting Turkey-NATO relations. The first is Turkey's policies towards ISIS and Kurdish armed groups in Syria, shaped by the new terrorism and security dynamics emerging from the Syrian Civil War. The second is Turkey's increasingly cooperative political stance towards the Russian Federation, which is also linked to the Syrian Civil War and Russia's rising influence in the region. These foreign policy behaviours have been found to contradict two of NATO's four main strategic pillars. The first contradiction lies in the divergence between Turkey and the Euro-Atlantic Bloc in combating ISIS and Kurdish armed groups. The second contradiction is Turkey's non-compliance with NATO's strict political stance towards Russia.

During the FIDESZ government, examining international political developments and their impact on foreign policy in Hungary also revealed policy behaviours that conflicted with two of NATO's strategic pillars. Hungary's increasing dependence on the Russian Federation in the economic and energy sectors led to policies that emphasized cooperation with Russia, which conflicted with the Euro-Atlantic Bloc's strategies towards Russia. Additionally, political tensions between Hungary and Ukraine over the rights of the Hungarian minority in the Transcarpathian region have prompted Hungary to take action against Ukraine in its foreign policy, which was found to be inconsistent with NATO's enlargement strategy.

In light of all these findings, this section concludes by identifying the areas of disagreement between Turkey and Hungary with NATO. Building on this foundation, the subsequent sections will examine the domestic political dynamics in Turkey and Hungary, discussing and elaborating on how political survival and ideational factors have influenced the processes that led to these conflict areas.

CHAPTER 3

The AKP Era and Domestic Dynamics: Intervening Variables Complementary to Turkey-Nato Relations

The previous chapter provided an overview of Turkey-NATO and Hungary-NATO relations in the context of developments in international politics. Accordingly, the conflict areas in the relationships between these countries and the North Atlantic Alliance during the AKP and FIDESZ governments were identified.

It has been observed that NATO's evolving strategies and missions currently consist of four main pillars (enlargement, crisis management, fight against terrorism and collective posture against Russia); Turkey and Hungary have come into conflict with two of these areas each. For Turkey, the issues of counterterrorism and relations with Russia are areas of contention with the Euro-Atlantic alliance. The Syrian civil war and the resulting terrorism-security problem are the primary reasons for Turkey's divergence from NATO in its foreign policy on the international stage. Similarly, the increasing influence of Russia in the region due to the Syrian civil war and the subsequent strategic partnership between Turkey and Russia reveal the international political basis for another area of conflict between Turkey and NATO.

Based on the identified conflict areas, this and the following chapter (focusing on Hungary) aim to determine the impact of domestic dynamics on these disputes under the theoretical guidance of Neoclassical Realism (NCR). In this context, the intervening variables model introduced in the study is applied, evaluating the role of the ideational factors and the AKP government's political survival efforts in Turkey as complementary elements. Thus, alongside international political developments, the intervention of domestic political characteristics in the

government's foreign policymaking is revealed, and it is understood from the findings of this chapter how these interventions influence policies and contribute to disputes in Turkey-NATO relations.

3.1. Ideational Factors

Under this concept, two main topics are addressed. The first is the leader image, reflecting the cognitive and ideological portrait of Erdoğan, the AKP government's leader, and the Turkish state's primary decision-maker. This section examines Erdoğan's and, consequently, the AKP government's ideological development, evolution, and policy perception. This provides an understanding of the AKP government's ideological base and its relationship with foreign policy decisions.

The second topic, strategic culture (grand strategy), considers the grand strategy that the modern Turkish state (the Republic of Turkey) has constructed since its establishment. This section investigates whether the AKP government has altered this grand strategy within the context of its ideological base and how it implements the grand strategy. By evaluating the ideological power of the AKP government and Erdoğan, the impact of ideational factors on foreign policy, and consequently on areas of conflict with NATO, is determined.

3.1.1. Leader Image: Ideological Base of Erdoğan and AKP

The leader images are constituted by the master beliefs and character of the decision-making political elites (leaders) who shape foreign and security policies. Master belief represents leaders' ideological and identity-based perspectives and perceptions regarding world politics. The master belief, combined with leaders' character, influences how leaders respond to

stimuli in international politics.²⁷⁴ In other words, leader images emerge as a fundamental element when formulating a country's foreign and security policies. While it is possible to mention various political elites and figures within the state during foreign policy formulation, in Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had exerted complete control over the bureaucracy and the AKP. Thus, he had created a political leader figure who holds all the power.²⁷⁵ At this point, Erdoğan's master beliefs and character, as the Turkish state's foremost political figure and primary decision-maker, are significant in terms of their impact on Turkey's foreign policy during the AKP government period.

The AKP came to power in 2002, and Erdoğan has been a dominant political figure since then. However, to fully comprehend Erdoğan's perceptions and character, it is necessary to delve into Milli Görüş Hareketi (the National Outlook Movement), of which he emerged as a political figure for the first time and became a part of. The AKP, founded in 2001 by Erdoğan and his friends who originated from the National Outlook Movement, almost meant a continuation of this movement. Both the AKP and Erdoğan drew significant influence from the ideological base of the National Outlook.²⁷⁶ In this context, it can be argued that Erdoğan's political perceptions are not fully independent of the political perspective presented by this movement.

The foundations of the National Outlook Movement date back to the 1970s. Established under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, this movement positioned itself as a third way built upon Islamic values in Turkish politics, which was dominated by two polarized factions at the time (right-wing Turkish

²⁷⁴ Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 63-64.

²⁷⁵ Antonino Castaldo, "Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 18, no. 4 (2018), p. 479.

²⁷⁶ Fulya Atacan, "Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP," *Turkish Studies*, 6, no. 2 (2005), p. 196-197.

nationalists and left-wing communism supporters). The National Outlook Movement emphasized that Muslims should not only be enslaved people within the existing political order but should also be active actors in the political sphere. Within this framework, the movement's primary political objective and ideology aimed to establish economic and political unity in the Islamic world.²⁷⁷ This movement, which rejects ethnic identities concerning the nation-state, embraced Islam as the core identity. In this context, regardless of geography and borders, it considered all Muslims as a single nation. Due to its opposition to ethnicity, which is a crucial component of the nation-state, this political movement focused on the Ottoman Empire era. It referred to Turkey as a country that has shaped world politics during the imperial period and emphasized the need to embrace Ottoman heritage.²⁷⁸ For Turkey and other Muslim countries, it identified the West and Israel as the most significant threats. It argued that organizations such as NATO and the European Union are created in line with imperialist objectives and continuously voiced the opinion that Turkey should not be part of these entities.²⁷⁹ For instance, a parliamentary question submitted by the deputies of Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party), which was the representative of the National Outlook Movement, in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1993 regarding the European Union reflected this approach. In the parliamentary question, the European Union was criticized as follows:

“The European Community is a highly ambitious integration model that gradually moves towards the goal of the United States of Europe, with its foundation based on Christian-Western culture; it is a political union, working towards forming a European State. The Common Market is a Catholic European Union established according to a Christian ideology. Turkey is a Muslim country.

²⁷⁷ Talip Tuğrul, “Milli Görüş Hareketi’nin Temel Karakterleri,” *Mezhep Araştırmaları Dergisi* 10, no. 2 (2017), p. 620-625.

²⁷⁸ Cevdet Coşkun and Eda Yanar, “Milli Görüş ve Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: Süreklilikler ve Kopuşlar,” *Akademik İzzet Dergisi* 5, no. 2 (2020), p. 270.

²⁷⁹ Tuğrul, “Milli Görüş Hareketi’nin Temel Karakterleri,” p. 635.

Our nation should not have a place within such a socio-political union...”²⁸⁰

At this point, it can be said that, from the perspective of the National Outlook Movement, the West is an outright enemy with which no partnership must be established. This approach of the National Outlook Movement can be observed in Turkish foreign policy with the rise of the Welfare Party to power in 1996 and Erbakan assuming the position of Prime Minister. Erbakan initiated his first diplomatic visits by meeting with leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and launched a project called D-8 (Developing Eight), which encompassed economic and political cooperation among Muslim countries.²⁸¹ As the National Outlook Movement became popular in Turkish political life, Erdoğan, who was involved in this movement starting in the 1970s, also rose in his political career. Erdoğan, who ran as a candidate for the Welfare Party, was elected as the Mayor of Istanbul in 1994. It can be observed that his political views and perceptions during this period were fully aligned with the Islamic understanding on which the National Outlook Movement is based. For instance, due to his views rooted in Islamic ideology, Erdoğan was investigated in 1998. During a speech, he quoted a poem by Ziya Gökalp and used the expression, “*Minarets are our bayonets, domes are our helmets, mosques are our barracks, believers are our soldiers.*” which led to accusations of him for politicizing Islam and inciting society to hatred and enmity. As a result, he received a prison sentence and a political ban.²⁸²

²⁸⁰ Grand National Assembly of Turkey, “Parliamentary Minutes (123rd Meeting, 6.7.1993),” 1993, <https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d19/c038/tbmm19038123.pdf>.

²⁸¹ Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, “Modernity, Identity and Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” *Insight Turkey* 10, no. 1 (2008), p. 66.

²⁸² Milliyet, “Erdoğan’a 10 Ay Hapis,” 1998, <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/Erdogana-10-ay-hapis-5358830>. (Accessed on 04 August 2022)

In 1998, the Welfare Party was also dissolved by the constitutional court order, ceasing its political activities.

In 2001, when Erdoğan and his friend founded the AKP, it is noteworthy that this new political formation did not emphasize Islamic ideology like the National Outlook Movement. For instance, in the founding statute of the AKP, all religious and ethnic identities within Turkey were considered as cultural richness. It was emphasized that the AKP was a political party that respects this cultural diversity. Additionally, significant references to Atatürk's principles and Republican values were put forward.²⁸³ The differentiation of the AKP from the National Outlook Movement was more precise in the party's manifesto published for the 2002 general elections. While defining itself as a conservative party, the AKP also emphasized its openness to contemporary global developments. This stance reflected a commitment to ensuring that foreign policy decisions would not be guided by prejudice or ideological fixations, but rather by the country's interests and rationality.²⁸⁴ One of the main objectives of the AKP during its establishment phase was to demonstrate that it did not solely focus on Islamic ideology and Ottomanism like the National Outlook Movement, and to underscore its lack of affiliation with that movement. In 2003, Erdoğan declared that the AKP and the National Outlook Movement represented completely different political structures. He likened the National Outlook Movement to a garment that they had now removed, signaling a clear departure

²⁸³ AKP, "Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- Parti Tüzüğü," 2002, <https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11543/901/2/00204121.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

²⁸⁴ AKP, "Seçim Beyannamesi," 2002, <https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11543/954/2/00304063.pdf?sequence=1>.

from the political approach and ideology advocated by that movement.²⁸⁵

The traces of Erdoğan's announcement of leaving the National Outlook Movement can be observed in the foreign policy pursued by the AKP during this period. Instead of a simplistic anti-Western stance, Erdoğan and the AKP adopted a more moderate political approach and took steps toward developing collaborations. For instance, in 2003, although Turkey and the US could not reach a complete partnership regarding military intervention in Iraq, the AKP government did not adopt a sharply negative position towards the US. In this respect, Erdoğan emphasized the US as a crucial ally and referred to the American soldiers in Iraq as heroes.²⁸⁶ Moreover, the AKP government considered EU integration as a foreign policy priority during the same period. In this regard, it took revisionist steps compared to previous governments. It endeavored to resolve prominent issues such as the Cyprus problem to foster strong relations with the Euro-Atlantic community. Within Turkey, various reforms highlighting liberal values (such as judicial independence and minority rights) were implemented in pursuit of EU membership.²⁸⁷ During its early years in power, the AKP government perceived the West not as a rival but as a natural ally with which Turkey should fully integrate.

In 2007, following the AKP's victory in the general elections and Erdoğan's reappointment as prime minister, a noticeable change can be observed in the party's policies and Erdoğan's political approach. This period was characterized by increased

²⁸⁵ Milliyet, "Milli Görüş'ü Terk Ettiler," 2003, <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/milli-gorusu-terk-ettiler-5179000>. (Accessed on 04 August 2022)

²⁸⁶ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, "My Country Is Your Faithful Ally and Friend," *The Wall Street Journal*, 2003, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB104907941058746300>.

²⁸⁷ Philip Robins, "Between the EU and the Middle East: Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Government, 2002-2007", *Istituto Per Gli Studi di Politicia Internazionale*, (Milano, 2007), p. 12.

public support, the AKP's effective presence in state institutions, and the beginning of a decline in the Turkish military's hegemony over politics. These developments gave Erdoğan and the AKP the power to modify the liberal image they projected in 2002.²⁸⁸ Consequently, there was a shift towards the old roots, in other words, the ideological basis of the National Outlook. For example, before 2007, Erdoğan exhibited a cooperative and moderate approach to foreign policy. However, in 2009, he did not hesitate to take the first step that negatively impacted Turkey-Israel relations. During the Davos Economic Forum, Erdoğan verbally argued with President of Israel Shimon Peres, accusing Israel of committing human rights violations against Palestinians in Gaza and perpetrating massacres.²⁸⁹ Similarly, in 2002, Erdoğan indicated that he had no problem with Atatürk's reforms. However, he subsequently changed his discourse, emphasizing that conservative Muslims in Turkey were constantly oppressed due to Kemalist ideology.²⁹⁰ At this point, the notable aspect is Erdoğan's politically flexible and pragmatic character rather than his roots in National Outlook. Prior to 2007, or in other words, until he consolidated his political power, it can be said that Erdoğan did not reflect his fundamental political perceptions and approach. Within this framework, the initial embrace of Western values and the perception of the West as Turkey's natural ally during the early years of power have gradually given way to a view of the West as a rival, replaced by a strategic partnership approach grounded in balance politics.

²⁸⁸ Acar Kutay, "A Historical Analysis of the AKP in Power: Hegemony, Predominance, and Interregnum," *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift* 123, no. 1 (2021), p. 61-64.

²⁸⁹ BIANET, "Erdoğan Leaves Davos Gaza Panel in Protest," 2009, <https://m.bianet.org/bianet/world/112227-Erdoğan-leaves-davos-gaza-panel-in-protest>. (Accessed on 04 August 2022)

²⁹⁰ Ihsan Yılmaz, "Erdoğan's Political Journey: From Victimised Muslim Democrat to Authoritarian, Islamist Populist," *ECPS*, 7 (Brussels, 2021), p. 12.

Erdoğan and the AKP's reversion to the foundational principles of National Outlook has integrated elements such as Ottomanism and Muslim identity as central components in their policy implementation. For example, to address the persistent issue posed by the PKK terrorist organization in Turkey, Erdoğan posited that a shared Muslim identity could be an effective solution. Within this framework, he contended that the Turkish state had previously enacted misguided policies towards the Kurds and subsequently issued an apology on behalf of the Turkish state.²⁹¹ Erdoğan, emphasizing his opposition to all forms of ethnic nationalism, highlighted common values and the bond of Islam rather than ethnic origins.²⁹² Through a project called *the Solution Process*, the AKP government both initiated negotiations with the PKK for disarmament and aimed to address the demands of Kurds in Turkey through various reforms, including the use of the Kurdish language. Additionally, in terms of foreign policy, Erdoğan asserted that Turkey's influence extended beyond the geographical boundaries of Anatolia. He envisioned the hope and salvation of the Middle East, Africa, the Balkans, and the Caucasus—regions corresponding to the former Ottoman Empire—as being intertwined with the success of the AKP.²⁹³ In this context, the AKP government's policy towards the MENA and Turkey's direct involvement in the Syrian civil war aligned with Erdoğan's political perspectives rooted in Islam and Ottomanism.

Although Erdoğan clearly displayed his Islamic-based political approach after 2007, the turning point in his perceptions about the most profound rupture with the Euro-Atlantic can be

²⁹¹ BBC, "Turkey PM Erdoğan Apologises for 1930s Kurdish Killings," 2011, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-15857429>. (Accessed on 04 August 2022)

²⁹² Hürriyet, "Erdoğan: Milliyetçilik Ayak Altında," 2013, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/Erdoğan-milliyetçilik-ayak-altında-22621388>. (Accessed on 04 August 2022)

²⁹³ T24, "Başbakan Erdoğan'ın Konuşmasının Tam Metni," 2012, <https://t24.com.tr/haber/basbakan-Erdoğanın-konusmasının-tam-metni,214180>. (Accessed on 04 August 2022)

identified as the 2013 Gezi Park protests. Emerging as a reaction to the AKP's Islamic-based political approach, the Gezi Park protests not only caused a division within Turkish society between secularists and conservatives but also transformed into a social movement that posed a threat to Erdoğan's legitimacy in power.²⁹⁴ The suppression of this social movement became crucial for the AKP government; on the other hand, messages given from the Euro-Atlantic criticized the government's use of violence to suppress these protests. At this point, in Erdoğan's perception, the West transformed from being Turkey's ally to an external force that sought to undermine the country's stability and impede its development.²⁹⁵ Additionally, during the same period, the escalation of the civil war in Syria and the PKK's attempts to establish an autonomous state in southeastern Turkey instead of disarming hindered Erdoğan's plans to resolve the Kurdish issue based on Muslimness.²⁹⁶ This situation led to the termination of *the Solution Process* and also meant the failure of an implemented policy by Erdoğan based on Islamism. From this point onward, as the intensity of Turkey's armed struggle against Kurdish groups both within its borders and in Syria escalated, AKP government showed no hesitation in diverging from the political agenda of its NATO allies.

From Erdoğan's perspective, while the West had already diminished in its alliance value especially after 2013 period, another significant turning point occurred in 2016. The coup attempt initiated that year by a faction of the Turkish Army aimed directly at overthrowing the AKP government. Although the coup attempt failed, subsequent investigations led the AKP government to conclude that the plot was orchestrated by the

²⁹⁴ Ergun Özbudun, "AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan's Majoritarian Drift," *South European Society and Politics* 19, no. 2 (2014), p. 157.

²⁹⁵ Yılmaz, "Erdoğan's Political Journey: From Victimised Muslim Democrat to Authoritarian, Islamist Populist.," p. 13.

²⁹⁶ Talha Köse, "Çözüm Sürecinin Yükseliş ve Düşüşü," *Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi* 4, no. 1 (2017), p. 33.

Gülen Movement, a religious cult led by cleric Fethullah Gülen. The military coup attempt was perceived as an effort to oust the AKP government, alter the country's regime, and install Gülen as the new leader of Turkey.²⁹⁷ In response, Erdoğan called on the US government to extradite Fethullah Gülen, who resides in the United States and is recognized by the Turkish state as the leader of a terrorist organization. Additionally, Turkey sought cooperation from European countries in combating the Gülen Movement, which it had declared a terrorist organization.²⁹⁸ It can be said that the lack of expected responses from the AKP government by both the US and Europe, along with the US rejecting Gülen's extradition on the grounds of insufficient concrete evidence, further solidified Erdoğan's negative perceptions of the West.²⁹⁹ From this point onwards, Erdoğan has accused the West of supporting terrorism. He has expressed his belief that the West does not adhere to justice and law-based approaches, emphasizing the hypocrisy.³⁰⁰ While from Erdoğan's perspective, Western countries became unreliable allies, Russia's political steps following the coup attempt were supportive of the AKP government. Kremlin, which had previously emphasized the dangerous nature of the Gülen

²⁹⁷ Presidency of Republic of Türkiye, "10 Questions to Understand 15 July Coup Attempt and Fetullah Terrorist Organization," 2016, <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/assets/dosya/2016-12-02-onsorudafeto-tr-en.pdf>.

²⁹⁸ Euronews, "Erdoğan, ABD'den Fethullah Gülen'in iadesini Talep Etti," 2016, <https://tr.euronews.com/2016/07/16/Erdoğan-amerika-ya-seslenerek-fethullah-gulen-in-iadesini-talep-etti>. (Accessed on 04 August 2022)

²⁹⁹ Deutsche Welle, "Turkey to Halt Extraditions to US until It Gets Gulen," 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-to-halt-extraditions-to-us-until-it-gets-fethullah-gulen/a-42116304>. (Accessed on 04 August 2022)

³⁰⁰ Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Justice, "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Cumhuriyet Tarihimizde İlk Defa Yargımız Darbecilerin Değil, Milletin Yanında Yer Aldı," 2018, <https://basin.adalet.gov.tr/cumhurbaskani-Erdoğan-cumhuriyet-tarihimizde-ilk-defa-yargimiz-darbecilerin-degil-milletin-yaninda-yer-aldi>.

Movement even before 2016, conveyed a message to Erdoğan after the coup attempt, expressing its openness to any cooperation in combating the Gülen Movement.³⁰¹ Thus, Putin began to be referred as “*friend*,” and Erdoğan emphasized that Russia’s support was vital for Turkey’s future.³⁰² In this context, since 2016, Erdoğan’s entirely negative perception of the West, coupled with his simultaneously improving positive perception of Russia, has ultimately shaped his policy outlook and triggered a disagreement with NATO on this matter.

In light of all these factors, it is evident that Erdoğan’s and, by extension, the AKP government’s political perceptions and ideology are not independent of the Islam-based approach of the National Outlook Movement from which they emerged. However, while Erdoğan and the AKP government are rooted in this tradition, they do not fully embody the strict Islamic political stance of the National Outlook Movement. Pragmatic actions and sharp political maneuvers during moments of political crisis are integral to Erdoğan’s leader image. In this context, it can be understood that while the concepts of Islam and Ottomanism shape the ideological foundation of Turkish foreign policy moves by the AKP government, these moves are also calculated to allow for rapid shifts in stance during political crises. From this ideological perspective, the West is primarily perceived as a rival, while at the same time, it is interpreted as a strategic partner with whom balanced politics must be pursued within the framework of power dynamics. However, over time, the internal and external policy outcomes of Erdoğan’s and the AKP government’s ideology have transformed the West from a mere competitor into an external force/enemy perceived as a threat to Turkey. This perception has had significant implications for NATO, manifesting in Turkey’s growing distrust and

³⁰¹ Şener Aktürk, “Relations between Russia and Turkey before, during, and after the Failed Coup of 2016,” *Insight Turkey* 21, no. 4 (2019), p. 105.

³⁰² Hürriyet, “Dostum Putin’in Desteğine İhtiyacım Var,” 2016, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/dostum-putinin-destegine-ihhtiyacim-var-40257109>. (Accessed on 04 August 2022)

divergence from its allies. In particular, Turkey's challenges to its NATO allies in the context of counterterrorism efforts and the development of positive relations with Russia coincide with a period in which negative perceptions of the West peaked, and Erdoğan's political pragmatism increasingly framed the West as an adversary.




Figure 7: Milestones of Erdoğan's Political Perceptions³⁰³

3.1.2. Strategic Culture (Grand Strategy) of Turkey

As it has mentioned before in the theoretical part, a country's strategic culture embodies a collective consciousness that influences its grand strategy in the international arena. In essence, strategic culture encompasses the beliefs, perceptions, and expectations of both the decision-making political elites and the society that elects them. This strategic culture can be reshaped over time through historical events, and it can also be altered by the deliberate actions and plans of a government in power.³⁰⁴

When the AKP government came to power in 2002, it not only assumed the power of governance but also inherited the strategic culture of a Turkish state that was laid in 1923. This inherited strategic culture was a structure that had been shaped around Kemalist principles due to the collapse of the Ottoman

³⁰³ Created by the author.

³⁰⁴ Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 66-68.

Empire and the declaration of the Republic of Turkey.³⁰⁵ The grand strategy of the Turkish state, established on new foundations by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923, was shaped in response to the shortcomings of the Ottoman Empire prior to its collapse. For instance, it was observed that the Ottoman Empire's attempts to promote the concept of Ottomanism (uniting all people within the Ottoman geography under an Ottoman identity) and the idea of Islamic unity had failed to save the empire from destruction. In this regard, Atatürk's efforts to transform the Turkish state into a homogeneous structure (nation-state) and adopt a state vision free from imperialist goals were strategic moves aimed at addressing these observed shortcomings.³⁰⁶

With the declaration of the republic, Atatürk introduced the idea of constructing the new structure of the Turkish state based on six main principles (Kemalist principles). Within this framework, four of the principles³⁰⁷: republicanism, secularism, nationalism, and reformism, possessed a direct influence on shaping new Turkish foreign policy and security strategy. The principle of republicanism aimed to detach the state's form of governance and structure from monarchy and imperialist roots. The principle of secularism aimed to eliminate the Islamic-centered identity of the Ottoman Empire. Through the principle of nationalism, the new Turkish state sought to establish a sense of Turkishness, and national consciousness based on shared history, culture, and language among the population within its borders. The principle of reformism aimed to promote Turkey's integration with the developed and modern

³⁰⁵ Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy since 2002: Between a 'Post-Islamist' Government and a Kemalist State," *International Affairs* 83, no. 2 (2007), p. 289.

³⁰⁶ Malik Mufti, *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture Republic at Sea* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 18.

³⁰⁷ Six principles of Kemalism: Republicanism, Populism, Nationalism, Secularism, Statism, and Reformism.

world (the West) and prepare the country for these relations.³⁰⁸ In line with these principles, the strategic culture of the Republic of Turkey completely abandoned the expansionist policies of the Ottoman Empire, focusing instead on national unity within the new borders (Anatolia) and refraining from involvement in conflicts outside the country's borders. It transformed into a new identity that prioritized territorial integrity and independence as fundamental goals.³⁰⁹ In other words, Turkey's foreign and security policy, within the framework of the motto "*peace at home, peace in the world*" focused solely on Turkey's security and the interests of the Turkish nation. It was emphasized that Turkey would refrain from engaging in conflicts and avoid using hard power unless there was a direct threat to its independence and territorial integrity. By avoiding involvement in conflicts, Turkey put forward its commitment to developing diplomacy as a means of power within the framework of rational policies. Consequently, the country expressed its desire to engage in international organizations and to enhance military, economic, and political cooperation with the Western world.³¹⁰

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who led Turkey's war for independence during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, recognized that the state's achievements and stability would be attained not only on the battlefield but also through successful diplomatic relations and strategic collaborations. In this context, it was crucial for the country to cooperate with the West to maximize its gains and security while simultaneously relying on its own

³⁰⁸ Aslı Ilgıt and Binnur Ozkececi-Taner, "Identity and Decision Making: Toward a Collaborative Approach to State Action," in *Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012), p. 100.

³⁰⁹ Ryan Evans, "Turkey's Shifting Strategic Culture: Part 2 – The Rise of Republican Strategic Culture," 2014, <https://www.fpri.org/2014/10/turkeys-shifting-strategic-culture-part-2-the-rise-of-republican-strategic-culture/>.

³¹⁰ Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Atatürk Döneminde Türk Dış Politikası," 2022, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/ataturk-doneminde-turk-dis-politikasi.tr.mfa>.

strength.³¹¹ The political move of successor governments after Atatürk's death toward NATO membership was also part of this objective. In the emerging bipolar world order, Turkey's participation in the alliance signified its inclusion in the community of civilized societies and enabled the country to establish relations with Western states on an equal footing. As a result, Turkey gained the ability to influence other states as a member of this alliance, making a move that would guarantee its security and stability. Beyond security concerns, NATO membership also solidified the new strategic culture of the state, which emphasized the disengagement from the East (Ottoman past) and a shift towards the West.³¹²

Until the 1970s, although the state's strategic culture and core principles remained unchanged, the Cold War's impact on Turkey led to a division within Turkish society into two camps (Turkish nationalists and supporters of communism) and revised Atatürk's understanding of nationalism. During this period, in contrast to Communist ideology, Turkish nationalists emphasized religious values, bringing the Islamic identity back to the forefront. In this regard, an understanding of a Turkish nation based on the synthesis of Turkishness and Islam began to develop.³¹³ Hence, Atatürk's concept of a nation based on cultural, historical, and linguistic unity gradually gave way to an approach that integrated Islam with Turkishness. The integration of Islamic values into the national identity gained momentum in the 1970s, but efforts to orient Turkey towards both the West and the East in the country's strategic culture became prominent in the 1990s when the Cold War was coming to an end. The initiatives of Turgut Özal, who was the 8th President

³¹¹ Emel Akçali and Mehmet Perinçek, "Kemalist Eurasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Discourse in Turkey," *Geopolitics* 14, no. 3 (2009), p. 554-555.

³¹² Ilgit and Ozkececi-Taner, "Identity and Decision Making: Toward a Collaborative Approach to State Action," p. 102.

³¹³ Mustafa Şen, "Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party," *Turkish Studies* 11, no. 1 (2010), p.61.

of Turkey, brought this orientation to the forefront. Özal saw the power vacuum resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union as an opportunity and took steps to establish deep relations with the newly independent Turkic countries in Central Asia and the states in the Balkans. Additionally, Turkey began to develop dialogues to increase its influence in the Middle East. In this context, Özal became the first leader to challenge Turkey's status quo-oriented and Western-focused strategic culture, attempting to revise it.³¹⁴ Özal's sudden death, accompanied by political crises and economic turmoil, resulted in the premature fading of the ambitious plans for a highly influential Turkish state, "*ranging from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China.*"³¹⁵ At this point, it can be said that when the AKP came to power in 2002, the strategic culture that the AKP inherited was largely based on Kemalist ideology, but it had already begun to undergo certain changes. Islamic values had significantly reintegrated with the Turkish national identity after the 1970s, and initial concrete steps were taken towards reshaping the strategic culture.

Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was Erdoğan's chief foreign policy advisor in 2003 and later became the Minister of Foreign Affairs, assumed a key position in shaping Turkey's foreign policy strategy. Drawing upon the accumulated historical background, Davutoğlu had already systematically presented his observations on the desired strategic culture of the state and outlined new plans that needed to be implemented in his book *Stratejik Derinlik* (Strategic Depth), published in 2001. These observations and plans put forth by Davutoğlu gradually began to be implemented in Turkey's foreign and security policy, transforming

³¹⁴ Alexander Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 6 (2006), p. 946-947.

³¹⁵ Göktürk Tüysüzoğlu, "Milenyum Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası: Yeni Osmanlılık ve Türk Avrasyacılığı Ekseninde İnşa Edilen Bir Pragmatizm," *Alternatif Politika* 5, no. 3 (2013), p. 304.

into a doctrine starting in 2003.³¹⁶ Davutoğlu identified coalition governments, economic crises, and the lack of a distinct theory in Turkish foreign policy as vital shortcomings. However, his fundamental criticism was directed toward the country's strategic vision based on Kemalism. According to him, Turkey's post-republic vision was one-dimensional and filled with errors that prevented evaluating its full potential. The country failed to utilize its geopolitical advantages and rich historical heritage. Instead of possessing a strategic mindset like great powers, Turkey tended to preserve the status quo with a vision of a small state. This condition had a link to Turkey abandoning its Ottoman past and losing its great power identity. The distinction between great and small powers was the ability of great powers to embrace and effectively utilize their rich historical and cultural heritage.³¹⁷ Identifying the existing strategic culture as the fundamental problem, Davutoğlu designed a solution to address it by reclaiming the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire and effectively employing it in foreign policy. In this context, Turkey, referred to as the "*near land basin*" by Davutoğlu, initially aimed to increase its sphere of influence in the Balkans, Middle East, and the Caucasus. By expanding its influence in these regions, Turkey could subsequently become a power that also exerted influence in North Africa, Europe, and Central and East Asia. In this regard, the emphasis on the common historical and cultural heritage established by the Ottoman Empire had a pivotal role in the Balkans, Middle East, and Caucasus. Turkey would establish zero-problem networks of relations with governments in these regions through diplomacy while also utilizing public diplomacy to positively transform the perception of Turkey among the societies in these areas. In other words, Turkey would present an independent vision, not conforming to Western impositions, and hold the

³¹⁶ Cengiz Çandar, "Turkey's 'Soft Power' Strategy: A New Vision for a Multi-Polar World," *SETA*, 2009, p.5.

³¹⁷ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001), p. 45-87.

reins in its own hands, thereby freeing the country from being confined within the narrow boundaries of Anatolia.³¹⁸

At this point, it can be observed that Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth doctrine meant resetting Turkey's national identity and understanding of national borders, rendering it utterly independent from Kemalism. The national identity initially formulated by Atatürk, which later evolved into the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, was transformed into an Ottoman-Islamic synthesis by Strategic Depth. In other words, the Ottoman identity substituted the shared historical and cultural heritage represented by Turkishness before.³¹⁹ While the country's official borders were limited to Anatolia, the perception of Turkey extended beyond that. Turkey's borders encompassed not only the regions inhabited by Turks but also all the geographies where the Ottoman Empire left a historical mark.³²⁰ On the other hand, the strategic culture formed by the AKP government did not aim for a complete rupture with the West. While Turkey presented a strategy of becoming an influential state, it also intended to advance its relations with the West steadily. However, a crucial aspect of these relations was that they must not harm Turkey's national interests.³²¹ In this context, the positive relations with the West established in the early years of the AKP government, such as the goal of European Union membership and smooth relations with NATO, were not contrary to the

³¹⁸ Ibid, p. 97-124.

³¹⁹ Cenk Saraçoğlu, "Akp, Milliyetçilik Ve Dış Politika: Bir Milliyetçilik Doktrini Olarak Stratejik Derinlik," *Alternatif Politika* 5, no. 1 (2013), p. 55.

³²⁰ Cenk Saraçoğlu and Özhan Demirkol, "Nationalism and Foreign Policy Discourse in Turkey under the AKP Rule: Geography, History and National Identity," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 3 (2015), p. 310-313.

³²¹ Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Speech Entitled 'Vision 2023: Turkey's Foreign Policy Objectives' Delivered by H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu," 2011, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-entitled-vision-2023-turkey-s-foreign-policy-objectives-delivered-by-h_e_ahmet-davutoglu-minister-of-foreign-af.en.mfa.

new strategic culture that was developed. Alongside smooth relations with the West, also Turkey's steps to resolve issues with Armenia, positive diplomatic relations established with the governments of Libya and Syria aligned with the country's vision of becoming a great power and exerting influence in the former Ottoman territories.

While the Strategic Depth doctrine emphasized soft power and smooth diplomatic relations, it also emphasized that Turkey would no longer pursue a reactionary policy and, therefore, it must be ready to use all options, including hard power, without hesitation when necessary. In other words, Turkey would proactively and preventively intervene in crises that it deemed important regions, reflecting all possibilities on the ground, including military power.³²² The Syrian civil war was a prime example of this approach. Although the AKP government initiated positive diplomatic relations with the Assad regime in 2008, Assad was generally perceived as a potential threat to Turkey's grand strategy. Davutoğlu had already indicated the necessity of eliminating leaders promoting Arab nationalism like Assad in the Middle East and supporting Islamic movements in the region for Turkey to become a pivotal actor by freely maneuvering in the region.³²³ In this context, the AKP's proactive vision encompassed a direct involvement in the Syrian civil war and an attempt to overthrow Assad rather than remaining passive. Furthermore, the Turkish Foreign Ministry declared standing against the Assad regime in Syria as an inevitable historical mission and a realistic policy.³²⁴ For Turkey,

³²² Burçin Hafize Tarcan, Hilal Akgüller, and Kübra Işık, "Ahmet Davutoğlu Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası," *Econder International Academic Journal* 2, no. 2 (2018), p. 255-256.

³²³ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Ortadoğu'nun Geleceği ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Alternatifleri," *Yeni Şafak*, 1996, <https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/ahmet-davutoglu/ortadogunun-gelecegi-ve-turkiyenin-di-politika-alternatifleri-2026912>.

³²⁴ Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun VI. Büyükelçiler Konferansının Açılış Oturumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma," 2014,

which could directly target the Damascus regime, diverging from its Western allies and breaking free from the status quo posed no problem within the framework of the grand strategy. In 2012, Davutoğlu explicitly announced that Turkey would continue coordinating its actions with its Western allies but would never accept approaches that did not align with its policies, Turkey could take different positions in line with its interests.³²⁵

The grand strategy formulated by the AKP government has demonstrated that Turkey's new vision transcends the principles of Kemalism, aiming to become a global power akin to the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, the balance (status quo) established in foreign and security policy prior to the AKP era has undergone a transformation. At this juncture, Turkey's intervention in political events beyond its national borders (particularly in the Middle East, Balkans, and Caucasus) has become an integral part of its grand strategy. Principles based on Islamism and Ottomanism have formed the cornerstone of this new vision. Therefore, Turkey's active role in the Syrian civil war as an influential actor is one of the most striking manifestations of this new vision on the ground. Additionally, the new strategic culture reassessing Turkey's relations with the West in the context of Turkey's potential as a major power aims to encourage different stances, moving beyond the existing balance in these relationships.

3.2. Remarks on Ideational Factors

The examination of Erdoğan's leader image and the ideological foundation of the AKP reveals that the core ideology of this political leader and party, which emerged from the National

https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu_nun-vi_-buyukelciler-konferansinin-acilis-oturumunda-yaptiklari-konusma_-13-ocak-2014_-an.tr.mfa.

³²⁵ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring," *TEPAV*, 2012, p.4.

Outlook Movement, is shaped within the context of Islamism and Ottomanism. However, this ideology also possesses a pragmatic nature, capable of sudden changes during political crises rather than adhering to rigid fundamentalism. In this regard, it is evident that the strategic culture of Modern Turkey, which embraced Kemalist principles and a nation-state concept refraining from intervention beyond its borders, has been revised under Erdoğan's AKP. This revision has manifested in the form of *strategic depth*. Consequently, Turkey has implemented a foreign policy strategy that actively engages politically and militarily, particularly in the former Ottoman territories, and makes moves that transcend the existing status quo, reinforcing its identity as a major power.

Erdoğan's ability to revise and reconstruct the existing strategic culture according to his political perceptions and ideologies reflects his ideological power as a leader. Therefore, the ideological factors are complementary to Turkey's conflict areas with NATO. Firstly, Turkey's intervention in the Syrian civil war itself reflects the Ottomanist ideology. Secondly, the divergence from Western allies in dealing with Kurdish armed groups that emerged from the Syria issue, as well as the rapprochement with Russia by confronting NATO allies, align with its self-ascribed identity as a "major power" and a proactive stance against the status quo.

3.3. Political Survival

This concept is examined under two subheadings. The first subheading analyzes the relationship between the AKP government and domestic institutions from 2002 to 2020. In this context, the interactions between the government, the parliament, and the Turkish military are examined, alongside an assessment of the government's influence over these institutions. Parliament was selected due to its critical role as a vital organ for legislation and policy development, while the military was chosen for its potential political influence and its direct connection

to the alliance as a domestic institution. The second subheading, which focuses on state-society relations, evaluates the trends in political support the AKP government received from Turkish society between 2002 and 2020.

Through these subheadings, the study determines whether the AKP government's political power has experienced any disruptions over time and elucidates the strategies employed by the government to maintain its political dominance. Consequently, any policy changes (if there are any) implemented by the government for the purpose of political survival and their ramifications on foreign policy and relations with NATO are detailed in this section.

3.3.1. Domestic Institutions

3.3.1.1. AKP's Position in the Parliament

In formulating a state's foreign and security policy, the level of consensus or divergence among decision-making political elites plays a crucial role. The extent of divergence among these elites influences whether a state will maintain the status quo in its foreign policy. When there are significant differences in perceptions regarding international politics among political elites, it becomes challenging for the government to implement political moves that would alter the status quo. This is because the opposition can veto the government's initiatives at points of divergence during the decision-making process. Consequently, the composition and positions of political parties in the parliament of democratic countries become pivotal in shaping the country's foreign and security policy.³²⁶

In the 2002 general elections, when the AKP came to power, a bipolar structure emerged in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. While the AKP, with 35% of the votes, took power,

³²⁶ Randall L. Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," *International Security* 29, no. 2 (2004), p. 170-172.

the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi/ Republican People's Party), with a 19% vote share, positioned itself as the main opposition. The other political parties failed to enter the parliament as they could not surpass the 10% electoral threshold. Thus, a parliamentary composition was formed that was shaped only by two political parties.³²⁷ The political approach of the CHP, which gained the central opposition position, showed significant divergence from the AKP. While the AKP positioned itself on the right side of the political spectrum as a conservative party, the CHP saw itself responsible for preserving the Kemalist principles as the founding party of the Republic of Turkey, established by Atatürk. In this context, the CHP in domestic politics particularly emphasized secular republican values while, in foreign policy, it advocated for integration with the West and signaled Turkey's avoidance of extraterritorial conflicts by upholding the status quo.³²⁸ The CHP consistently opposed the AKP's revisionist political maneuvers and exercised its veto power to counteract these initiatives. For instance, in 2003, when the AKP exhibited a favorable disposition towards a collaborative military operation with the United States against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, it encountered vehement criticism and a veto from the CHP. During the parliamentary session deliberating the motion for Turkey's involvement in the Iraq war, Onder Sav, the general secretary of the CHP, asserted that Turkey must not engage in a "dirty war" and declared that the CHP would not share the political responsibility with the AKP.³²⁹ The motion was ultimately rejected by the

³²⁷ Republic of Türkiye Supreme Election Council, "22. Dönem Milletvekili Genel Seçimi," 2022, <https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/03-kasim-2002-xxii-donem-milletvekili-genel-secimi/3009>. (Accessed on 07 August 2022)

³²⁸ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, "Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 2002 Seçim Bildirgesi," 2002, <https://chp.org.tr/yayin/2002-secim-bildirgesi/Open>.

³²⁹ Grand National Assembly of Turkey, "Parliamentary Minutes (39th Meeting, 1.3.2003)," 2003,

combined vetoes of all CHP deputies and some AKP deputies, underscoring the AKP government's insufficient power to modify the status quo then. Consequently, the AKP government could not advance its revisionist policies until the 2007 general elections, wherein it consolidated its political authority.

In the 2007 general elections, the AKP augmented its vote share by more than ten percentage points, securing 341 seats out of the total 550 seats in the parliament, which constituted 46% of the votes. At this juncture, the AKP established a robust governmental position with a representation authority surpassing an absolute majority in the parliament. Another significant outcome of these general elections was reconfiguring the opposition distribution. While the CHP retained its status as the main opposition party, the MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi/Nationalist Movement Party) bolstered its position and emerged as another principal opposition party within the parliament.³³⁰ However, in contrast to the CHP, the MHP exhibited an ideological affinity closer to the AKP's. The MHP positioned itself on the right side of the political spectrum, underscoring Turkish nationalism. In advocating for the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the MHP ascribed significant importance to Islamic values. Furthermore, the MHP harbored skepticism towards globalization and cautiously approached relations with the West.³³¹ Regarding foreign and security policy, the party endorsed Turkey's role as a preeminent regional power and supported an active Turkish policy in the Middle East, Balkans, and the Caucasus. Moreover, the MHP did not perceive using deterrent military power to advance Turkey's interests as

<https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c006/tbmm22006039.pdf>.

³³⁰ Republic of Türkiye Supreme Election Council, "23. Dönem Milletvekili Genel Seçimi," 2022, <https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/22-temmuz-2007-xxiii-donem-milletvekili-genel-secimi/5001>.

³³¹ Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, "TÜRK SİYASETİNDE YOZLAŞMA VE ARAYIŞ SÜRECİNDE MİLLİYETÇİ HAREKET PARTİSİ" (Ankara, 2002), p. 34-52.

problematic.³³² In essence, the MHP's political approach was consonant with the AKP's vision of a strong Turkey that reveres and upholds the legacy of the Ottoman Empire.

Domestically, however, the Kurdish policy and the resolution process with the PKK, as well as the external issue of Syria, created significant divergence between the AKP and the MHP. Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the MHP, criticized the AKP for what he perceived as concessions to terrorism (the PKK) within the framework of the resolution process and issued stern warnings against continuing this policy.³³³ Concerning Syria, the MHP emphasized that Turkey was being manipulated by its Western allies. According to the MHP, the escalating civil war in Syria had spawned new terrorist threats (mainly from the PYD/YPG). The MHP insisted that Turkey must revise its Syrian policy and prioritize combating armed Kurdish groups in the region.³³⁴ Conversely, the CHP adopted a position diametrically opposed to the AKP's approach to Syria. The CHP argued that Turkey should refrain from intervening in Syria's internal affairs and maintain complete neutrality in the Syrian civil war.³³⁵ Despite these divergences between the two major opposition parties in parliament, the AKP, having garnered almost 50% of the votes in the 2011 elections, maintained a robust

³³² Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, "Parti Programı," 2009, https://mhp.org.tr/usr_img/_mhp2007/kitaplar/mhp_parti_programi_2009_opt.pdf.

³³³ VOA News, "Çözüm Sürecinde AKP-MHP Gerilimi Artıyor," 2013, <https://www.voaturkce.com/a/cozum-surecinde-akp-ve-mhp-arasinda-gerilim-artiyor/1633471.html>. (Accessed on 07 August 2022)

³³⁴ Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, "Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Genel Başkanı Sayın Devlet BAHÇELİ'nin, TBMM Grup Toplantısında Yapmış Oldukları Konuşma," 2012, https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/mhp/2407/mhp/Milliyetci_Hareket_Partisi_Genel_Baskani_Sayin_Devlet_BAHCELI_nin_gunu_TBM_M_Grup_Toplantisinda_yapmis_olduklari_konusma_16.html.

³³⁵ Hürriyet, "Kılıçdaroğlu'ndan Türk Hükümetine Suriye Eleştirisi," 2013, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/kilicdaroglundan-turk-hukumetine-suriye-elestirisi-22347924>. (Accessed on 07 August 2022)

position unaffected by opposition veto power.³³⁶ In this context, the AKP was able to advance its political agenda despite the criticisms from the opposition.

Until 2015, the AKP did not face the obstacle of the opposition's veto power. However, the general elections held on June 7, 2015, which coincided with a period of deepening Syrian civil war and a lack of progress in the solution process with the PKK, had shaken the AKP's strong government position for the first time. As a result of the elections, the AKP, which had held an absolute parliamentary majority since 2002, lost its ability to govern alone, and the necessity of forming a coalition government emerged. Also, the June 7 elections showed increased votes for the MHP, which advocated security-oriented policies. Another noteworthy aspect was the significant rise in votes for the HDP (Halkların Demokratik Partisi/ People's Democratic Party), representing the political wing of the Kurdish movement in Turkey. The representatives of the Kurdish movement, who had failed to surpass the 10% electoral threshold in previous elections, reached a 13% vote share and became a key political party in the parliament.³³⁷ However, the political maneuver executed by the MHP effectively nullified the results of the June 7 elections. The MHP declared its refusal to participate in any coalition government, advocated for new elections, and indirectly supported the continuation of the AKP administration.³³⁸ Due to the MHP's opposition to coalition formations, the AKP garnered 49% of the vote in the repeat general

³³⁶ Republic of Türkiye Supreme Election Council, "24. Dönem Milletvekili Genel Seçimi," 2022, <https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/12-haziran-2011-xxiv-donem-milletvekili-genel-secimi/4929>. (Accessed on 07 August 2022)

³³⁷ Alper Ballı, "7 Haziran Seçiminin 8 Sonucu," *BBC NEWS TÜRKÇE*, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/06/150608_secim_satir_baslari_gs2015.

³³⁸ *BBC NEWS TÜRKÇE*, "Devlet Bahçeli: Türkiye'de Son 16 Yılda Siyasete Yön Veren Kararları," 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/43799117>. (Accessed on 07 August 2022)

elections held on November 1, 2015, thereby regaining the authority to form a single-party government.³³⁹ A crucial point to note is that immediately following the MHP's political stance favoring the AKP government, the Turkish state terminated the solution process with the PKK and initiated a campaign against the PKK/PYD. This campaign posed challenges to Turkey's relations with its Western allies, particularly in the context of counterterrorism methods. However, it simultaneously reduced the divergence between the AKP and the MHP.

After 2015, the convergence between the AKP and MHP, driven by the government's security-oriented policies, brought forth another critical issue for the AKP: securing MHP's support for transitioning from a parliamentary to a presidential system via constitutional amendments. Erdoğan's election as the Turkish President in 2014, constrained by the AKP's internal regulation that prohibited holding the same position for more than three terms, catalyzed this process. Despite maintaining a dominant influence over the AKP, Erdoğan was confined to the limited authority of the presidential office within the parliamentary system. Consequently, transitioning to a presidential system became a priority for Erdoğan post-2014.³⁴⁰ However, the AKP lacked sufficient parliamentary seats to unilaterally enact the constitutional amendment or even to present it for a referendum. The diminished divergence between the AKP and MHP rendered the MHP a pivotal ally for Erdoğan. Turkey's military operations against the PYD and ISIS in Syria in 2016, coupled with its closer ties with Russia aimed at resolving the Syrian conflict, garnered favor from the MHP.³⁴¹ his alignment

³³⁹ Republic of Türkiye Supreme Election Council, "26. Dönem Milletvekili Genel Seçimi," 2022, <https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/1-kasim-2015--26-donem-milletvekili-genel-secimi/3413>. (Accessed on 07 August 2022)

³⁴⁰ SÖZCÜ, "Erdoğan'dan Başkanlık Sistemi Açıklaması," 2015, <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/gundem/Erdoğandan-baskanlik-sistemi-aciklamasi-989489/>. (Accessed on 07 August 2022)

³⁴¹ Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, "Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Genel Başkanı Sayın Devlet BAHÇELİ'nin, TBMM Grup Toplantısında Yapmış

prompted the MHP to support the AKP's push for a presidential system and to abstain from exercising its veto power during the constitutional amendment process.³⁴² The 2017 referendum facilitated Turkey's transition to a presidential system, subsequently leading to a formal AKP-MHP alliance. In this context, it is evident that the MHP's support since 2015 and the execution of nationalist and security-oriented policies have been indispensable for the AKP in maintaining a robust government position.

The composition of political parties within the Turkish Grand National Assembly illustrates how the strength of the AKP government predominantly constrained the opposition's ability to exercise veto power and shape the nation's foreign and security policies. However, the erosion of the AKP's dominance in 2015 and its subsequent reliance on the MHP elevated the significance of the MHP's security-centric policies. Consequently, the MHP, unlike other parliamentary parties, attained a pivotal role in influencing Turkey's foreign and security policies from that period onwards. The AKP's efforts to maintain a robust governmental presence in parliament and secure the MHP's support are intricately linked to Turkey's shift towards a more nationalist tone and the adoption of more security-focused strategies.

3.3.1.2. AKP and Turkish Army

It is possible to discuss the military's influence on a country's foreign policy and security strategy in all states, whether democratic or not. However, in democratic states, incorporating the military into the decision-making processes cooperatively and

Oldukları Konuşma,” 2017,
https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/genel_baskan/konusma/4311/index.html.

³⁴² Gazete Duvar, “Kapıyı Açan Bahçeli Oldu,” 2017,
<https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/gundem/2017/04/15/kapiyi-bahceli-acti>. (Accessed on 07 August 2022)

limiting the military's influence under the authority of elected governments prevents crises between the state and the military and prevents the military from acting as a fundamental political veto player.³⁴³ However, in Turkey, it can be observed that the military, by not assuming a position under the authority of elected governments, directly engages with politics, thus positioning itself as a fundamental veto player in the country, as evidenced by the military coups it has carried out. Since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, the Turkish Army has directly intervened in Turkish politics by carrying out two military coups (in 1960 and 1980) and forcing the resignation of governments through the threat of military coups on two occasions (in 1971 and 1997). In other words, the military has removed governments by using force when they veto their policies.³⁴⁴ In this context, during the AKP government period, the military's position, and the power struggle between the AKP and the Turkish Army came to the forefront of the country's political life.

The first military coup carried out by the Turkish Army, known as the 1960 coup, targeted Demokrat Parti (the Democrat Party) government. The party, which came to power in the first general elections following Turkey's transition to a multi-party system, maintained its position until the 1960 military coup. However, the Democrat Party in government attempted to exert influence over the entire bureaucracy, applied political pressure on the opposition CHP, and failed to intervene in various Islamic reactionary activities, ultimately leading to the military coup in 1960. As a result of the coup, the Prime Minister and leader of the Democrat Party, Adnan Menderes, was tried on various charges such as constitutional violations and corruption

³⁴³ Haluk Alkan, "15 Temmuz'u Anlamak: Parametreler ve Sonuçlar," *Bilgi* 79, no. 1 (2016), p. 257.

³⁴⁴ Pelin Telsiren Kadercan and Burak Kadercan, "The Turkish Military as a Political Actor: Its Rise and Fall," *Middle East Policy* 23, no. 3 (2016), p. 86.

and subsequently executed.³⁴⁵ The 1980 military coup aimed to eliminate the rising polarization in the country between Turkish nationalists and supporters of communism during the Cold War era and to prevent a potential civil war. The Turkish Army, which seized power, emphasized the failure of politicians to ensure stability in the country. Referring to the protector of the state structure based on Kemalist principles, the military carried out the coup.³⁴⁶

The military intervention in 1997, while not a full-fledged coup, played a crucial role in the government's ousting. This intervention notably targeted the National Outlook Movement, to which Erdoğan belonged. In 1996, the leader of the National Outlook Movement, Erbakan, ascended to the Prime Ministership, igniting a crisis between the government and the military. The military accused the government of advancing reactionary activities under its Islamist ideology. The Turkish Armed Forces expressed dissatisfaction with the government's policies and subtly suggested the potential for a military coup. Unable to withstand the combined pressures from the military and bureaucracy, the Erbakan government resigned, allowing the military to preserve the secular state structure.³⁴⁷ It can be contended that the AKP government, which ascended to power in 2002 and has its roots in the National Outlook Movement, operated in a political climate constrained by military oversight. Consequently, the AKP government was unable to implement its Ottomanist and Islamist policies without confronting the military's veto power

³⁴⁵ Atiye Emiroğlu, "27 MAYIS 1960 İHTİLALİ VE DEMOKRAT PARTİ'NİN TASFİYESİ," *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal ve Teknik Araştırmalar Dergisi* 1, no. 1 (2011), p. 13–27.

³⁴⁶ Emel Akçali and Mehmet Perinçek, "Kemalist Eurasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Discourse in Turkey," *Geopolitics* 14, no. 3 (2009), p. 556.

³⁴⁷ Özcan Tunahan, "28 Şubat Süreci: Post-Modern Darbe'nin Sosyo-Politik Dinamikleri ve Toplum Desteği," *Bilgi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 30, no. 1 (2015), p. 30–34.

The crisis between the AKP government and the Turkish Armed Forces in 2007 marked a turning point. The nomination of Abdullah Gül by the AKP for the 2007 Presidential elections faced a veto from the main opposition party, CHP. Deniz Baykal, the leader of CHP, expressed concerns that Gül had issues with the secular values of the republic and emphasized that his election as president would harm the republican structure.³⁴⁸ Additionally, during this period, Turkish society segments which were critical of the AKP government and advocated for the protection of secular values organized large-scale protest demonstrations.³⁴⁹ At this point, the Turkish Armed Forces also intervened in the ongoing political developments by issuing a memorandum. In the memorandum published on the official website of the Turkish Armed Forces, it was stated that the Turkish Army was concerned about the developments taking place and emphasized the Army's commitment to Kemalist principles and the secular state structure.³⁵⁰ At this critical juncture, it can be posited that the military sought to exercise its veto power and apply pressure on the government by insinuating the threat of a coup. Conversely, the AKP government's response to this situation is particularly noteworthy. Unlike the capitulation of the Erbakan government in 1997, the Erdoğan administration actively engaged in a power struggle with the military. In the wake of the military's memorandum, security operations began to uncover the existence of an organization called "*Ergenekon*" linked to the Turkish Armed Forces, which was allegedly attempting to remove the government

³⁴⁸ CNN TÜRK, "Baykal'ın Gül'e Dair Eleştirileri Sürüyor," 2007, <https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/baykalin-gule-dair-elestirileri-suruyor>. (Accessed on 08 August 2022)

³⁴⁹ Mehmed Mazlum Çelik, "Türk Demokrasisinde Kara Bir Gün: 27 Nisan e-Muhtırası," *Independent Türkiye*, 2020, <https://www.indyturk.com/node/169886/siyaset/turk-demokrasisinde-kara-bir-gun-27-nisan-e-muhtirasi>.

³⁵⁰ Mynet, "27 Nisan E-Muhtırası Tam Metni," 2015, <https://www.mynet.com/27-nisan-e-muhtirasi-tam-metni-110102212559>. (Accessed on 08 August 2022)

from office through a coup plan named “*Bahçe*” (Sledgehammer). Consequently, these security operations resulted in the arrest and prosecution of three hundred officers, including seventy active generals. As a result, the military’s pressure on the AKP government began to wane post-2007.³⁵¹ Moreover, the AKP government’s ability to pursue an Ottomanist and Islamist approach in its foreign and security policies parallels the weakening of the military’s veto power after 2007.

On the other hand, achieving success in its power struggle with the military in 2007, the AKP government faced an attempted coup in 2016. Notably, the military personnel involved in the coup attempt were not associated with Kemalism. Instead, they were linked to the Gülen Movement, an Islamist organization. Following the failed coup attempt, over twenty thousand personnel were expelled from the military due to alleged connections with this organization.³⁵²

Although the AKP government believed it had dismantled the Kemalist structures within the military since 2007, the 2016 coup attempt demonstrated that groups aligned with Islamic ideology also had the potential to leverage military power against the government. At this juncture, the AKP’s determination to combat all anti-AKP factions within the military became imperative for its political survival. This necessity also triggered a process of reassessment of its relationships with Western allies and a pivot towards new strategic partnerships, such as with Russia.

³⁵¹ Ahmet T. Kuru, “Türkiye’de Askeri Vesayetın Yükseliş ve Düşüşü: İslamcılık, Kürtçülük ve Komünizm Korkuları,” in *Türkiye’de Demokrasi, İslam ve Laiklik* (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2013), p. 141-142.

³⁵² Anadolu Ajansı, “TSK’nın FETÖ İle Kararlı Mücadelesinde 24 Bin 256 Personel İhraç Edildi,” 2021, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/tsk-nin-feto-ile-kararli-mucadelesinde-24-bin-256-personel-ihrac-edildi/2457167>. (Accessed on 08 August 2022)

3.3.2. *State-Society Relations*

In formulating a state's foreign and security policy, in addition to the consensus among decision-making political elites, the minimal level of divergence between the government and society is also of great importance. In democratic countries, governments that do not receive sufficient support and trust from society face the risk of losing elections, resulting in a weakened government position. Hence, weak governments have limited policy options due to societal pressures. In other words, weak governments cannot control and allocate national resources in line with their aspirations and visions concerning foreign policy. In this regard, governments can revise their policies to avoid falling into a weak governmental position and consequently reshape the country's foreign and security policies, considering society's support.³⁵³

Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP government has achieved a robust position by garnering public support. The rising voter percentages in the 2002, 2007, and 2011 general elections and significant public backing indicated a relatively shallow polarization between the AKP government and Turkish society. During this period, particularly in the domains of foreign and security policy, the majority of the population did not conflict with the policies of the AKP government. For instance, a foreign policy survey conducted by Ankara University in 2010 revealed that 61% of the society considered the foreign policy pursued by the AKP government as successful.³⁵⁴ Considering that the AKP government received 46% of the vote in the 2011 elections, it can be argued that the general public largely supported the government's foreign policy strategy. However, on the other hand, the government's approach towards Syria since 2011 has not been embraced by society and has been perceived as a foreign policy issue. For instance, a foreign policy survey

³⁵³ Randall L. Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," *International Security* 29, no. 2 (2004), p. 174.

³⁵⁴ Ankara University, "KAMUOYU VE TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI ANKETİ," ATUM, 2010, p. 22.

conducted by Kadir Has University in 2013 indicated that 75% of the population perceived the core issues that needed resolution in foreign policy as the Syria subject and terrorism issue.³⁵⁵ Moreover, in the same year, “*Transatlantic Trends*” survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund also reflected the divergence between the Turkish society and the AKP government regarding the Syrian policy. According to the research findings, 72% of the population believed Turkey should adopt a neutral position (avoiding efforts to topple the Assad regime) and refrain from intervening in the Syrian civil war.³⁵⁶ The most apparent manifestation of the polarization between the AKP and Turkish society within the framework of the Syrian policy was observed on June 7, 2015. As a result of the election outcome, the AKP government lost its ability to form a single-party government in the parliament and regressed to a weak government position.

It can be said that the polarization between society and the AKP that emerged in 2015 also indicates the areas that need to be revised within the framework of the Syrian policy. In this context, for the AKP government, solving the refugee problem in the country and eliminating security threats based on terrorism became essential moves to regain solid societal support. In 2015, the number of registered Syrian refugees in Turkey reached approximately 2.5 million, making Turkey the country hosting the largest number of refugees worldwide.³⁵⁷ Additionally, the Turkish government spent 5.6 billion US dollars on refugees until 2015.³⁵⁸ The influx of refugees to the country

³⁵⁵ Kadir Has University, “Türk Dış Politikası Kamuoyu Algıları Araştırması,” (Istanbul, 2013), <https://www.khas.edu.tr/sites/khas.edu.tr/files/inline-files/tdpkaa-2013.pdf>.

³⁵⁶ The German Marshall Fund, “Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2013,” 2013, p. 31.

³⁵⁷ The UN Refugee Agency, “Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2015,” 2016, p. 15.

³⁵⁸ Nurettin Altundeg er and M. Ertu rul Yılmaz, “İ  Sava tan B lgesel İ stikrarsızlı a: Suriye Krizinin T rkiye’ye Faturası,” *S leyman Demirel*

increased the unemployment rate (due to the issue of illegal workers)³⁵⁹ and brought the housing problem to the forefront.³⁶⁰ Furthermore, the forced migration of numerous people from Syria weakened border security, and Turkey was exposed to various terrorist attacks by both Kurdish groups and ISIS during the same period. At this point, the AKP government's plan to establish a safe zone in northern Syria directly targeted these issues. The government indicated its aim for re-setting Syrian refugees in northern Syria by clearing the region from armed Kurdish groups (PYD/YPG) and ISIS.³⁶¹ Thus, the government demonstrated its intention to the Turkish society to reassess its foreign policy position before the repeated general elections on November 1, 2015.

After regaining public support and establishing a strong government position in the November 1, 2015, elections, the AKP government continued to pursue its revised Syria policy. Concurrently, Turkey's military operations in Syria and its stance towards armed Kurdish groups in 2016 deepened the contentious areas between Turkey and its NATO allies, particularly in the realm of counterterrorism. Nonetheless, these military operations received a positive reception from the Turkish public. For instance, a study conducted by Kadir Has University

Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 21, no. 1 (2016), p. 296.

³⁵⁹ M. İhsan Kuyumcu and Hülya Kösematoğlu, "The Impacts of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey's Economy (2011-2016)," *Journal of Turkish Social Sciences Research* 2, no. 1 (2017), p. 81-82.

³⁶⁰ Semih Tumen, "The Economic Impact of Syrian Refugees on Host Countries: Quasi-Experimental Evidence From Turkey," *American Economic Review* 106, no. 5 (2016), p. 459.

³⁶¹ İhsan Taşçı, "10 Soruda Suriye Sınırında 'Güvenli Bölge,'" *BBC NEWS TÜRKÇE*, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/07/150728_guvenli_bolge_nedir.

revealed that 80% of the population did not oppose Turkey's military operations in Syria.³⁶²

An important aspect that should be considered is the general attitude of Turkish society towards the divergences between Turkey and the Euro-Atlantic Bloc. For example, data from the “*Transatlantic Trends*” survey in 2004 already indicated that 70% of the population supported policies aligned with Turkey's national interests. Therefore, a significant portion of the society backed Turkey's adoption of a stance contrary to NATO policies if deemed necessary for the country's political gains.³⁶³ The second area of disagreement between Turkey and NATO, which emerged due to Turkey-Russia relations from 2016 onwards, can also be evaluated in connection with this general societal trend. For instance, a 2019 study by Kadir Has University found that 55% of the Turkish population supported positive relations between Turkey and Russia within the framework of a strategic partnership. However, Turkish society does not refrain from emphasizing the importance of Turkey's NATO membership and advocating for Turkey to remain a part of NATO.³⁶⁴

The relationship between the AKP administration and the broader society indicates that the AKP has faced relatively few challenges in garnering substantial public support since its inception in 2002. Consequently, the AKP, maintaining a robust governmental stance, has largely been able to implement its policies without facing significant societal opposition.

³⁶² Kadir Has University, “Türk Dış Politikası Kamuoyu Algıları Araştırması” (Istanbul, 2017), https://www.khas.edu.tr/sites/khas.edu.tr/files/inline-files/TDP-2017_vfinal.pdf.

³⁶³ The German Marshall Fund, “Transatlantic Trends: 2004 Partners,” 2004, p. 22.

³⁶⁴ Kadir Has University, “Türk Dış Politikası Kamuoyu Algıları Araştırması” (Istanbul, 2019), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334226883_Turk_Dis_Politikasi_Kamuoyu_Algilari_Arastirmasi_-_2019.

However, it is evident that in 2015, when the government risked losing public support and encountered increasing polarization, a shift in its Syria policy became necessary. Despite the emergence of contentious areas in Turkey-Euro-Atlantic relations following this foreign policy revision, the AKP government successfully regained societal support and maintained a strong governing position. This underscores that public perceptions and the securing of societal support have not only influenced the AKP government's foreign policy maneuvers and have also contributed to the development of conflict areas in the relations between Turkey and NATO.

3.4. Remarks on Political Survival

Evaluating the AKP government within the framework of the political survival concept reveals the dynamics of its relationships with institutions and society. It has been observed that the AKP maintained a solid position in Parliament until 2015, managing to avoid the veto power of the Parliament despite its ideational differences with the opposition. Concurrently, the AKP enjoyed robust societal support. Although the political struggle between the AKP and the military persisted until 2007, the government assumed a dominant position over the Kemalist military faction post-2007. However, the threat of losing its parliamentary majority in 2015, the declining trend in public support, and the attempted military coup by the Gülenist Islamist faction within the military triggered the government's efforts to survive politically post-2015.

The alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) shifted the AKP towards a nationalist and security-oriented stance, and the pessimistic climate following the coup attempt further solidified this trajectory. Public anxiety, particularly following failures in Syria, prompted the government to revise its foreign policy and take more concrete steps to address the country's security threats. Consequently, as the AKP sought political survival, it was compelled to undertake foreign policy

maneuvers to support this endeavor, including active counter-terrorism efforts in Syria and developing a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation. Therefore, the dispute areas in Turkey-NATO relations cannot be viewed in isolation from the AKP government's efforts to maintain its political power domestically.

CHAPTER 4

The FIDESZ Era and Domestic Dynamics: Intervening Variables Complementary to Hungary-Nato Relations

Following the preceding chapters of the research, the conflicts between NATO and Hungary, or rather, the emerging areas of disputes, were identified with the framework of international politics (system level). It was observed that the issues between the alliance and Hungary evolved within two main frameworks. The first of these pertained to Hungary's maneuvers aimed at fostering positive economic and energy-based relations with Russia, as well as Hungary's creation of a sphere of political legitimacy for the Kremlin. The second issue concerned Hungary's veto of Ukraine's NATO integration due to the ethnic Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia, thereby diverging from the alliance's enlargement strategy.

This section focuses on the intra-state political dynamics during Hungary's FIDESZ government. As in the previous section on Turkey-AKP, intervening variables (domestic dynamics) are evaluated under two fundamental concepts based on the model applied in the study. In this context, the section first elucidates Viktor Orbán's leader image and FIDESZ's ideological basis in order to detail the impact of ideational factors on foreign policy. Subsequently, within this ideological framework, the section examines how Hungary's strategic culture, namely the objectives of its grand strategy, is addressed and implemented by the FIDESZ government, thereby determining the role of ideational factors in foreign policymaking.

Under the concept of political survival, the section investigates the extent to which the FIDESZ government maintains its power over parliament and secures public support. Based on these findings, it becomes evident whether the government sought to maintain its political power during the 2010-2020

period and how the concern for political survival served as a complementary factor in relations with NATO.

4.1. Ideational Factors

Under this conceptual framework, at the beginning, the analysis examines the leader image that encapsulates Orbán's and the FIDESZ government's political approaches and ideological stances. This involves tracing the evolution of Orbán's political career from its inception to the present, alongside the ideological reconfiguration of FIDESZ. Within the rubric of strategic culture, the focus shifts to the grand strategy developed by Hungary post-communism. It assesses whether the Orbán government has transformed this strategic culture within its ideological context and how it has been executed. In this regard, the potency of Orbán's ideology and its ramifications for foreign policy, particularly concerning NATO, are elucidated.

4.1.1. Leader Image: Ideological Base of Orbán and FIDESZ

In 2010, Viktor Orbán became the Prime Minister for the second time, having won the elections. He possessed the attributes of a leader who holds authority and directs decisions and policies both within his party and the Hungarian state. In other words, having obtained a mandate of representation from the Hungarian people, Orbán exhibited effective leadership, positioning himself as the primary decision-maker in the country's foreign and security policies.³⁶⁵ In this context, Orbán's perceptions and beliefs regarding politics (leader image) have the potential to influence the country's overall foreign policy; consequently, it can come to prominence in Hungary-NATO relations. Although FIDESZ and the Orbán came to power in 2010, the roots of Orbán's leader image trace back to the 1980s.

³⁶⁵ Attila Antal, "The Political Theories, Preconditions and Dangers of the Governing Populism in Hungary," *Politologický Casopis* 24, no. 1 (2017), p. 11-12.

Therefore, it is essential to delve into the period before 2010 to comprehend Orbán's political perceptions, beliefs and ideology.

Orbán's emergence on the political scene occurred in the late 1980s, a time when the influence of the Soviets was waning, and there was a growing desire for a change in the communist regime in Hungary. In 1988, Orbán and his friends founded FIDESZ, initially as a youth organization that represented a political position emphasizing liberal values in opposition to the communist regime. This youth organization transformed into a political party in 1989 and succeeded in the first free elections held in Hungary in 1990. Although the conservative Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF/ the Hungarian Democratic Forum) led by Jozsef Antall won the elections, FIDESZ, with 22 seats in the 386-seat parliament, found its place in the opposition.³⁶⁶ During this period, Orbán's political perception was primarily shaped by his opposition to communism. Having grown up under communist rule, the change of this regime was of paramount importance to Orbán. At the same time, he viewed the Hungarian left wing, which he accepted as representatives of communism in the post-communist era, as rivals and approached them as political entities that needed to be sharply opposed.³⁶⁷ Besides this, Orbán and his associates opposed the nationalist and conservative rhetoric of the Jozsef Antall government. During this period, FIDESZ emphasized liberal values and reforms in the parliament, aligning its political stance with other liberals the parliament, such as SZDSZ (Szabad

³⁶⁶ Lee Congdon, "The Rise of Viktor Orbán, Right-Wing Populist," *Modern Age* 60, no. 4 (2018), <https://theimaginativeconservative.org/2018/11/viktor-orban-hungarian-resistance-lee-congdon.html>.

³⁶⁷ John O'Sullivan and Kálmán Pócza, *The Second Term of Viktor Orbán: Beyond Prejudice and Enthusiasm* (London: Social Affairs Unit, 2015), p. 14.

Demokraták Szövetsége – a Magyar Liberális Párt/ the Alliance of Free Democrats).³⁶⁸

However, it can be argued that the 1994 general election and the resulting political landscape marked the first significant rupture in Orbán's political perceptions. The general elections in 1994 resulted in MSZP (Magyar Szocialista Párt/ the Hungarian Socialist Party) obtaining a high vote percentage and SZDSZ's (liberals) forming a coalition with the socialists against conservative MDF. As FIDESZ became the minor opposition party in the parliament with only 20 seats, this failure triggered Orbán's opposition not only to the Hungarian left-wing but also to the liberal political camp due to the liberals' ability to cooperate with the socialists as contrary to their values.³⁶⁹ Therefore, after the 1994 elections, Orbán's political perceptions shifted from liberal values to conservative elements rooted in Hungarian nationalism and Christian identity. In this context, FIDESZ adopted a new political position in the center-right spectrum, with Orbán's political approach focusing on patriotism, national interests, traditions, and middle-class values.³⁷⁰

After 1994, the economic reforms implemented by the government formed by socialists and liberals proved to be unsuccessful. Furthermore, with the passing away of Jozsef Antall, the MDF also experienced a loss of influence, which allowed FIDESZ to take advantage of the power vacuum in the center-right spectrum. In the 1998 elections, FIDESZ emerged as the leading party, and Orbán became the Prime Minister. During this initial period of FIDESZ's governance, the government's economic reforms were successful. Additionally, the government did not hinder the country's efforts toward liberalization; instead, it encouraged Hungary's accession to NATO and the EU. Under the Orbán government, Hungary joined NATO in

³⁶⁸ Paul Lendvai, *Orbán: Hungary's Strongman* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 25-27.

³⁶⁹ O'Sullivan and Pócza, *The Second Term of Viktor Orban: Beyond Prejudice and Enthusiasm*, p.15 .

³⁷⁰ Lendvai, *Orbán: Hungary's Strongman*, p. 34-35.

1999 and was accepted as a candidate country for EU membership in 2000, starting the accession negotiations.³⁷¹ While promoting the country's integration with the West, FIDESZ also made moves that emphasized a nationalist and conservative approach. For instance, in 2001, the FIDESZ government introduced the Status Law to the parliament and worked toward its approval. This law aimed to strengthen the ties between Hungary and the ethnic Hungarian population living in the Carpathian region. Under this law, identity cards were issued to Hungarians living in Ukraine, Romania, and Serbia, and the Hungarian state encouraged this community to develop a sense of Hungarian identity by providing privileges in some areas, such as education, healthcare, and travel.³⁷² However, the 2002 elections, in which FIDESZ lost power and the left-wing regained control, marked the second rupture in Orbán's political perceptions. This election outcome placed FIDESZ and Orbán in the opposition until 2010, leading Orbán to adopt a new political strategy. In this regard, Orbán recognized that a significant portion of Hungarian society is generally dissatisfied with all governments' economic policies. To obtain and maintain government power, he believed the key approach should focus on the welfare of the impoverished classes and economic policies.³⁷³ In other words, Orbán redefined his leader image with a political perception that would embrace the disadvantaged segments of society, ensure the country's economic independence, and emphasize national values. For instance, in response to the policies implemented by the Gyurcsany government, FIDESZ's 2007 manifesto was prepared in this new strategic direction. The manifesto emphasized that the socialist-liberal coalition's economic policies led society toward absolute poverty and

³⁷¹ Bulent Kenes, "Viktor Orbán: Past to Present," ECPS Leader Profile Series (Brussels, 2020), p. 6-7.

³⁷² Edith Oltay, "Redefining the Concept of the Hungarian Nation," *Hungarian Review* 12, no. 2 (2021), <https://hungarianreview.com/article/redefining-the-concept-of-the-hungarian-nation/>.

³⁷³ Congdon, "The Rise of Viktor Orbán, Right-Wing Populist."

despair. To address this situation, FIDESZ pledged to enhance the welfare of the impoverished segments of society, safeguard Hungarian national values, and bolster the country's economic growth. Another notable aspect of the manifesto was FIDESZ's emphasis on Euro-Atlantic. From FIDESZ's perspective, Hungary was not merely a country that would serve as a bridge between the West and the East; rather, the manifesto indicated that Hungary would become one of the leading powerful nations in the West.³⁷⁴

In 2008, Hungary's economic situation worsened, leading the country to request financial assistance from the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As a result of this financial request, Hungary received 8.7 billion euros from the IMF and 5.5 billion euros from the EU in financial support and an austerity program.³⁷⁵ This situation led to the end of the socialist-liberal coalition government and paved the way for FIDESZ to regain power in 2010 for the second time. For Orbán, who assumed the prime ministerial office for the second time, the most fundamental priority was to resolve the deep economic problems the country was facing. However, according to Orbán, the solution to this economic problem required departing from the one-dimensional Western dependency (on the EU and IMF) policies. In Orbán's perception, the world was entering a new era, and Hungary needed to position itself within this new order. The one-dimensional pro-Western policies pursued after 1990 had not sufficiently contributed to the country; instead, they had diminished its potential.³⁷⁶ Therefore, it had

³⁷⁴ FIDESZ, "A Stronger Hungary – Fidesz Presents Its Manifesto," 2007, https://fidesz-eu.hu/en/a_stronger_hungary_fidesz_presents_its_manifesto/. (Accessed on 05 November 2022)

³⁷⁵ European Commission, "Financial Assistance to Hungary," 2018, https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-financial-assistance/non-euro-area-countries/financial-assistance-hungary_en. (Accessed on 05 November 2022)

³⁷⁶ Hungary Prime Minister's Office, "Sikeres Államot Csak Akkor Lehet Felépíteni, Ha Erős Nemzet Áll Mögötte," 2011, <https://2010->

become necessary to create a Hungary that was not dependent on either the West or the East but rather one that could independently determine its own axis and stand on its own feet.³⁷⁷ At this point, another noteworthy aspect was the connection established by Orbán between the economic problem and the country's independence. From Orbán's perspective, economic dependency on the West had turned Hungary into a captive, and the West was inclined to maintain this captivity of Hungary. Resolving Hungary's economic problems would also result in regaining its complete independence.³⁷⁸ The actions of the FIDESZ government in 2013, such as repaying Hungary's debts to the IMF and seeking to close the IMF office in Budapest,³⁷⁹ reflected Orbán's perceptions and approach toward achieving economic and political independence for the country. Upon coming to power in 2010, initiating the Eastern Opening project, in other words, strengthening its economic ties with Russia, was a move aligned with Orbán's desire to reduce dependency on the West and diversify the country's one-dimensional pro-Western policies. At this point, Orbán insisted that his intention was not to turn Hungary into a satellite of Moscow again and argued that the policies aimed at positive relations

2014.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/fsikeres-allamot-csak-akkor-lehet-felepiteni-ha-cros-nemzet-all-mogotte.

³⁷⁷ hvg.hu, "Orbán: Nehéz Lesz, 'Nem Babazsúrra Készülünk,'" 2010, https://hvg.hu/itthon/20100529_orban_nem_babazsurra_keszul. (Accessed on 05 November 2022)

³⁷⁸ Miniszterelnok, "1848 És 2010 Is Megújulást Hozott," 2011, https://2010-2015.miniszterelnok.hu/beszed/1848_es_2010_is_megujulast_hozott. (Accessed on 05 November 2022)

³⁷⁹ Spiegel, "Hungary Wants to Throw Out IMF," 2013, <https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/hungary-calls-on-imf-to-close-its-budapest-office-a-911250.html>. (Accessed on 05 November 2022)

with Russia were not pro-Russian but rather in the national interest of Hungary.³⁸⁰

After 2010, Orbán has aimed to create an economically developed, independent, and strong Hungary, perceiving Hungarian national identity and Christian values as significant components of this vision for a powerful Hungarian state. Although there were references to these components before 2010, Orbán's post-2010 political moves given them a more tangible form and prominence. For instance, Orbán began to assert that Hungary is not only a defender of Christianity within its borders but also across Europe and globally. In this context, the Hungarian state's financial aid programs for Christian groups in Africa and the Middle East reflected this belief in its foreign policy.³⁸¹ Additionally, references to the historical period of the Hungarian Empire gained prominence to highlight the Hungarian national identity. For example, in 2010, the FIDESZ government enacted June 4th (the signing date of the Trianon Treaty) as the National Unity Day, emphasizing Hungary's past strength before signing the Trianon Treaty. In the text of the law, it was emphasized that the Trianon Treaty had a devastating impact on the country, and it stated that the Hungarian state would always provide support to the ethnic Hungarians who remained in the territories of other countries to preserve their identities.³⁸² In 2011, the FIDESZ government under Orbán's leadership took a step towards granting dual citizenship to ethnic Hungarians in Carpathia, implementing the most assertive policy to strengthen the Hungarian identity in that region during

³⁸⁰ Alexei Shevchenko, "From a Follower to a Trendsetter: Hungary's Post-Cold War Identity and the West," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 51, no. 1 (2018), p. 69.

³⁸¹ Shaun Walker, "Orbán Deploys Christianity with a Twist to Tighten Grip in Hungary," *The Guardian*, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/14/viktor-orban-budapest-hungary-christianity-with-a-twist>.

³⁸² "2010. Évi XLV. Törvény a Nemzeti Összetartozás Melletti Tanúságtételről" (2010), <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1000045.tv>.

the post-communist era.³⁸³ Since 2010, Hungarian identity and Christianity have become indispensable and non-negotiable fundamental elements in Orbán's political vision.

Orbán's political vision, which has evolved since 2010, is centered around two key components: economic independence and a strong state ideal rooted in Christian Hungarian identity, which, in the broader context, must be understood with his perception of the decline of the West and the superiority of Hungarian identity over the corrupted Western values. According to Cabada, Central and Eastern European states, historically caught between the influences of both the West and the East and subjected to the pressures of these powers, have failed to achieve modernization within the cycle of Westernization and Easternization fully. Consequently, they have preserved their traditionalist structures both institutionally and socially.³⁸⁴ Alongside maintaining this traditionalism, the state of being trapped between the major powers of the West and the East has manifested in the collective consciousness of Central and Eastern European countries as a "victim syndrome" and an "inferiority complex." This, in turn, has brought to the forefront a belief in their underdevelopment compared to the West due to recurring phenomena of betrayal, occupation, and exploitation. As a result, the mental framework shaped by a mixture of admiration, envy, and resentment toward the West has produced outcomes that have traditionalized a tendency in Central and Eastern European countries to affirm themselves and view themselves as morally superior to both the West and the East.³⁸⁵ From this perspective, Orbán's political perceptions lean and inspired by this mental framework and traditionalism in Central and Eastern Europe.

³⁸³ Oltay, "Redefining the Concept of the Hungarian Nation."

³⁸⁴ Ladislav Cabada, "Central Europe between the West and East: Independent Region, the Bridge, Buffer Zone or 'Eternal' Semi-Periphery?," *Politics in Central Europe* 16, no. 2 (2020), p. 425.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 421-422.

For instance, Orbán's speech on the 100th anniversary of the Trianon fully reflects this victim syndrome and the phenomena of betrayal. Orbán expresses Hungary's historical stuckness and resistance between the West and the East with the following words: *"We didn't become a German province, nor a Turkish vilayet, nor a Soviet republic."*³⁸⁶ His accusatory stance toward the West is sharply articulated in the following statement:

"Finally, the thousand-year-old historical Hungary was stabbed in the back by the conspiracies in Budapest. His army was paralyzed and disbanded, the only statesman capable of rescuing the nation was assassinated, the country was handed over to our enemies, the government to the Bolsheviks. The West raped the thousand-year-old borders and history of Central Europe. They forced us to live between indefensible borders, deprived us of our natural treasures, separated us from our resources, and made a death row out of our country. Central Europe was redrawn without moral concerns, just as the borders of Africa and the Middle East were redrawn. We will never forget that they did this."³⁸⁷

Especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, while Central and Eastern European states entered a process of Western integration and modernization, the trajectory of this modernization in technical areas (such as industrialization and welfare) did not align with its ideological and cognitive progression.³⁸⁸ In this context, during the process of Western integration, some groups in Central and Eastern European states, confronted with concepts such as cosmopolitan liberalism and globalization, have responded with actions aimed at combating these phenomena and demonizing these concepts. Figures such as George Soros, ideas like open society, and structures like the

³⁸⁶ About Hungary, "Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Commemoration Speech," 2020, <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/primeminister-viktor-orbans-commemoration-speech-trianon>.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Cabada, "Central Europe between the West and East: Independent Region, the Bridge, Buffer Zone or 'Eternal' Semi-Periphery?", p. 429.

neoliberal economic order were perceived as serious threats.³⁸⁹ The West, framed as a dystopia characterized by threats, crises, and decline, was depicted as undergoing a significant downfall due to its eroding values. In contrast, the antithesis to this perceived degeneration was articulated through models of states that uphold independent national and religious values.³⁹⁰ The decline of the West frequently underscored in Orbán's discourse, and the fundamental threats emanating from it are observed to coalesce within the framework of these phenomena. For instance, in his 2017 speech at Baile Tusnad, Orbán explicitly highlights these issues. In his analysis of the crisis afflicting the West, with a particular focus on Europe, Orbán identifies three principal threats: the degeneration of European societal values (notably through de-Christianization), the imposition of neoliberal policies, and the engineered multicultural demographic shifts facilitated through immigration:

“In summary, where do we stand in Europe today? My summary conclusions are as follows. Christian democratic parties in Europe have become un-Christian: we are trying to satisfy the values and cultural expectations of the liberal media and intelligentsia. The second important aspect is that left-wing politics has lost ground, and the social democratic parties are themselves no longer social democratic. They have lost the proletariat, if I can put it that way. The numbers and power of organised labour have fallen, mostly because many industrial jobs have been relocated outside the European Union, and therefore not even social democratic parties are what they once used to be. They've married themselves to global business interests representing neoliberal economic policy, and now they have a single policy area, they're concentrating on a single area: preservation of their influence over culture... And the third important thing is that Europe is currently being prepared to hand its territory over to a new mixed, Islamised Europe. We are observing the conscious step-

³⁸⁹ Ladislav Cabada, “Nativist and Anti-Liberal Narratives in Conservative Populist Agenda in Central Europe,” *Teorija in Praksa* 58, no. 2 (2021), p. 294-295.

³⁹⁰ Ladislav Cabada, “Liberal Populism as a Polarizing Factor of Regional Cooperation in Central Europe,” *Revista UNISCI* 66, no. 1 (2024), p. 73-74.

by-step implementation of this policy. In order for this to happen, for the territory to be ready to be handed over, it is necessary to continue the de-Christianisation of Europe – and we can see these attempts.”³⁹¹

Within the context of Orbán's perception of the West's decline, three critical domains emerge as essential in combating perceived threats: collective memory, identity, and values.³⁹² In this direction, the reconstruction of historical narratives and the invocation of myths of past “golden eras” play a crucial role in distinguishing Hungary's identity from that of the declining West.³⁹³ For instance, Orbán's adherence to Turanism, which posits a connection between the origins of Hungarians and the Turkic peoples, should be understood as part of his broader endeavour to deepen Hungarian identity both historically and geographically while asserting its distinctiveness and authenticity from the West.

Turanism, as endorsed by Orbán, is an antiquated ideology in Hungary with roots that date back over a century. Historically, the quest for origins among Hungarians became particularly pronounced during the Habsburg Empire, where fears of Germanization prevailed, and later during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, when concerns over Pan-Slavism came to the forefront. In this context, Hungarian scholars from the mid-1800s began exploring connections between the Hungarian and Turkic languages, a discourse notably advanced by the linguist and Turcologist Armin Vambery.³⁹⁴ This scholarly pursuit gained

³⁹¹ About Hungary, “Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 28th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp,” 2017, <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/viktor-orbans-speech-at-the-28th-balvanyos-summer-open-university-and-student-camp>.

³⁹² Cabada, “Liberal Populism as a Polarizing Factor of Regional Cooperation in Central Europe,” p. 68.

³⁹³ Cabada, “Nativist and Anti-Liberal Narratives in Conservative Populist Agenda in Central Europe,” p. 295.

³⁹⁴ Alev Duran and Fatma Çalık Orhun, “Macarlar, Macaristan ve Turancılık,” *History Studies* 11, no. 2 (2019), p. 560-561.

prominence and became a pivotal theory regarding Hungarian origins, suggesting that Hungarians descended from Central Asian Turkic peoples. The notion of kinship with Turkic tribes gained substantial popularity, culminating in formally establishing the first Turan Society in 1910. Prominent figures such as Count Pal Teleki, a geographer and later Prime Minister, geographer-writer Jenő Cholnoky, and historian Sándor Márki were among its notable members, highlighting the widespread intellectual and political support for this ideology.³⁹⁵

It can be said that Orbán, operating within the same paradigm, utilizes Turanism as a significant tool in his efforts to detach Hungarian identity from the Western axis. By participating in the Organization of Turkic States and securing Hungary's observer member status in 2018, Orbán consistently underscored Hungary's Turkic roots in his rhetoric at these summits, thereby defining Hungarian identity through this lineage. In a 2018 statement at a Turkic States meeting, Orbán characterized the Hungarian nation as follows:

“Among you, we are the people who have moved farthest West, and who also converted to Christianity. So we are a Christian people living in the West, standing on foundations of Hun-Turkic origins; the Hungarians see themselves as the late descendants of Attila.”³⁹⁶ His 2019 statement similarly underscores Hungarian-Turkic kinship, noting: “Not everyone here is aware that there are Kipchaks in Hungary, that many Hungarians have Kipchak blood...”³⁹⁷

³⁹⁵ Michał Kowalczyk, “Hungarian Turanism. From the Birth of the Ideology to Modernity – an Outline of the Problem,” *Historia i Polityka* 27, no. 20 (2017), p. 53.

³⁹⁶ Hungary Prime Minister's Office, “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 6th Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States,” 2018, <https://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-speech-at-the-6th-summit-of-the-cooperation-council-of-turkic-speaking-states/>.

³⁹⁷ Hungary Prime Minister's Office, “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 7th Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States,” 2019, <https://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu/prime->

In the face of his perceived declining West and its associated threats, Orbán's sympathy for Turanism—his affinity towards Turkic peoples—cannot be considered in isolation. He also demonstrates cognitive alignment with other countries that advocate for independent, strong nation-states. For instance, Orbán frequently praises China as a labor-based society, identifying it as a country to be emulated.³⁹⁸ He also pays considerable attention to enhancing bilateral relations between Hungary and Serbia under Aleksandar Vucic's leadership.³⁹⁹ On the other hand, Orbán's anticipation of benefits from these alliances and his calculations to expand Hungary's political influence should not be overlooked.

Orbán's vision of an independent, strong Hungary—anchored in nationalist and Christian values—also resonated in his approach to NATO relations, which he frames pragmatically. While acknowledging Hungary's place as part of the Euro-Atlantic, Orbán started to emphasize that Hungary was not a hostage. According to him, even in areas where its policies may not align with Euro-Atlantic, Hungary should continue to pursue its interests considering global realities.⁴⁰⁰ At this point, the victory in the 2014 elections further reinforced Orbán's perception of an independent Hungarian state. In 2015, Orbán announced that Hungary would pursue an independent, proactive foreign and security policy. He emphasized that Hungary had shown remarkable success since 2010, strengthening its economy, regaining its independence, and becoming ready to

minister-viktor-orbans-speech-at-the-7th-summit-of-the-cooperation-council-of-turkic-speaking-states/.

³⁹⁸ Tamás Matura, "Hungary: No Need for a Chinese Soft-Power Strategy" (Cligendael Institute, 2021), p. 48.

³⁹⁹ Stefano Giantin, "Hungarian PM Tries to Develop Stronger Ties with Populists in the Balkans," *Nato Defense College Foundation*, 2023, <https://www.natofoundation.org/balkans-black-sea/hungarian-pm-tries-to-develop-stronger-ties-with-populists-in-the-balkans/>.

⁴⁰⁰ Hungary Prime Minister's Office, "Prime Minister's Speech after Taking the Oath of Office."

implement its own policies rather than dictated ones.⁴⁰¹ Thus, particularly in the perceptions of the Orbán government, NATO and the Euro-Atlantic axis have shifted from being an objective to a means for Hungary. An alternative foreign policy orientation has been introduced, based on the belief that Hungary's interests are not closely tied to Euro-Atlantic strategies.

Orbán's leader image highlights the ideological evolution of both himself and FIDESZ, transitioning from their initial liberal stance to a robust, independent approach rooted in Hungarian national identity and Christianity. The enhancement of Hungary's economic strength and the defense of Hungarian identity are indispensable goals for the Orbán administration. Consequently, implementing policies aimed at achieving these objectives forms the cornerstone of the country's foreign and security policy vision. This ideological stance elucidates Hungary's economic and political pivot towards Russia, diverging from the NATO axis, and its obstruction of the alliance's enlargement strategy concerning the Hungarian ethnic minority issue in Ukraine. In essence, Orbán's political perception and FIDESZ's pragmatic prioritization of Hungarian state interests shape the overarching framework of Hungary's policies since 2010, directing contentious aspects of Hungary-NATO relations accordingly.

⁴⁰¹ Hungary Prime Minister's Office, "The next Years Will Be about Hardworking People," 2015, <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/the-next-years-will-be-about-hardworking-people>.

Turmoil in Turkey and Hungary's Relations with NATO




Figure 8: Milestones of Orbán's Political Perceptions⁴⁰²

4.1.2. Strategic Culture (Grand Strategy) of Hungary

Although a country's grand strategy can be transformed by a government (a complex and lengthy political process), on the other hand, a government can only implement some strategic maneuvers while adhering to the principles of the existing strategic culture. In other words, a government may not necessarily aim to transform the existing strategic culture completely, but it can make various adjustments to the country's foreign and security policies in line with the fundamental objectives set forth by the grand strategy.⁴⁰³

In 1990, when Hungary held its first free democratic elections, its post-communist independent strategic culture also began to take shape. In this context, Hungarian political elites engaged in debates from the late 1980s and early 1990s about the country's strategy's fundamental objectives and the direction of the state's foreign and security policy. These discussions involved various options, such as maintaining ties with Russia, adopting a neutral stance, or focusing on Euro-Atlantic integration. However, the challenges arising both regionally and internally following the collapse of the bipolar order led to a consensus among Hungary's political elites to move towards Euro-

⁴⁰² Created by author.

⁴⁰³ Katalin Miklóssy and Justyna Pierzynska, "Regional Strategic Culture in the Visegrad Countries: Poland and Hungary," in *Strategic Culture in Russia's Neighborhood: Change and Continuity in an In-Between Space* (New York: Lexington Books, 2019), p. 86.

Atlantic integration.⁴⁰⁴ For instance, the internal conflicts and ethnic crises experienced in Yugoslavia after the Soviet Union's dissolution raised concerns for Hungary about potential conflicts that could also affect Central Europe.⁴⁰⁵ Additionally, the economic downturn resulting from the regime change and its potential repercussions on the population, including potential social crises and political instabilities, posed another danger for Hungary.⁴⁰⁶ The necessity of the country's entry under the security umbrella of the Euro-Atlantic was acknowledged to ensure the country's security and minimize potential risks. Consequently, Euro-Atlantic integration became one of the fundamental pillars of Hungary's strategic culture.⁴⁰⁷ During the Antall government period, this aspect was directly addressed in official documents declared as "*The Basic Principles of National Security Policy*"⁴⁰⁸ and *The Basic Principles of National Defense*"⁴⁰⁹ in 1993. The published documents emphasized the new international environment and threats that emerged after the Cold War, highlighting elements such as the disruption of regional stability, deepening economic problems, and social unrest as the key danger areas from Hungary's perspective. To address these areas of danger, the documents outlined the necessity of

⁴⁰⁴ Péter Tálas, "Hungarian Strategic Culture and the New National Military Strategy," *Nemzet És Biztonság / Nation and Security* 6, no. 1 (2014), p. 6.

⁴⁰⁵ József Lajos Németh, "The Evolution of the Hungarian Security Policy Thinking between 1989-1999, with a Special View on the Hungarian Defence Forces," *Security and Defence Quarterly* 1, no. 2 (2013), p. 98.

⁴⁰⁶ Tálas, "Hungarian Strategic Culture and the New National Military Strategy," p. 7-8.

⁴⁰⁷ Péter Tálas and Tamas Csiki, "Strategic Cultures in Europe - Hungary," in *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent* (Postdam: Springer, 2013), p. 169.

⁴⁰⁸ "11/1993. (III. 12.) OGY Határozat a Magyar Köztársaság Biztonságpolitikájának Alapelvei" (1993), <https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=993h0011.OGY>.

⁴⁰⁹ "27/1993. (IV. 23.) OGY Határozat a Magyar Köztársaság Honvédelmének Alapelveiről" (1993), <https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=993h0027.OGY>.

engaging in military, economic, legal, and social reforms oriented toward Euro-Atlantic integration. Furthermore, the development of collaborations with neighboring countries in the region (Central Europe) was set as a target. Additionally, Hungary declared that it did not perceive any country as a potential enemy, expressing its aim to establish constructive relations and cooperation with all nations.

Another noteworthy aspect of the published documents is the issue of ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries. Article 8 of the “*Basic Principles of National Security Policy*” document highlighted this matter, emphasizing that it is the responsibility of the Hungarian state to preserve the ethnic identities of Hungarians living in neighboring countries and to prevent potential assimilation policies that could be imposed on these communities.⁴¹⁰ Prime Minister Antall's statements regarding Hungarian minorities immediately after the 1990 elections already underscored the importance of this matter for the Hungarian state. With the statement, “... *We have to send a message to every member of the 15 million world community of Hungarians. The Hungarian nation stands united regardless of the citizenship that some of them may have obtained in the thunderstorm of history.*”⁴¹¹ Antall had declared that the Hungarian minority beyond the country's borders is an integral part of the nation. Furthermore, during the Antall government period, state officials held regular meetings with leaders of the Hungarian community living in neighboring countries, and Hungary attempted to provide financial and political support to them. Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky continuously emphasized the necessity of local autonomy in post-communist

⁴¹⁰ 11/1993. (III. 12.) OGY határozat a Magyar Köztársaság biztonságpolitikájának alapelvei.

⁴¹¹ Blaine Harden, “‘HUNGARIAN-NESS’ BACK IN FASHION,” *The Washington Post*, 1990, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/04/11/hungarian-ness-back-in-fashion/baa45b79-7cc6-454e-87a8-e3f28a608ced/>.

countries within the framework of the Hungarian minority issue.⁴¹² Considering the Hungarian minority issue, Hungary's strategic culture during the post-communist period consisted of three main pillars:

- Integration with Euro-Atlantic (the West),
- Regional cooperation and establishing positive political relations with neighboring countries to ensure regional stability,
- Preserving the rights and identities of the Hungarian ethnic minority.⁴¹³

The composed strategic culture and the national objectives also became central to the foreign and security policies of the governments that succeeded the Antall government. For instance, the conservative-nationalist Antall government was followed by the Horn government, which was a Socialist-Liberal coalition. This socialist-liberal government also prioritized preserving the rights of the Hungarian ethnic minority and continued to provide financial and political support to them.⁴¹⁴ Likewise, the Orbán government, which came to power in 1998 and was positioned on the right wing, supported efforts towards integration with Euro-Atlantic and continued policies to achieve this goal. In this regard, *"The Basic Principles of Defense and Security Policy"* act issued by the Hungarian state in 1998 reflected similar points as the initial declarations published in 1993. In the act, the completion of Hungary's Euro-Atlantic integration process was stated as the priority. Furthermore, it was reiterated that Hungary did not perceive any country as an enemy, and it was once again emphasized that the Hungarian state would

⁴¹² Julian Duplain, "Ethnic Hungarian Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe," 1996, UNHCR, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ac6a6c34.html>.

⁴¹³ Márta Benedek, "Strategic Culture: The Facets of Foreign Policy and National Security," *AARMS* 14, no. 3 (2015), p. 303.

⁴¹⁴ Duplain, "Ethnic Hungarian Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe."

make every effort to defend the identities and cultural rights of Hungarian minorities.⁴¹⁵

In 1999, by becoming a member of NATO and joining the EU in 2004, Hungary completed its Euro-Atlantic integration, achieving one of the fundamental objectives of its strategic culture. At this point, signs of revision in the strategic culture and national objectives emerged. “*The National Security Strategy*” act published in 2004 was significant in reflecting indicators of this revision. The published document stated that Hungary achieved an essential strategic objective and was in a stable position concerning security, thanks to its NATO and EU membership. However, on the other hand, the document also pointed out the new responsibilities brought about by Euro-Atlantic integration. In this context, the shared interests of the Euro-Atlantic partnership were addressed alongside Hungary's national interests.⁴¹⁶ Hungary recognized that active participation in NATO's joint missions and military operations was a component of its new strategic vision. In this regard, the country aimed to attain an influential presence within the alliance through its military activities and efforts within NATO, aiming to gain leverage in political maneuvering concerning Hungary's interests by earning the amity of its allies.⁴¹⁷ Another significant aspect of the 2004 declared *National Security Strategy* was the emphasis on economic vulnerability and energy dependency. Ensuring energy security and mitigating economic fragility were stated as crucial objectives. In this context, there was a reference to relations with Russia, underscoring the significance of Russia's strategic partnership and highlighting the importance

⁴¹⁵ “94/1998. (XII. 29.) OGY Határozat a Magyar Köztársaság Biztonság- És Védelempolitikájának Alapelveiről” (1998), <https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=998h0094.OGY>.

⁴¹⁶ “2073/2004. (IV. 15.) Korm. Határozat a Magyar Köztársaság Nemzeti Biztonsági Stratégiájáról” (2004), <https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2004-2073-30-22>.

⁴¹⁷ Benedek, “Strategic Culture: The Facets of Foreign Policy and National Security.”, p. 303.

of positive relations between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community.⁴¹⁸ Beyond these elements, the national objective of preserving the identities and rights of ethnic Hungarians remained unchanged, in line with previous official decisions.

From 2004 onwards, although signs of revision in Hungary's strategic culture were reflected, the global economic downturn in 2008 and the crisis within the Hungarian economy led to the official declaration of this revision by the Gyurcsany government in 2008.⁴¹⁹ In this context, the published *Foreign Relations Strategy of Hungary* outlined a vision that plays a more active role within the Euro-Atlantic sphere, remains steadfast in its national interests, and balances its national interests with the common interests of the Euro-Atlantic community. Additionally, the issue of Hungarian minorities remained a constant component of the national objective. Alongside these factors, another crucial aspect of the revised strategic culture was the vision concerning to shape of Hungary's foreign policy following global economic trends. *The Foreign Relations Strategy of Hungary* highlighted the influence of globalization on global economic trends and pointed out the emergence of new economic powers and centers of attraction worldwide. In this context, there was a specific mention of economic centers of attraction in Asia, underscoring the planned enhancement of Hungary's economic relationship with Eastern countries. Furthermore, the Russian Federation was indicated as one of the key countries that requires the development of economic-based relations and partnerships at this juncture.⁴²⁰ With the revision, it can be said that a second phase emerged in Hungary's strategic culture. Within this framework, certain changes occurred in the three

⁴¹⁸ 2073/2004. (IV. 15.) Korm. határozat a Magyar Köztársaság nemzeti biztonsági stratégiájáról.

⁴¹⁹ Balázs Kiss and Csaba Zahorán, "Hungarian Domestic Policy in Foreign Policy," *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* 16, no. 2 (2007), p. 60.

⁴²⁰ "1012/2008. (III. 4.) Korm. Határozat Magyarország Külkapcsolati Stratégiájáról" (2008), <https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2008-1012-30-22>.

fundamental pillars of the strategic culture that began to take shape since 1990 (post-communist era). In this context, the three key pillars of Hungary's strategic objectives underwent a reshaping, which included:

- Attaining an influential role within Euro-Atlantic and implementing competitive policies aligned with national interests.
- Becoming a successful nation regionally by tracking global economic trends.
- Preserving the rights and identities of the Hungarian ethnic minority.⁴²¹

When the FIDESZ government came into power in 2010, it considered the second-phase objectives of the revised strategic culture. The document on *Hungary's Foreign Policy* announced in 2011 emphasized all three pillars of the country's strategic objectives. In this context, it was stated that Hungary would continue collaborating with Euro-Atlantic while prioritizing its national interests. The document indicated that economic issues had weakened the country's social and political strength, underlining the necessity of developing relations with emerging economic centers in the East. Therefore, the significance of Russia was emphasized, considering its role as a critical strategic partner in the domains of economy and energy. Furthermore, the approach towards the Hungarian ethnic minority was noteworthy. A more concrete and active policy was indicated. Policies that strengthen the relationship between Hungarians and Hungarians were regarded as a fundamental priority.⁴²² At this point, the foreign and security policy implemented during the tenure of the FIDESZ government cannot be viewed in

⁴²¹ Consulate General of Hungary Los Angeles, "HUNGARY AND THE WORLD," 2022, <https://losangeles.mfa.gov.hu/eng/page/hungary-and-the-world>. (Accessed on 06 November 2022)

⁴²² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, "Hungary's Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union," 2011, https://brexit.kormany.hu/admin/download/f/1b/30000/foreign_policy_20111219.pdf.

isolation from the fundamental objectives of Hungary's strategic culture. The FIDESZ administration's Russia policy focused on the economic and energy sectors, and its veto of Ukraine's integration process with the alliance due to issues concerning the rights of the Hungarian minority created contentious areas in Hungary's relations with the Euro-Atlantic framework. However, these actions also encompass the primary pillars of the country's strategic objectives. It can be argued that fostering positive relations with Russia aligns with pursuing economic interests and developing competitive policies in line with national interests. Similarly, exerting pressure on Ukraine regarding the educational rights of the Hungarian minority aligns with the country's grand strategy objective concerning the Hungarian minority issue. Therefore, it is evident that the FIDESZ government has not sought to transform the fundamental objectives of Hungary's strategic culture completely; instead, it has utilized these existing goals as starting points in formulating its foreign policy.

4.2. Remarks on Ideational Factors

Orbán's leader image reveals the evolution of his political beliefs from a liberal trajectory to a conservative and nationalist axis over time. In this vein, Orbán's adherence to a Hungarian identity rooted in Christian values has become integral to his worldview and political perception, positioning liberalism and socialism as ideological adversaries to be contested. The ideological foundation of FIDESZ, having diverged from its liberal origins under Orbán's leadership, has solidified into a conservative stance grounded in Hungarian nationalism, striving to secure Hungary's independence and strength against the liberal order.

Governing the country since 2010 with this ideological foundation, the FIDESZ government has sought to rationalize Hungary's strategic objectives within its own ideology, although not entirely transforming the country's strategic culture. For instance,

Hungary's national strategy aimed at becoming a competitive country attuned to global economic trends was implemented during the FIDESZ era through the Eastern Opening project. This initiative manifested in strategic and economic partnerships with the Russian Federation. Similarly, FIDESZ's stance towards Ukraine concerning the rights of ethnic Hungarian minorities and its use of NATO as a pressure tool within this policy agenda reflects Orbán's political perceptions.

Therefore, the interpretation of Hungary's strategic culture by the FIDESZ government not only mirrors Orbán's ideological influence as a leader but also underscores the direct impact of his political perceptions on foreign policy and relations with NATO.

4.3. Political Survival

Under this concept, the subsection on domestic institutions evaluates the FIDESZ government's political power within the Hungarian Parliament and its stance towards opposition parties. Accordingly, the influence of the government over this decision-making body during the 2010-2020 period is ascertained. Conversely, the relationship between FIDESZ and the Hungarian Army will not be examined under a separate subsection as in the Turkish case. In the post-communist era, the Hungarian military has not assumed an active political role and has operated under the political authority of successive governments, rendering this relationship less pertinent for evaluation.

Under the subsection on state-society relations, the trends in public support for the FIDESZ government and its policies are scrutinized. This analysis reveals the harmony between the government's policies and the general tendencies of public opinion. Through these subsections, the chapter elucidates whether the FIDESZ government encountered concerns of political survival and assesses the implications of this situation on foreign policy.

4.3.1. Domestic Institution: FIDESZ's Position in the Parliament

In the general elections of 2010, the FIDESZ government not only gained administration power but also achieved unprecedented success in Hungary's history of free and democratic elections. With a vote share of 53%, the Orbán government, having obtained a two-thirds majority in the parliament, positioned itself as the first government to secure a supermajority, eliminating the necessity for forming a coalition in the legislative process. In this context, for the Orbán government, the obstacle of opposition's veto obstacle was removed in terms of implementing its policies and even amending the constitution.⁴²³ Although the Orbán government overcame the veto barrier in the parliament through its supermajority power, the parliamentary composition of opposition parties resulting from the elections also eliminated the risk of the Orbán government's foreign and security policy encountering robust ideological opposition. Following the elections, the central opposition position was taken by the socialist MSZP, but their vote share remained limited at 19%. Apart from the socialists, the liberal party LMP (Lehet Más a Politika/Politics Can Be Different) managed to reach a vote share of 7%. On the other hand, with a radical right-wing ideology, JOBBIK (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom/Movement For A Better Hungary), positioned itself very close to the main opposition by garnering a vote share of 16%.⁴²⁴ In other words, the parliament was divided into two ideological camps, where parties representing the right-wing ideological spectrum accounted for approximately 70% of the vote share.

⁴²³ France 24, "Centre-Right Wins Majority in Round Two of Elections," 2010, <https://www.france24.com/en/20100425-hungary-centre-right-fidesz-party-wins-parliamentary-majority-round-two-elections>. (Accessed on 07 November 2022)

⁴²⁴ Hungary National Election Office, "Parliamentary Elections 2010," 2017, <https://www.valasztas.hu/web/national-election-office/25>. (Accessed on 07 November 2022)

The division of the parliament into two ideological camps also limited the opposition's reactions to the FIDESZ government's foreign policy with the socialist-liberal bloc. However, it can be observed that the opposition stance of the socialist bloc did not permeate every aspect of the foreign and security policy of the government. For instance, the MSZP did not oppose the dual citizenship law concerning Hungarian ethnic minorities, which was a significant subject in Hungary's foreign policy. The MSZP declared its support for ethnic Hungarians obtaining dual citizenship. The party only objected to these communities exercising their right to vote in Hungarian general elections.⁴²⁵ The prominent criticisms of foreign policy by MSZP and LMP were directed towards FIDESZ's Russia policy and its political moves to deviate the country from the Euro-Atlantic trajectory. For instance, the 2013 MSZP manifesto indicated that FIDESZ's foreign and security policies led the country toward isolation. MSZP emphasized the necessity for Hungary to remain within the Euro-Atlantic orbit and recommended that relations with Russia must be approached in alignment with Euro-Atlantic strategies.⁴²⁶

JOBBIK, positioned as the third major opposition party within the right-wing political spectrum, lent support to FIDESZ's foreign policy approach both concerning Hungarian ethnic minorities and Russia subjects. It can be said that JOBBIK's foreign policy stance, situated at a more radical point in comparison to FIDESZ, constituted the primary rationale for this support. For instance, JOBBIK historically rooted its nationalism in the figure of Attila the Hun, presenting Pan-Turanism as a

⁴²⁵ MSZP, "Socialists Approve of Dual Citizenship, Object to Voting Rights," 2011, https://mszp.hu/hir/socialists_approve_of_dual_citizenship_object_to_voting_rights. (Accessed on 07 November 2022)

⁴²⁶ MSZP, "IGAZSÁG, BIZTONSÁG, SZABADSÁG, JÓLÉT AZ MSZP AJÁNLATA MAGYARORSZÁGNAK" (Budapest, 2013), https://mszp.hu/sites/default/files/ajanlat_magyarorszagnak_kongresszus20131019.pdf.

foreign policy option within this context. While linking the Hungarian race's origins to Central Asia, JOBBIK considered Pan-Turanism as an alternative to the Euro-Atlantic alliance.⁴²⁷ Advocating for the autonomous status of Hungarian ethnic minorities, JOBBIK also emphasized the necessity for Hungary to adopt a position against the Euro-Atlantic alliance in the context of Russia. From JOBBIK's perspective, Russia was perceived as a more significant strategic and economic partner for Hungary.⁴²⁸ In this regard, JOBBIK not only refrained from acting as a veto player but also created a political space to radicalize FIDESZ's foreign and security policies further.

The Paks nuclear power plant agreement brought to the parliament by FIDESZ before the 2014 general elections served as the most illustrative example of the opposition's stance on Russia policy. Attila Mesterhazy, the leader of the Socialist MSZP, announced their opposition to the agreement made by the Orbán government with Russia, asserting that agreements of this nature, which concern the country's future, should not be made solely based on the decisions of a single party. He indicated that this agreement should be subject to a referendum to be presented to the public.⁴²⁹ Similarly, LMP also emphasized similar points, stating that one of Hungary's most crucial energy agreements was attempted to be legislated by FIDESZ without

⁴²⁷ András Kovács, "The Post-Communist Extreme Right: The Jobbik Party in Hungary," in *Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 227-228.

⁴²⁸ JOBBIK, "Radical Change," 2010, <https://www.jobbik.com/temp/Jobbik-RADICALCHANGE2010.pdf>.

⁴²⁹ Andrei Zolotov, "The Intrigue Behind the Hungarian Nuclear Deal," VALDAI, 2014, https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the_intrigue_behind_the_hungarian_nuclear_deal/?fbclid=IwAR35JNWvzJrSaXjTFoQhQ-yGyiq_JlZxsRwTGq_vbC34koaltOdmN7Yi-pk.

social and political consensus, resembling a unilateral action.⁴³⁰ In contrast to the socialist-liberal opposition parties, JOBBIK reflected its pro-Russia position at this juncture and assumed a supportive stance towards the FIDESZ government. In the parliamentary vote regarding the approval of the Paks agreement, alongside FIDESZ, JOBBIK members of parliament also cast affirmative votes.⁴³¹

In the 2014 elections, FIDESZ, which garnered 44% of the votes, maintained a strong government position. FIDESZ, attaining a supermajority in the parliament, once again rendered ineffective the veto power of other political parties within the legislature. In this election, the main opposition was led by the Unity/Összefogás alliance, predominantly headed by MSZP, while JOBBIK continued to hold its position as the third-largest opposition party.⁴³² During this phase of the Orbán government's tenure, the opposition's stance on foreign and security policies remained unchanged. For instance, criticisms of the government's Russia policy persisted from the socialist-liberal opposition wing, emphasizing that the Orbán government jeopardized the country's security.⁴³³ It was reiterated that FIDESZ should adhere to the policies set forth by the Euro-Atlantic alliance and consider the interests of its allies in its relations with Russia.⁴³⁴ On the other hand, JOBBIK once again

⁴³⁰ Index, "Az Oroszok Építik Paks Két Új Blokkját," 2014, https://index.hu/gazdasag/ado_es_koltseghet/2014/01/14/nem_veletlenul_ment_orban_moszkvaba/. (Accessed on 07 November 2022)

⁴³¹ BBC, "Hungarian MPs Approve Russia Nuclear Deal," 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26072303>. (Accessed on 07 November 2022)

⁴³² Hungary National Election Office, "Parliamentary Elections 2014," 2017, <https://www.valasztas.hu/web/national-election-office/24>. (Accessed on 07 November 2022)

⁴³³ ORIGO, "Gyurcsány: Léket Kapott a Keleti Nyitás Politikája," 2014, <https://www.origo.hu/itthon/20141202-gyurcsany-leket-kapott-a-keleti-nyitas-politikaja.html>. (Accessed on 07 November 2022)

⁴³⁴ HIRADO, "Szanyi: Magyarország Nem Moszkvai Különállókban Érdekel," 2014, <https://hirado.hu/2014/08/10/szanyi-magyarorszag->

demonstrated its differentiation from other opposition parties by asserting that Hungary should pursue its national interests. JOBBIK highlighted the need for Hungary to remain neutral in the crisis between NATO and Russia,⁴³⁵ and in this regard, its alignment with FIDESZ's stance continued.

While opposition parties and the government diverge in terms of their policies towards Russia, it can be observed that in 2017, during the crisis between Hungary and Ukraine concerning the ethnic Hungarian community, all political actors exhibited a collective stance. In this context, socialist-liberal opposition parties aligned with the FIDESZ government's position, protesting Ukraine's education law, and supporting a political move by the Hungarian state to address this issue.⁴³⁶ Hence, the entire opposition supported the FIDESZ government to develop policies advocating for the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia, thus creating a political maneuvering space. The 2018 general elections, which served as an evaluation of the policies of the FIDESZ, also resulted in a victory for the Orbán government. A noteworthy aspect of these elections was the transformation within the opposition. The socialist-liberal faction, which had held the central opposition position since 2010, weakened in this election, and JOBBIK emerged as the main opposition.⁴³⁷ In other words, owing to the strong government position that had already shielded it from the opposition's veto power since 2010, FIDESZ further fortified its stance from 2018 onward through the weakening

nem-moszkvai-kulonalkukban-erdekel/. (Accessed on 07 November 2022)

⁴³⁵ Katona Mariann, "Nyugat Felé Fordulna a Jobbik," *Magyar Nemzet*, 2015, <https://magyarnemzet.hu/belfold-archivum/2015/03/nyugat-fele-fordulna-a-jobbik>.

⁴³⁶ The Budapest Beacon, "Ukraine's Language Law Sparks Political Storm in Hungary," 2017, <https://budapestbeacon.com/ukraines-language-law-sparks-political-storm-hungary/>. (Accessed on 07 November 2022)

⁴³⁷ Hungary National Election Office, "Parliamentary Elections 2018," 2018, <https://www.valasztas.hu/web/national-election-office/parliamentary-elections-2018>. (Accessed on 07 November 2022)

of the socialist-liberal opposition faction, thereby acquiring a main opposition that aligned with its foreign policy framework.

The structure of the Hungarian Parliament, bolstered by FIDESZ's electoral victories since 2010, indicates that the government has maintained a strong position, unaffected by the opposition's veto power. Consequently, opposition parties have not wielded direct influence over the country's foreign and security policies. In this context, the FIDESZ government has encountered no obstacles in the decision-making process and has not been compelled to revise its policies. In other words, the Hungarian Parliament does not serve as a balancing power (veto player) in formulating foreign policy.

However, the indirect influence of opposition parties in areas emphasizing Hungary's Euro-Atlantic relations is debatable. In the context of the Ukraine issue, the entire opposition appears to have provided political maneuvering space for the FIDESZ government, thereby partially legitimizing its policy. Regarding Russia policy, JOBBIK's support for the government has prevented FIDESZ from facing pressure from the unified opposition in Parliament, thereby encouraging this policy stance.

4.3.2. State-Society Relations

While maintaining a strong government position since 2010, the FIDESZ government also signaled harmony between the government and Hungarian society. In other words, a significant part of society endorsed and supported FIDESZ's policies.

Upon assuming power in 2010, the FIDESZ government prioritized a new economic program and an Eastern Opening vision. In this context, strengthening Hungary's relations with Russia constituted a significant part of the country's foreign policy objective. Notably, there appears to be no substantial divergence between the Hungarian society and the government concerning Russia subject. For instance, a public opinion poll by the Median Institution revealed that 51% of the Hungarian population did not perceive the Russian Federation as a potential threat. Furthermore, 50% of the population expressed a

favorable attitude towards positive relations with Russia for the country's interests.⁴³⁸ Similarly, the research conducted by the International Republican Institute yielded comparable results. This survey also reflected that 54% of the society regarded co-operation with Russia as favorable for state interests.⁴³⁹ The Hungarian population did not perceive the relations between Hungary and Russia negatively; on the contrary, it deemed the Euro-Atlantic policies towards Russia as misguided. For instance, research conducted by the Nézőpont Institute showed that the Euro-Atlantic policy towards Russia (including economic sanctions) was deemed damaging to Hungary's interests by 66% of the Hungarian population.⁴⁴⁰ At this point, the divergence between the FIDESZ government and its allies' stance on Russia was not perceived as a problem by society. The most notable aspect contributing to the society's lack of perception of the divergence between Hungary and the Euro-Atlantic as problematic was the society's pragmatic inclination towards the country's allies. The research conducted by Globsec in 2016 revealed that the Hungarian population supports the Euro-Atlantic alliance at a rate exceeding 70%.⁴⁴¹ However, on the other hand, a study conducted by the Pew Research Center in the same year demonstrated that more than half of the

⁴³⁸ Magyar Peter, "A Fideszesek Nagyon Megszerették Putyint És Oroszországot," *444*, 2018, <https://444.hu/2018/03/14/a-fideszesek-nagyon-megszerettek-putyint-es-oroszorszagot>.

⁴³⁹ International Republican Institute, "Public Opinion in Hungary," 2017, https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/hungary_poll_presentation.pdf.

⁴⁴⁰ Nézőpont Institute, "A MAGYAROK ELLENZIK AZ ENERGIASZANKCIÓKAT," 2022, <https://nezopont.hu/a-magyarok-ellenzik-az-energiaszankciokat/>. (Accessed on 08 November 2022)

⁴⁴¹ GLOBSEC, "GLOBSEC Trends 2016," 2016, <https://www.globsec.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/GLOBSEC-Trends-2016.pdf>.

population (51%) advocates for Hungary pursuing a separate axis outside the Euro-Atlantic regarding national interests.⁴⁴²

In another aspect where the FIDESZ government diverged from Euro-Atlantic, namely the Ukraine issue (on the right to education in the mother tongue for the Hungarian ethnic minority), the population's stance resembled that of the government. For instance, research conducted by the Publicus Institute revealed the sensitivity of Hungarian society towards the identities of the Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian region. The research indicated that 68% of the Hungarian population supports dual citizenship for the Hungarian minority.⁴⁴³ Similarly, a study conducted by the International Republican Institute revealed that only 24% of the population associated having a Hungarian identity with being born within the borders of Hungary. Conversely, for 36% of the population, the most significant aspect of Hungarian identity was ethnic Hungarian descent, regardless of whether the individuals resided outside the country's borders. In other words, a limited segment of Hungarian society linked Hungarian identity solely to the country's current territorial boundaries.⁴⁴⁴ Again, the same survey indicated that, for 51% of the population, matters related to the Hungarian identity are a political realm in which politicians should not compromise.⁴⁴⁵ Another notable result emerges from the research conducted by Globsec in 2018. The crisis between Hungary and Ukraine in 2017 revealed Hungarian society's hostile stance towards the Ukrainian government. Only

⁴⁴² PEW Research Centre, "Europeans Face the World Divided," 2016, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/06/Pew-Research-Center-EPW-Report-FINAL-June-13-2016.pdf>.

⁴⁴³ Tamás Orbán, "Citizenship and Voting Rights in the Hungarian Diaspora," Hungarian Conservative, 2022, https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/culture_society/citizenship-and-voting-rights-in-the-hungarian-diaspora/. (Accessed on 08 November 2022)

⁴⁴⁴ International Republican Institute, "Public Opinion in Hungary."

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

10% of the Hungarian population viewed the policies of the Ukrainian government positively.⁴⁴⁶ At this juncture, it can be stated that, from the perspective of the Hungarian society's national identity perception, the Ukraine policy of the FIDESZ government and the resultant divergence with NATO did not constitute an issue.

The relationship between the FIDESZ government and society indicates that, since 2010, FIDESZ has encountered no significant issues in securing the majority's support. The Orbán government, maintaining its strong position, has implemented policies that align with the general perceptions of the population. In this context, harmony between the state and society has emerged, and the FIDESZ government has not been compelled to revise its foreign and security policy strategies due to societal pressures. In areas of contention between Hungary and the Euro-Atlantic, the majority of the population's stance has been congruent with the government's emphasis on national interests. The fact that a significant portion of the public does not perceive Russia as a serious threat but rather as an important partner for cooperation has afforded the FIDESZ government substantial political maneuvering space to implement its policies. Similarly, regarding the issue of ethnic Hungarian minorities, a significant portion of the nationalist-leaning population has demonstrated that they view this matter as a non-negotiable political domain for the Hungarian state.

4.4. Remarks on Political Survival

The influence of the FIDESZ government in Parliament and its interaction with Hungarian society demonstrate that, since 2010, the government has not harbored concerns about losing its grip on power and has continuously maintained a strong

⁴⁴⁶ GLOBSEC, "GLOBSEC TRENDS 2018," 2018, https://kurier.plus/sites/default/files/2018/GLOBSEC_TRENDS_2018_CENTRAL_EUROPE_ONE_R.pdf.

governing position. Although the Orbán administration has encountered various political disagreements with the opposition within Parliament, the opposition's veto power has remained ineffective, rendering the government autonomous in implementing its foreign policy strategies.

Similarly, regarding its interaction with society, FIDESZ's ability to sustain public support during elections and the approval of its policy maneuvers by a broad population segment indicate a harmonious relationship and the government's strength. This harmony has provided the FIDESZ government with significant political maneuvering space, enabling Orbán to project his ideology onto foreign policy initiatives without revision. Consequently, the lack of political survival anxiety within the FIDESZ government should be seen as a complementary factor that allows the administration to steadfastly adhere to its ideological and political convictions, thereby shaping its course in foreign policy and relations with NATO.

CONCLUSION

5.1. Findings and Discussion

This research, grounded in the concept of alliances within the discipline of international relations, focuses on NATO, one of the most prominent military alliances in contemporary times. The disputes and conflicts between NATO and its member states serve as the starting point of the investigation. From this basis, the study scrutinizes two member states, Turkey and Hungary, which are notable for their current discord in relations with the Euro-Atlantic sphere, as two separate cases (this study does not adopt a comparative case study method).

The relations between Turkey-NATO and Hungary-NATO have garnered significant attention and commentary within various international relations studies. Given the impact of intra-NATO issues on the alliance's cohesion, strategic and mission-setting processes, and the political stances of non-member states, it is unsurprising that these cases attract considerable interest. Existing research has partially elucidated the disputes between these states and the Euro-Atlantic sphere within the context of international politics. Additionally, it has been initially observed that some studies attribute these relational challenges to the ideologies of right-wing conservative governments, such as those of the AKP in Turkey and FIDESZ in Hungary. These interpretations and diverse perspectives not only contribute valuable insights to the discourse but also highlight gaps that have motivated the undertaking of this study.

The unidimensional nature of prior studies and their insufficient holistic evaluation of international politics and domestic dynamics have directed this research to investigate the problematic relations between NATO and Turkey- Hungary under the AKP and FIDESZ governments. These relations are treated as a complex puzzle requiring comprehensive analysis and explanation. To offer an alternative and integrative third path to existing perspectives, this study employs the theoretical

inquiry of neoclassical realism, aiming to produce an explanation that synthesizes international politics with domestic dynamics. Accordingly, international political developments and the contentious issues between these states and NATO are examined with domestic dynamics considered as complementary factors. Furthermore, this research not only seeks to elucidate these cases but also aims to address the theoretical shortcoming of neoclassical realism in identifying intervening variables. The study employs an intervening variables model, thereby also testing the practical application of the theoretical approach. This dual objective enriches the theoretical discourse and offers a nuanced explanation of the cases in question.

Guided by the theoretical framework of NCR, this research first examines international political developments (international system level) and identifies the contentious areas in Turkey-NATO and Hungary-NATO relations considering them. The findings, which provide a general overview of NATO's transforming strategies and missions from its inception to the present, reveal that the alliance's strategy and objectives consist of a primary framework supported by four fundamental pillars. This primary framework is based on collective deterrence and defense, while the supporting pillars include enlargement, crisis management, the fight against terrorism, and a collective stance against Russian aggression. The points of divergence between Turkey- Hungary and these four fundamental pillars (strategies) of NATO, in the context of international political developments, have been identified as the conflict areas between these countries and the alliance.

During the period between 2002 and 2020, encompassing the rule of the AKP, it has been identified that Turkey diverged from two of the core strategies of the Euro-Atlantic. These contentious areas pertain to the alliance's concept of counter-terrorism and its collective stance towards Russia. The international political catalyst for the conflict area related to counter-terrorism was the civil war in Syria that erupted following the Arab Spring and Turkey's policies towards the MENA region

in general, and Syria in particular. Turkey's opposition to the Assad regime, the deepening of the civil war, resulting military and political destabilization in the region, and the emergence of new actors (ISIS and Kurdish armed groups PYD/YPG) escalated the situation into a dispute. Turkey's position towards Kurdish groups, driven by its security concerns, conflicted with NATO allies' strategy against ISIS, highlighting a divergence in priorities and security policies between Turkey and the Euro-Atlantic.

Regarding the other contentious area, Turkey's political stance towards Russia, the developments in the context of the Syrian civil war served as the underlying international political reason. Russia's support for the Assad regime and its transformation into a critical actor in the Syrian issue underscored Russia's indispensability in Turkey's security policies. As Turkey's security concerns in Syria led to divergences with NATO allies, its rapprochement with the Russian Federation reflected a balancing policy. This proximity, initiated by security concerns and the Syrian issue, acted as a catalyst, fostering positive relations between Turkey and Russia that extended to other domains, such as energy sector and the economy field.

The Hungarian case, encompassing the period from 2010 to 2020 under the FIDESZ government, reveals that the country diverged from two of NATO's core strategies. These conflict areas emerged over the alliance's collective stance towards Russia and its enlargement strategies. The international political reasons for these conflicts include Hungary's dependence on Russia for energy, the country's new economic development strategy, and concerns regarding protecting the Hungarian ethnic minority in the Transcarpathia region. Regarding the contentious area related to Russia, Hungary's economic vulnerability and energy needs are at the core of the issue. The FIDESZ government's new economic strategy, designed with these factors in mind, aimed to increase strategic cooperation with Eastern countries, leading to a positive shift in Hungary's political stance towards Russia, deviating from the Euro-Atlantic alignment.

The conflict arising from NATO's enlargement strategy in the international political platform was triggered by the renewed prominence of the Hungarian minority issue in the Transcarpathia region following Ukraine's implementation of an education law. The FIDESZ government, concerned with protecting the rights and identity of the Hungarian ethnic minority, used NATO (through its veto power) as a political leverage tool over Ukraine. This approach hindered NATO's policy towards Ukraine and, more broadly, its enlargement strategy. Consequently, Hungary's maneuver to strengthen its bargaining position and protect national interests regarding the Hungarian minority also signalled a departure from NATO's trajectory.

Considering the findings, the research demonstrates that international political developments (such as military and economic power balances and security concerns) played an initial role in forming conflicts and dispute issues in Turkey-NATO and Hungary-NATO relations. Consequently, the areas of disagreement between Turkey- Hungary and the alliance have been established within a cause-and-effect framework at the international system level. Subsequently, as the study posits, it examines the influence of domestic political dynamics on these issues with the alliance and identifies how these internal factors contribute complementarily to the process. The domestic political dynamics are categorized into two primary concepts: ideational factors and political survival. These concepts were analyzed in both Turkey and Hungary cases.

To ascertain the influence of ideational factors in the Turkey case, the ideological foundation of Erdoğan and the AKP has been meticulously detailed. The study examines whether Turkey's strategic culture (grand strategy) has been reshaped within this ideological context and how this grand strategy has been implemented. This reveals the power of the government's ideological base, its role in foreign policy formulation, and its impact on relations with NATO. The findings indicate that Erdoğan's ideological foundation aligns with the National Outlook Movement, encompassing elements of Islamism and

Ottomanism. However, unlike the National Outlook Movement, Erdoğan's leader image is pragmatic and does not adhere strictly to a rigid Islamist doctrine. Under the AKP government, it has been determined that the ideology of Islamism and Ottomanism has reshaped the fundamental strategic culture and foreign policy objectives of modern Turkey. While the strategic culture established within Kemalist principles emphasized non-intervention beyond national borders, Western integration, and a focus on Turkish national identity, the AKP era has shown a shift towards aspiring to be a significant regional power with influence over former Ottoman territories and emphasizing a Muslim identity. Consequently, Turkish foreign policy has evolved into a form that operates outside the existing status quo and rapidly changes positions to achieve its goals. In this context, Turkey's involvement in the Syrian civil war and its efforts to overthrow the Assad regime are directly linked to these ideological objectives. The divergence in policies with NATO allies following the deepening of the Syrian conflict is a manifestation of this rapidly changing, pragmatic approach.

In the Turkey case, the direct impact of political survival efforts on foreign policy has also been identified. Findings indicate that the AKP faced the threat of losing its strong government position in parliament in 2015 and saw a decline in public support, particularly in the context of its Syria policy. Additionally, the power struggle between the AKP government and the Turkish Armed Forces culminated in an attempted military coup in 2016, significantly endangering the government's political existence. To maintain its strong position in parliament, the AKP government allied with the MHP, thereby incorporating the MHP's nationalist and security-focused policies into its political agenda. Moreover, public pressure and desire for a resolution to the Syrian civil war, including issues related to refugees and terrorism/security, compelled the AKP government to adopt more security-oriented policies. The lack of coordination and alignment between the AKP government and its Western allies following the coup attempt, especially in combating the Gülen Movement, markedly increased Erdoğan's scepticism towards

the West. Considering these developments, Turkey's counter-terrorism policy in Syria and its increasingly positive relations with Russia align closely with the AKP's efforts to ensure its political survival.

Regarding the impact of ideational factors in the Hungary case, findings reveal that Orbán and FIDESZ's ideological foundation has shifted over time from an initially liberal stance to one centered around Hungarian nationalism with Christian roots. Consequently, socialism and liberalism are seen by Orbán's government as opposing ideologies to be combated, while Hungary's independence and strength as a state are viewed as achievable only through divergence from the impositions of the liberal order. Thus, this political perception emphasizes an independent, strong, and pragmatically nationalistic state that underscores Hungarian identity and harbors significant scepticism towards the West and liberalism. When examining Hungary's strategic culture goals post-independence (post-communist era), it is observed that the FIDESZ government has not entirely transformed the country's grand strategy. However, Orbán's ideological foundation has significantly influenced the interpretation and implementation of the grand strategy's objectives. Specifically, Hungary's national strategic aim to follow global economic trends and pursue a competitive path has manifested in a way that supports and encourages rapprochement with Russia, in line with FIDESZ's anti-liberalism and scepticism towards the West. Similarly, the projection of Hungary's stance on Hungarian identity and nationalism is evident in its political position towards Ukraine, particularly regarding the issue of Hungarian minority rights. The utilization of the Euro-Atlantic integration process as a means of exerting pressure aligns with Orbán's concept of political pragmatism.

The findings indicate that concerns over political survival do not directly shape Hungary's foreign policy but indirectly influence the government's foreign policymaking process. Since the FIDESZ government came to power in 2010, it has maintained a strong position in parliament and has neutralized the opposition's

veto power despite disagreements. Additionally, it has not faced significant challenges in garnering majority public support. The military's lack of influence as a political actor in Hungary and its subordination to the elected government diminishes the significance of the relationship between the FIDESZ government and the Hungarian Armed Forces. The absence of an acute threat to political survival has granted the FIDESZ government considerable latitude to implement its political agenda. In this context, the government has not revised its policies under pressure, ensuring that foreign policy remains consistent with Orbán administration's ideological framework. Consequently, the government has pursued its uncompromised political agenda, as evidenced by its stance towards Russia and the issue of Ukraine (in terms of alliance enlargement and integration), even when these stances have led to conflicts with NATO.

Examining intervening variables has also yielded findings addressing the research question: **“In which way do political survival and ideational factors constrain and affect Turkey’s and Hungary’s relationship with NATO?”**

Summarizing these findings, the strategic culture's reconstruction and the policies aimed at implementing these new objectives, framed by Erdoğan and the AKP government's ideology and perceptions (Islamism and Ottomanism), lay the groundwork for the contentious areas in Turkey-NATO relations. On the other hand, concerns over political survival have pressured the government, particularly regarding its Syria policy and security strategies, constraining policy options and necessitating changes. Thus, while the concept of political survival directly influences foreign policymaking, it also contributes to deepening conflicts with the Euro-Atlantic. In the context of Hungary-NATO relations, Orbán's and the FIDESZ government's ideational influence is paramount. Although the FIDESZ government has not reconstructed the strategic culture's objectives, it has leveraged its ideological foundation to interpret and politically realize them, aligning the country's foreign policy accordingly. Consequently, this ideological approach and political

perceptions shape the construction of conflicts with NATO. Furthermore, the absence of a severe threat from political survival concerns has not constrained the FIDESZ government's policy options, allowing it to implement its political agenda freely. In this regard, while the concept does not exert a direct influence, it indirectly ensures that the government does not deviate from its foreign policy trajectory, thereby circumscribing Hungary-NATO relations within the ideological framework of the Orbán government

As a result, the findings confirm the research's **Hypothesis 1: "Both in Turkey and Hungary's respective cases with regards to their NATO disputes, political survival concerns are as effective as ideational factors."** In both cases, the leaders' and governments' ideological foundations and policy perceptions are paramount. In the case of Turkey, the intensity of political survival concerns has compelled the government to adjust its policies, thereby deepening disputes with NATO. Conversely, in the case of Hungary, the absence of a significant threat from political survival concerns has encouraged the government to adhere to its political agenda without concessions, thereby indirectly influencing NATO disputes.

The findings also address the second research question: **"Is there any affiliation between the concepts of political survival and ideational factors? If yes, how? What are their relative impacts on each other?"** According to the data obtained, a connection between ideational factors and political survival has been identified. In the case of Turkey, it is evident that the AKP government exhibits high levels of political survival concerns, which have led to changes in its policy perceptions. Originally grounded in an Islamist and Ottomanist ideological base, the government was compelled to update its policies within a nationalist and security-oriented framework following significant political upheavals. Initially, the AKP government aimed to overthrow the Assad regime and enhance Turkey's regional dominance. However, facing the threat of losing power, its priorities shifted to combating Kurdish armed groups, seeking a

political solution in Syria, and addressing the refugee crisis. This period also coincides with a peak in the government's negative perception of Western allies. In the case of Hungary, the absence of political survival threats is linked to the government's steadfast adherence to its ideological base and policy perceptions. The FIDESZ government has not faced pressure to adjust its foreign policies, allowing it to continue infusing its ideological strength into policymaking without compromise.

Considering the data, *Hypothesis 2: "There is a causal link between political survival and ideational factors. Political survival concerns affect the ideational base,"* is incomplete and flawed. Rather than a causal relationship, there is a conditional relationship between political survival and ideational/ideological elements. Political survival concerns can reshape or force a revision of the ideational/ideological foundation under certain conditions. Therefore, political leaders and governments do not form their ideologies and policies solely based on political survival concerns. Only in specific situations, such as facing severe threats or crises, do they seek to reassess their ideational base and, consequently, their policies, as exemplified in the case of Turkey.

5.2. Contributions and Limitations of Research and Recommendations for Further Studies

In the context of the study's objectives and findings, this research contributes to the field of international relations on both empirical and theoretical levels. Empirically, it provides a comprehensive analysis of Turkey-NATO and Hungary-NATO relations. Integrating data from both the international political and unit levels addresses gaps left by other studies, adding a transitive and detailed explanation to the literature. It demonstrates that domestic political characteristics are complementary factors.

Examining the Turkey-NATO and Hungary-NATO cases in this study offers an alternative/different perspective for

understanding the relationships between NATO and its member states in the broader context. It serves as an example of applying a multi-layered approach to examining other issues within the alliance. Beyond international policy explanations or cognitive approaches, it introduces a perspective that integrates domestic political peculiarities with international politics, thereby providing a framework for similar studies on NATO.

Utilizing NCR as a theoretical guide in this study provides a significant contribution by applying and testing this foreign policy theory within the context of NATO and its member states' relations. Starting from the notion that alliances are a crucial instrument of foreign policy, the research establishes a link between NATO and states' foreign policy behaviours. Additionally, it addresses and mitigates some of NCR's inherent shortcomings. One of the theoretical contributions is creating a synthetic model to clarify existing confusion about intervening variables (domestic dynamics) and applying this model to the cases studied. Thus, the research has determined how NCR's theoretical claims perform in the relationships between NATO and its member states relations, validating these theoretical assertions with real-world cases and thereby influencing the literature.

In addition to the contributions of this study, it is essential to address its limitations, which generally stem from the nature of the cases examined. For instance, the study analyzes the AKP and FIDESZ governments until 2020, resulting in temporal limitations. Consequently, the study has not included recent developments (such as new conflict areas) post-2020. Additionally, as the research focuses on political leaders who have established full authority within their parties and administrations, like Erdoğan and Orbán, it only examines the ideational structures of these particular figures under leader image. However, this approach might differ in other states and cases, where various political figures with different ideological backgrounds might need to be considered. The same applies to the domestic institutions examined. The study limits these institutions to the

Conclusion

parliament and the military. However, in cases involving other alliances or organizations, it might be necessary to examine various actors, such as the judiciary, economic institutions, and civil society organizations. Thus, while this research provides significant insights, its scope is constrained by the specific cases and factors chosen for analysis.

The findings of this study, in the context of its contributions, open possibilities for further research. Future studies could similarly examine other cases of contentious relationships within NATO. Likewise, states with structurally similar governments but different positions within NATO could be compared. This inquiry, which integrates international politics with domestic dynamics as complementary factors, could also be applied to other alliances or international organizations in future research.

REFERENCES

Primary Sources (Official Documents)

- 1012/2008. (III. 4.) Korm. határozat Magyarország külkapcsolati stratégiájáról (2008). <https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2008-1012-30-22>.
- 11/1993. (III. 12.) OGY határozat a Magyar Köztársaság biztonságpolitikájának alapelvei (1993). <https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=993h0011.OGY>.
2010. évi XLV. törvény a Nemzeti Összetartozás melletti tanúságtételről (2010). <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1000045.tv>.
- 2073/2004. (IV. 15.) Korm. határozat a Magyar Köztársaság nemzeti biztonsági stratégiájáról (2004). <https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2004-2073-30-22>.
- 27/1993. (IV. 23.) OGY határozat a Magyar Köztársaság honvédelmének alapelveiről (1993). <https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=993h0027.OGY>.
- 94/1998. (XII. 29.) OGY határozat a Magyar Köztársaság biztonság- és védelempolitikájának alapelveiről (1998). <https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=998h0094.OGY>.
- About Hungary. “Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on Magyar Televízió (Hungarian Public Television) Summarising His Recent Visit to Beijing,” 2017. <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-on-magyar-televizio-hungarian-public-television-summarising-his-recent-visit-to-beijing>.
- . “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Commemoration Speech,” 2020. <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/primeminister-viktor-Orbán-s-commemoration-speech-trianon>.
- . “Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 28th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp,” 2017. <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/viktor->

Orb ns-speech-at-the-28th-balvanyos-summer-open-university-and-student-camp.

AKP. “Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- Parti T z   ,” 2002.

<https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11543/901/200204121.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

———. “Se im Beyannamesi,” 2002.

<https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11543/954/200304063.pdf?seque>.

European Commission. “Financial Assistance to Hungary,” 2018.

https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-financial-assistance/non-euro-area-countries/financial-assistance-hungary_en.

European Commission, and Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. “Member States’ Energy Dependence: An Indicator-Based Assessment.” Brussels, 2013.

https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp145_en.pdf.

FIDESZ. “A Stronger Hungary – Fidesz Presents Its Manifesto,”

2007. https://fidesz-eu.hu/en/a_stronger_hungary_fidesz_presents_its_manifesto/.

Grand National Assembly of Turkey. “Parliamentary Minutes

(123rd Meeting, 6.7.1993),” 1993.

<https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d19/c038/tbmm19038123.pdf>.

———. “Parliamentary Minutes (39th Meeting, 1.3.2003),” 2003.

<https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d22/c006/tbmm22006039.pdf>.

———. “T RK S LAHLI KUVVETLER N N KUZHEY IRAK’A G NDER LMES NE; BU KUVVETLER N GEREKT   NDE BEL RLENECEK ESASLAR DA RES NDE KULLANILMASINA VE MUHTEMEL B R ASKER  HAREKAT  ER EVE NDE YABANCI S LAHLI KUVVETLERE MENSUP HAVA UNSURLARININ T RK HAVA SAHASINI T RK MAKI,” 2003.

https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tbmm_kararlari/karar763.html.

———. “T rkiye B y k Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutana ı 24.

Dönem 3. Yasama Yılı 73. Birleşim 05/Mart /2013 Salı,” 2013. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr//develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=21904&P5=H&page1=53&page2=53.

Hungary National Election Office. “Parliamentary Elections 2010,” 2017. <https://www.valasztas.hu/web/national-election-office/25>.

———. “Parliamentary Elections 2014,” 2017. <https://www.valasztas.hu/web/national-election-office/24>.

———. “Parliamentary Elections 2018,” 2018. <https://www.valasztas.hu/web/national-election-office/parliamentary-elections-2018>.

Hungary Prime Minister’s Office. “Prime Minister’s Speech after Taking the Oath of Office,” 2014. <https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/the-prime-ministers-speeches/prime-minister-s-speech-after-taking-the-oath-of-office>.

———. “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 6th Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States,” 2018. <https://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-speech-at-the-6th-summit-of-the-cooperation-council-of-turkic-speaking-states/>.

———. “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 7th Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States,” 2019. <https://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-speech-at-the-7th-summit-of-the-cooperation-council-of-turkic-speaking-states/>.

———. “Sikeres Államot Csak Akkor Lehet Felépíteni, Ha Erős Nemzet Áll Mögötte,” 2011. <https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/miniszterelnok/beszed-ek-publikaciok-interjuk/fsikeres-allamot-csak-akkor-lehet-felepiteni-ha-cros-nemzet-all-mogotte>.

———. “The next Years Will Be about Hardworking People,” 2015. <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/the-next-years-will-be-about-hardworking-people>.

———. “Viktor Orbán’s Press Conference after His Meeting with

Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin,” 2015.
<https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-Orbán-s-press-conference-after-his-meeting-with-russian-president-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin>.

———. “Viktor Orbán’s State of the Nation Address,” 2011.
<https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/the-prime-ministers-speeches/viktor-Orbán-s-state-of-the-nation-address>.

JOBBIK. “Radical Change,” 2010.
<https://www.jobbik.com/temp/Jobbik-RADICALCHANGE2010.pdf>.

Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi. “Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Genel Başkanı Sayın Devlet BAĞÇELİ’nin, TBMM Grup Toplantısında Yapmış Oldukları Konuşma,” 2012.
https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/mhp/2407/mhp/Milliyetci_Hareket_Partisi_Genel_Baskani_Sayin_Devlet_BAHCELI_nin_gunu_TBMM_Grup_Toplantisinda_yapmis_olduklari_konusma_16.html.

———. “Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Genel Başkanı Sayın Devlet BAĞÇELİ’nin, TBMM Grup Toplantısında Yapmış Oldukları Konuşma,” 2017.
https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/genel_baskan/konusma/4311/index.html.

———. “Parti Programı,” 2009.
https://mhp.org.tr/usr_img/_mhp2007/kitaplar/mhp_parti_programi_2009_opt.pdf.

———. “TÜRK SİYASETİNDE YOZLAŞMA VE ARAYIŞ SÜRECİNDE MİLLİYETÇİ HAREKET PARTİSİ.” Ankara, 2002.

Ministry of Defence of Hungary. “There Is a Need for Armistice in Ukraine,” 2015. <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-defence/news/there-is-a-need-for-armistice-in-ukraine>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary. “Hungary’s Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union,” 2011.
<https://brexit.kormany.hu/admin/download/f/1b/30000/forei>

gn_policy_20111219.pdf.

Miniszterelnök. “1848 És 2010 Is Megújulást Hozott,” 2011.
https://2010-2015.miniszterelnok.hu/beszed/1848_es_2010_is_megujulast_hozott.

MSZP. “IGAZSÁG, BIZTONSÁG, SZABADSÁG, JÓLÉT AZ MSZP AJÁNLATA MAGYARORSZÁGNAK.” Budapest, 2013.
https://mszp.hu/sites/default/files/ajanlat_magyarorszagnak_kongresszus20131019.pdf.

———. “Socialists Approve of Dual Citizenship, Object to Voting Rights,” 2011.
https://mszp.hu/hir/socialists_approve_of_dual_citizenship_object_to_voting_rights.

NATO. “Alliance Ready to Deepen Partnership with Ukraine,” 2005. <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/02-february/e0222b.htm>.

———. “Ballistic Missile Defence,” 2022.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm.

———. “Brussels Summit Declaration,” 2018.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm.

———. “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” 2008.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm.

———. “Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine,” 1997.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25457.htm

———. “Consensus Decision-Making at NATO,” 2023.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49178.htm.

———. “Countering Terrorism,” 2022.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm.

———. “Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance,” 1990.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23693.htm

———. “Economic Developments in Cooperation Partner Countries From a Sectoral Perspective,” 1993.

- <https://www.nato.int/docu/colloq/1993/eco9320.txt>.
- . “Harmel Report,” 2022.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67927.htm.
- . “Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed,” 2001.
<https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm>.
- . “Istanbul Summit Communiqué,” 2004.
<https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>.
- . “London Declaration,” 2019.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm.
- . “Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation,” 1997. <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm>.
- . “Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept MC 48/2,” 1957. <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a570523b.pdf>.
- . “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality. Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation,” 2002. https://www.nato.int/nrc-website/media/59487/2002.05.28_nrc_rome_declaration.pdf.
- . “NATO’s Role in Kosovo,” 2022.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm.
- . “NATO and Libya (Archived),” 2015.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_71652.htm.
- . “NATO Launches ‘Intensified Dialogue’ with Ukraine,” 2005. <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/04-april/e0421b.htm>.
- . “NATO Offers Intensified Dialogue to Georgia,” 2006.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_22173.htm?selecteDLocale=en.
- . “North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991-1997),” 2022.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69344.htm.
- . “Operation Active Endeavour (2001-2016),” 2022.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_7932.htm.
- . “Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area MC 14/2,” 1957.

- <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a570523a.pdf>.
- . “Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2004),” 2022.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52122.htm.
- . “Prague Summit Declaration,” 2002.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19552.htm
- . “Riga Summit Declaration,” 2006.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_37920.htm?mode=pressrelease.
- . “Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document,” 2020.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_82584.htm.
- . “Statement by the North Atlantic Council,” 2001.
<https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm>.
- . “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,” 2010.
<https://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>.
- . “Study on NATO Enlargement,” 1995.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm
- . “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept (1991),” 1991.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm
- . “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999),” 1999.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm
- . “The Brussels Summit Declaration,” 1994.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24470.htm?mode=pressrelease.
- . “The Future Tasks of the Alliance Report of the Council - ‘The Harmel Report,’” 1967.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_26700.htm
- . “The Mediterranean Dialogue,” 2000.
- . “Wales Summit Declaration,” 2014.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.
- . “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” 2016.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.

Parliament of the Republic of Hungary. “88/1995. (VII. 6.) OGY Határozat a Magyar Honvédség Hosszú, Valamint Középtávú Átalakításának Irányairól És Létszámáról,” 1995.
<https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=995h0088.OGY>.

Presidency of Republic of Türkiye. “10 Questions to Understand 15 July Coup Attempt and Fetullah Terrorist Organization,” 2016.
<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/assets/dosya/2016-12-02-onsorudafeto-tr-en.pdf>.

———. “NATO’nun S-400 Alımına Müdahale Yetkisi Yok,” 2017.
<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/83489/natonun-s-400-alimina-mudahale-yetkisi-yok>.

———. “Türk Akımı Doğal Gaz Boru Hattı Projesi Anlaşması İmzalandı,” 2016.
<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/53547/cumhurbaskani-erdoğan-rusya-devlet-baskani-putin-ile-gorustu>.

President of Russia. “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” 2007.
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>.

Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation. “News Conference Following Russian-Hungarian Talks,” 2016.
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/51352>.

———. “Press Conference on Russian-Hungarian Talks,” 2018.
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58586>.

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Atatürk Döneminde Türk Dış Politikası,” 2022.
<https://www.mfa.gov.tr/Atatürk-doneminde-turk-dis-politikasi.tr.mfa>.

———. “Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu’nun Bahreyn, Katar ve Suriye’deki Temaslarına İlişkin Yaptığı Basın Toplantısı, 6 Nisan 2011, Şam,” 2011. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoğlu_nun-bahreyn_-katar-ve-suriye_deki-temaslarina-iliskin-yaptigi-basin-toplantisi_-6-nisan-2.tr.mfa.

———. “Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu’nun TBMM Genel Kurulu’nda Suriye’deki Olaylar Hakkında Yaptığı

- Konuşma, 26 Nisan 2012,” 2012.
https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-Davutoğlu_nun-tbmm-genel-kurulu_nda-suriye_deki-olaylar-hakkinda-yaptigi-konusma_-26-nisan-2012.tr.mfa.
- . “Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu’nun VI. Büyükelçiler Konferansının Açılış Oturumunda Yaptıkları Konuşma,” 2014. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-Davutoğlu_nun-vi_-buyukelciler-konferansinin-acilis-oturumunda-yaptiklari-konusma_-13-ocak-2014_-an.tr.mfa.
- . “NATO Genel Bilgi Notu,” 2021.
<https://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/nato-bilgi--notu.pdf>.
- . “Sayın Bakanımızın Libya Konusundaki Açıklaması, 21 Mart 2011, Ankara,” 2011. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-libya-konusundaki-aciklamasi_-21-mart-2011_-ankara.tr.mfa.
- . “Sayın Başbakanımızın Libya’ya İlişkin Olarak Yaptıkları Açıklama, 3 Mayıs 2011, İstanbul,” 2011.
https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-basbakanimizin-libya_ya-iliskin-olarak-yaptiklari-aciklama_-3-mayis-2011.tr.mfa.
- . “Speech Entitled ‘Vision 2023: Turkey’s Foreign Policy Objectives’ Delivered by H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu,” 2011.
https://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-entitled-_vision-2023_-turkey_s-foreign-policy-objectives_-delivered-by-h_e_-ahmet-Davutoğlu_-minister-of-foreign-af.en.mfa.
- . “Türkiye - Ermenistan Siyasi İlişkileri,” 2022.
<https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-ermenistan-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>.
- . “Türkiye - Libya Siyasi İlişkileri,” 2022.
<https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-libya-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>.
- Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Justice. “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Cumhuriyet Tarihimizde İlk Defa Yargımız Darbecilerin Değil, Milletin Yanında Yer Aldı,” 2018.
<https://basin.adalet.gov.tr/cumhurbaskani-Erdoğan-cumhuriyet-tarihimizde-ilk-defa-yargimiz-darbecilerin-degil-milletin-yaninda-yer-aldi>.

Republic of Türkiye Supreme Election Council. “22. Dönem Milletvekili Genel Seçimi,” 2022. <https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/03-kasim-2002-xxii-donem-milletvekili-genel-secimi/3009>.

———. “23. Dönem Milletvekili Genel Seçimi,” 2022. <https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/22-temmuz-2007-xxiii-donem-milletvekili-genel-secimi/5001>.

———. “24. Dönem Milletvekili Genel Seçimi,” 2022. <https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/12-haziran-2011-xxiv-donem-milletvekili-genel-secimi/4929>.

———. “26. Dönem Milletvekili Genel Seçimi,” 2022. <https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/1-kasim-2015--26-donem-milletvekili-genel-secimi/3413>.

The European Commission for Democracy through Law. “Agreements Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States [Done at Minsk, December 8,1991, and Done at Alma Alta, December 21,1991],” 1994. [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL\(1994\)054-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(1994)054-e).

The Russian Federation. “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation,” 1997. <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/11782/page/1>.

———. “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” 2000. <https://nuke.fas.org/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm>.

———. “The Foreign Policy Concept of The Russian Federation,” 2008. <http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116>.

———. “The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation,” 2000. <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/14927>.

The UN Refugee Agency. “Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2015,” 2016.

The United States Congress. “Public Law 107–40 Joint Resolution,” 2001. <https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf>.

The White House. “Statement by the Press Secretary,” 2019. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings->

statements/statement-press-secretary-64/.

Turkish Land Force Command. “Fırat Kalkanı Harekâtı.” Accessed July 29, 2022. <https://www.kkk.tsk.tr/firat-kalkani.aspx>.

United States Department of State. “Strategy for NATO’s Expansion and Transformation,” 1993. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16374-document-02-strategy-nato-s-expansion-and>.

Secondary Sources

24. “Orbán: Az Olaj Keletről Jön, de a Szabadság Nyugatról,” 2007. https://24.hu/belfold/2007/03/30/Orban_olaj_keletrol_jon/.

Acar, Zeynep Selin. “Doktrinleşme Sürecindeki İnsani Müdahale: Nato’nun Kosova Müdahalesi ve Koruma Sorumluluğu Kavramı.” *Ege Strategic Research Journal* 6, no. 1 (2015): 113–31.

Adler, Emanuel. “Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates.” In *Handbook of International Relations*, 112–44. New York: SAGE Publications, 2013.

———. “The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO’s Post—Cold War Transformation.” *European Journal of International Relation* 14, no. 2 (2008): 195–230.

Akçali, Emel, and Mehmet Perinçek. “Kemalist Eurasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Discourse in Turkey.” *Geopolitics* 14, no. 3 (2009): 550–69.

Akkoyunlu, Karabekir. “The Five Phases of Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AKP.” *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 88, no. 2 (2021): 243–70.

Aktürk, Şener. “Relations between Russia and Turkey before, during, and after the Failed Coup of 2016.” *Insight Turkey* 21, no. 4 (2019): 97–114.

Alkan, Haluk. “15 Temmuz’u Anlamak: Parametreler ve Sonuçlar.” *Bilgi* 79, no. 1 (2016): 253–72.

Altundeg er, Nurettin, and M. Ertuğrul Yılmaz. “İç Savaştan Bölgesel İstikrarsızlığa: Suriye Krizinin Türkiye’ye Faturası.” *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fak ltesi Dergisi* 21, no. 1 (2016): 289–301.

- Ámon, Ada, and András Deák. "Hungary and Russia in Economic Terms - Love, Business, Both or Neither?" In *Diverging Voices, Converging Policies: The Visegrad States' Reactions to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict*, 83–99. Warsaw: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2015.
- Anadolu Ajansı. "TSK'nın FETÖ İle Kararlı Mücadelesinde 24 Bin 256 Personel İhraç Edildi," 2021.
<https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/tsk-nin-feto-ile-kararli-mucadelesinde-24-bin-256-personel-ihrac-edildi/2457167>.
- András, Bódis. "Megvan a Bizonyíték: Nem Őszöd Volt a Gyurcsány-Korszak Legnagyobb Botránya," 2019.
<https://www.valaszonline.hu/2019/04/17/gyurcsany-szilvasy-oroszok-titkosszolgalat/>.
- Ankara University. "KAMUOYU VE TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI ANKETİ." Ankara, 2010.
- Antal, Attila. "The Political Theories, Preconditions and Dangers of the Governing Populism in Hungary." *Politologický Časopis* 24, no. 1 (2017): 5–20.
- Arbatov, Alexei G. "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives." *International Security* 18, no. 2 (1993): 5–43.
- Aslanov, Hümbet. "Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu Üyesi Devletlerin Topluluğa Farklı Yaklaşımlarının Karşılaştırılması." Istanbul University, 2009.
- Aslund, Anders. "Russia's Collapse." *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 5 (1999): 64–77.
- Atacan, Fulya. "Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP." *Turkish Studies*, 6, no. 2 (2005): 187–99.
- Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics* 38, no. 1 (1985): 226–54. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010357>.
- Aydoğan, Merve. "Turkey Gives US-Led Coalition Access to Incirlik Air Base in Fight against ISIS." *Daily Sabah*, 2015.
<https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2015/07/23/turkey-gives-us-led-coalition-access-to-incirlik-air-base-in-fight-against-isis>.
- Ayyaz, Zehra. "Astana ve Soçi Süreçlerinin Türk-Rus İlişkilerine Etkileri." *Diplomasi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 2, no. 2 (2020): 46–63.

- Balcı, Ali. "A Three-Level Analysis of Turkey's Crisis with the U.S.-Led Order." *Insight Turkey* 21, no. 4 (2019): 13–24.
- Ballı, Alper. "7 Haziran Seçiminin 8 Sonucu." *BBC NEWS TÜRKÇE*, 2015.
https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/06/150608_secim_satir_baslari_gs2015.
- Barnett, Michael N. "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East." In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 400–441. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
- Barnett, Michael N., and Jack S. Levy. "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962–73." *International Organization* 45, no. 3 (1991): 369–95.
- Başarı, Mehtap. "The Reflections of The Notes Given to Turkey by Soviet Russia, for Dissolution Of '1925 Nonaggression and Neutrality Treaty' in Turkish Press." *Belgi Dergisi* 2, no. 18 (2019): 1417–48.
- BBC. "Hungarian MPs Approve Russia Nuclear Deal," 2014.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26072303>.
- . "Turkey PM Erdoğan Apologises for 1930s Kurdish Killings," 2011. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-15857429>.
- BBC NEWS TÜRKÇE. "Devlet Bahçeli: Türkiye'de Son 16 Yılda Siyasete Yön Veren Kararları," 2018.
<https://www.bbc.com/turkce/43799117>.
- . "Erdoğan: 'PYD'ye Silah Göndermeye 'evet' Diyemeyiz,'" 2014.
https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/10/141019_Erdogan_pyd.
- . "YPG: Yerel Bir Örgütten, NATO Ülkelerinin Desteklediği Bir Güce Nasıl Dönüştü?," 2019.
<https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-50180068>.
- Beach, Derek, and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019.

- Benedek, Márta. "Strategic Culture: The Facets of Foreign Policy and National Security." *AARMS* 14, no. 3 (2015): 299–310.
- Benhür, Çağatay. "Stalin Dönemi Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri." *Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi* 15, no. 1 (2004): 325–37.
- Bennett, Andrew, and Jeffrey T. Checkel. "Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices." In *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*, 3–38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Bennett, Andrew, and Colin Elman. "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield." *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 2 (2007): 170–95.
- Bergsmann, Stefan. "The Concept of Military Alliance." In *Small States and Alliances*, 25–37. New York: Physica-Verlag Heidelberg, 2001.
- BIANET. "Erdoğan Leaves Davos Gaza Panel in Protest," 2009. <https://m.bianet.org/bianet/world/112227-Erdoğan-leaves-davos-gaza-panel-in-protest>.
- Bock, Andreas M, Ingo Henneberg, and Friedrich Plank. "If You Compress the Spring, It Will Snap Back Hard": The Ukrainian Crisis and the Balance of Threat Theory." *International Journal* 70, no. 1 (2015): 101–9.
- Bölme, Selin M. "Soğuk Savaş'ta NATO-ABD-Türkiye Üçgeninde Askeri Üsler: Süreklilik Ve Değişim." *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 9, no. 34 (2012): 51–71.
- Booth, Ken. "Alliances." In *Contemporary Strategy*, 172–91. New York: Routledge, 2021.
- Bozdağlıoğlu, Yücel. "Modernity, Identity and Turkey's Foreign Policy." *Insight Turkey* 10, no. 1 (2008): 55–75.
- Brovkin, Vladimir. "Discourse on NATO in Russia during the Kosovo War." *Demokratizatsiya* 7, no. 4 (1999): 544–60.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*. New York: Basic Books, 1998.
- Bush, George W. *Decision Points*. New York: Crown, 2010.
- Buzogány, Aron. "Illiberal Democracy in Hungary: Authoritarian

- Diffusion or Domestic Causation?" *Democratization* 24, no. 7 (2017): 1307–25.
- Cabada, Ladislav. "Central Europe between the West and East: Independent Region, the Bridge, Buffer Zone or 'Eternal' Semi-Periphery?" *Politics in Central Europe* 16, no. 2 (2020): 419–32.
- . "Liberal Populism as a Polarizing Factor of Regional Cooperation in Central Europe." *Revista UNISCI* 66, no. 1 (2024): 63–79.
- . "Nativist and Anti-Liberal Narratives in Conservative Populist Agenda in Central Europe." *Teorija in Praksa* 58, no. 2 (2021): 284–304.
- Çandar, Cengiz. "Turkey's 'Soft Power' Strategy: A New Vision for a Multi-Polar World," 2009.
- Castaldo, Antonino. "Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 18, no. 4 (2018): 467–87.
- Çelik, Mehmed Mazlum. "Türk Demokrasisinde Kara Bir Gün: 27 Nisan e-Muhtırası." *İndependent Türkçe*, 2020.
<https://www.indyturk.com/node/169886/siyaset/turk-demokrasisinde-kara-bir-gun-27-nisan-e-muhtirasi>.
- Christensen, Thomas J. *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Chrysosgelos, Angelos. "Populism in Foreign Policy." *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Politics*. Oxford University Press, 2017.
- CNN TÜRK. "Baykal'ın Gül'e Dair Eleştirileri Sürüyor," 2007.
<https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/baykalin-Gule-dair-elestirileri-suruyor>.
- Collins, Brian. "Operation Enduring Freedom and the Future of NATO." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 3, no. 2 (2002): 51–56.
- Congdon, Lee. "The Rise of Viktor Orbán, Right-Wing Populist." *Modern Age* 60, no. 4 (2018).
<https://theimaginativeconservative.org/2018/11/viktor-Orban-hungarian-resistance-lee-congdon.html>.

- Consulate General of Hungary Los Angeles. "HUNGARY AND THE WORLD," 2022.
<https://losangeles.mfa.gov.hu/eng/page/hungary-and-the-world>.
- Coşkun, Cevdet, and Eda Yanar. "Milli Görüş ve Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: Süreklilikler ve Kopuşlar." *Akademik İzdüşüm Dergisi* 5, no. 2 (2020): 266–80.
- Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. "Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 2002 Seçim Bildirgesi," 2002. <https://chp.org.tr/yayin/2002-secim-bildirgesi/Open>.
- D'Alema, Francesc. "The Evolution of Turkey's Syria Policy." 8, 2017.
- David, Steven R. "Explaining Third World Alignment." *World Politics* 43, no. 2 (1991): 233–56.
- Davutoğlu, Ahmet. "Ortadoğu'nun Geleceği ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Alternatifleri." *Yeni Şafak*, 1996.
<https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/ahmet-Davutoğlu/ortadogunun-gelecegi-ve-turkiyenin-di-politika-alternatifleri-2026912>.
- . "Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring," 2012.
- . *Stratejik Derinlik*. İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001.
- Deák, András, and Csaba Weiner. "Hungary: Leveraging Political Influence." In *The Russian Economic Grip on Central and Eastern Europe*, 136–50. New York: Routledge, 2019.
- Defense News. "Ukraine Parliament Restores NATO Membership as Strategic Target," 2017.
<https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2017/06/09/ukraine-parliament-restores-nato-membership-as-strategic-target/>.
- Deutsche Welle. "Putin ABD'ye Meydan Okudu," 2007.
<https://amp.dw.com/tr/putin-abdye-meydan-okudu/a-2574806?fbclid=IwAR1x9LY80FyEeCeK-nVEU2B78wLmcrrOmK0vgf3mNbBNVjjzPyImDNHHbbA>.
- . "Turkey to Halt Extraditions to US until It Gets Gülen," 2018. <https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-to-halt-extraditions-to-us-until-it-gets-fethullah-Gülen/a-42116304>.

- Devlen, Balkan, and Özgür Özdamar. "Neoclassical Realism and Foreign Policy Crises." In *Rethinking Realism in International Relations: Between Tradition and Innovation*, 136–63. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.
- Dinerstein, Herbert S. "The Transformation of Alliance Systems." *American Political Science Review* 59, no. 3 (1965): 589–601.
- Dueck, Colin. "Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy, 2000–2004." *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 4 (2004): 511–35.
- Duplain, Julian. "Ethnic Hungarian Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe," 1996.
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6c34.html>.
- Duran, Alev, and Fatma Çalık Orhun. "Macarlar, Macaristan ve Turancılık." *History Studies* 11, no. 2 (2019): 557–71.
- Emiroğlu, Atiye. "27 MAYIS 1960 İHTİLALİ VE DEMOKRAT PARTİ'NİN TASFİYESİ." *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal ve Teknik Araştırmalar Dergisi* 1, no. 1 (2011): 13–27.
- Erdemir, Aykan, and Ryan Brobst. "Engines of Influence: Turkey's Defense Industry Under Erdoğan," 2022.
- Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip. "My Country Is Your Faithful Ally and Friend." *The Wall Street Journal*, 2003.
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB104907941058746300>.
- Erşen, Emre. "Neo-Eurasianism and Putin's 'Multipolarism' in Russian Foreign Policy." *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies* 4, no. 1 (2004): 135–72.
- . "Suriye Sorunu Gölgesinde Türkiye-Rusya İlişkilerinde Normalleşme Süreci." *Marmara Türkîyat Araştırmaları Dergisi* 3, no. 2 (2016): 153–71.
- Eşel, Gökhan. "DARBELER ARASINDA (1960 - 1980) TÜRKİYE – NATO İLİŞKİLERİ." *The Journal of Academic Social Science Studies* 56, no. 1 (2017): 409–16.
- Euobserver. "Orbán Upsets Neighbours by Call for Hungarian Minority Self-Rule," 2014.
<https://euobserver.com/world/124145>.
- Euronews. "Erdoğan, ABD'den Fethullah Gülen'in İadesini Talep Etti," 2016. <https://tr.euronews.com/2016/07/16/Erdoğan-amerika-ya-seslenerek-fethullah-Gülen-in-iadesini-talep-etti>.

- Evans, Ryan. "Turkey's Shifting Strategic Culture: Part 2 – The Rise of Republican Strategic Culture," 2014.
<https://www.fpri.org/2014/10/turkeys-shifting-strategic-culture-part-2-the-rise-of-republican-strategic-culture/>.
- Evera, Stephen Van. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. London: Cornell University Press, 1997.
- Farkas, Evelyn. "The Future of NATO: New Challenges and Opportunities." GMF, 2019.
<https://www.gmfus.org/news/future-nato-new-challenges-and-opportunities>.
- Farkas, Tibor, and Erika Hronyecz. "Hungarian Defence Forces in NATO Multinational Operations." *Security and Defence Quarterly* 4, no. 3 (2014): 73–86.
- Faulconbridge, Guy. "Putin Criticizes U.S. over South Ossetia." Reuters, 2008. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-ossetia-usa-idUSN0850115420080811>.
- Fedder, Edwin H. "The Concept of Alliance." *International Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 1 (1968): 65–86.
- Feledy, Botond. "Hungarian Foreign Policy and the Crisis in Ukraine." In *Diverging Voices, Converging Policies: The Visegrad States' Reactions to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict*, 69–82. Warsaw: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2015.
- Flick, Uwe, Ernst Von Kardorff, and Ines Steinke. "What Is Qualitative Research? An Introduction to the Field." In *A Companion to Qualitative Research*, 3–11. London: SAGE Publications, 2004.
- Forster, Anthony, and William Wallace. "What Is NATO For?" *Survival* 43, no. 4 (2001): 107–22.
- France 24. "Centre-Right Wins Majority in Round Two of Elections," 2010. <https://www.france24.com/en/20100425-hungary-centre-right-fidesz-party-wins-parliamentary-majority-round-two-elections>.
- Gause, F. Gregory. "Ideologies, Alignments, and Underbalancing in the New Middle East Cold War." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 50, no. 3 (2017): 672–75.

- Gazete Duvar. “Kapıyı Açan Bahçeli Oldu,” 2017.
<https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/gundem/2017/04/15/kapiyi-bahceli-acti>.
- Gheciu, Alexandra. “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the ‘New Europe.’” *International Organization* 59, no. 4 (2005): 973–1012.
- Giantin, Stefano. “Hungarian PM Tries to Develop Stronger Ties with Populists in the Balkans.” *Nato Defense College Foundation*, 2023. <https://www.natofoundation.org/balkans-black-sea/hungarian-pm-tries-to-develop-stronger-ties-with-populists-in-the-balkans/>.
- GLOBSEC. “GLOBSEC Trends 2016,” 2016.
<https://www.globsec.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/GLOBSEC-Trends-2016.pdf>.
- . “GLOBSEC TRENDS 2018,” 2018.
https://kurier.plus/sites/default/files/2018/GLOBSEC_TRENDS_2018_CENTRAL_EUROPE_ONE_R.pdf.
- Godzimirski, Jakub M. “Russian National Security Concepts 1997 and 2000: A Comparative Analysis.” *European Security* 9, no. 4 (2000): 73–91.
- Gordon, Philip H. “The Crisis in the Alliance,” 2003.
<https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-crisis-in-the-alliance/>.
- Götz, Elias. “Explaining Russia’s Opposition to NATO Enlargement: Strategic Imperatives, Ideas, or Domestic Politics?” In *Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security after the Cold War*, 481–500. Washington DC: Johns Hopkins Press, 2019.
- . “Neoclassical Realist Theories, Intervening Variables, and Paradigmatic Boundaries.” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 17, no. 2 (2021): 1–13.
- Grieco, Joseph M. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism.” *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 485–507.
- Grobe, Stefan. “Europe’s Week: Hungary and Turkey Block Western Efforts against Russia.” *Euronews*, 2022.
<https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/05/20/europe-s-week-hungary-and-turkey-block-western-efforts-against-russia>.

- Habertürk. “1 Mart Tezkeresi’nin Tutanakları Açıklanacak Mı?” 2013. <https://www.haberturk.com/polemik/haber/819489-1-mart-tezkeresinin-tutanaklari-aciklanacak-mi>.
- Harden, Blaine. “HUNGARIAN-NESS’ BACK IN FASHION.” *The Washington Post*, 1990. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/04/11/hungarian-ness-back-in-fashion/baa45b79-7cc6-454e-87a8-e3f28a608eed/>.
- Harper, Jo. “Hungary Eyes Moscow for Gas.” *Deutsche Welle*, 2018. <https://www.dw.com/en/hungarian-gas-devil-or-deep-blue-sea/a-46614746>.
- Head, Jonathan. “Libya: Turkey’s Troubles with Nato and No-Fly Zone.” *BBC*, 2011. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12864742>.
- Hegedűs, Dániel. “The Kremlin’s Influence in Hungary: Are Russian Vested Interests Wearing Hungarian National Colors?” *DGAP Kompakt* 8, no. 1 (2016): 1–11.
- Heiss, Mary Ann. *NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conflicts*. Kent: Kent State University Press, 2008.
- Hellmann, Gunther, and Reinhard Wolf. “Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO.” *Security Studies* 3, no. 1 (1993): 3–43.
- HIRADO. “Szanyi: Magyarország Nem Moszkvai Különalkukban Érdekelt,” 2014. <https://hirado.hu/2014/08/10/szanyi-magyarorszag-nem-moszkvai-kulonalkukban-erdekel/>.
- Hopf, Ted. “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–200.
- Hungarian Free Press. “Hungary Sends Troops to Fight ISIS,” 2015. <https://hungarianfreepress.com/2015/04/14/hungary-sends-troops-to-fight-isis/>.
- Hungary Today. “Opening to the East May Be More Successful than Previously Expected,” 2024. <https://hungarytoday.hu/opening-to-the-east-may-be-more-successful-than-previously-expected/>.
- Hürriyet. “Başbakan Erdoğan, Suriye’ye Gitti,” 2008. <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/basbakan-Erdogan-suriyeye-gitti-8792220>.

- . “Dostum Putin’in Desteğine İhtiyacım Var,” 2016.
<https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/dostum-putinin-destegine-ihciyacim-var-40257109>.
- . “Erdoğan: Milliyetçilik Ayak Altında,” 2013.
<https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/Erdoğan-milliyetçilik-ayak-altında-22621388>.
- . “Kılıçdaroğlu’ndan Türk Hükümetine Suriye Eleştirisi,” 2013. <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/kilicdaroglundan-turk-hukumetine-suriye-elestirisi-22347924>.
- hvg.hu. “Orbán: Nehéz Lesz, ‘Nem Babazsúrra Készülünk,’” 2010.
https://hvg.hu/itthon/20100529_Orbán_nem_babazsurra_keszu1.
- Hyde-Price, Adrian. “NATO and the European Security System: A Neo-Realist Analysis.” In *Theorising NATO*, 41–60. New York: Routledge, 2015.
- İlgi, Aslı, and Binnur Özkececi-Taner. “Identity and Decision Making: Toward a Collaborative Approach to State Action.” In *Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance*, 92–118. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012.
- Index. “A Parlamentben Elhangzott Az Ondógép Szó,” 2015.
https://index.hu/belfold/2015/02/16/teljesulhet_kover_laszlo_alma/.
- . “Az Oroszok Építik Paks Két Új Blokkját,” 2014.
https://index.hu/gazdasag/ado_es_koltseghetes/2014/01/14/nem_veletlenul_ment_Orbán_moszkvaba/.
- . “Orbán: Keleti Szél Fúj,” 2010.
https://index.hu/belfold/2010/11/05/Orbán_keleti_szel_fuj/.
- International Republican Institute. “Public Opinion in Hungary,” 2017. https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/hungary_poll_presentation.pdf.
- Izbul, Can. “Erdoğan: ‘Suriye İç Meselemiz, Gereğini Yapmak Durumundayız.’” *VOA*, 2011.
<https://www.voaturkce.com/a/Erdoğan-suriye-ic-meselemiz-geregini-yapmak-durumundayiz-127078293/898713.html>.
- Jepperson, Ronald L, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein.

- “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security.” In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
- Józwiak, Veronika. “The Role of Defence Cooperation in Hungary’s Relations with the US.” Warsaw, 2019.
- Juhász, Attila, and et al. “I Am Eurasian’: The Kremlin Connections of the Hungarian Far-Right.” Budapest, 2015.
- Kadercan, Pelin Telseren, and Burak Kadercan. “The Turkish Military as a Political Actor: Its Rise and Fall.” *Middle East Policy* 23, no. 3 (2016): 84–99.
- Kadir Has University. “Türk Dış Politikası Kamuoyu Algıları Araştırması.” Istanbul, 2019.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334226883_Turk_Dis_Politikasi_Kamuoyu_Algilari_Arastirmasi_-_2019.
- . “Türk Dış Politikası Kamuoyu Algıları Araştırması.” Istanbul, 2013.
<https://www.khas.edu.tr/sites/khas.edu.tr/files/inline-files/tdpkaa-2013.pdf>.
- . “Türk Dış Politikası Kamuoyu Algıları Araştırması.” Istanbul, 2017.
https://www.khas.edu.tr/sites/khas.edu.tr/files/inline-files/TDP-2017_vfinal.pdf.
- Kaliber, Alper, and Esra Kaliber. “From De-Europeanisation to Anti-Western Populism: Turkish Foreign Policy in Flux.” *The International Spectator* 54, no. 4 (2019): 1–16.
- Kara, Mehtap. “Linking Turkey’s Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: The Justice and Development Party’s Political Strategies and Their Divergent Foreign Policy Effects.” *Turkish Studies* 23, no. 4 (2022): 529–53.
- Karaca, Bilal Bahadır, and Berk Köksal. “The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy in Syria: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective.” *Przegląd Strategiczny* 15, no. 1 (2022): 43–58.
- Karaca, Bilal Bahadır. “Vişegrad Grubu Ülkelerinin Rusya Federasyonu İle Siyasi İlişkileri: Ortak Ya Da Farklı Pozisyon?” *Rusya Araştırmaları Dergisi* 5 5, no. 1 (2021): 131–55.

- Karaosmanoğlu, ALi L. "NATO'nun Dönüşümü." *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 10, no. 40 (2014): 3–38.
- Kasım, Kamer. "Soğuk Savaş Dönemi Sonrası Kıbrıs Sorunu." *Gazî Akademik Bakış* 1, no. 1 (2007): 57–72.
- Kelle, Udo, and Christian Erzberger. "Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Not in Opposition." In *A Companion to Qualitative Research*, 172–77. London: SAGE Publications, 2004.
- Kenes, Bulent. "Viktor Orbán: Past to Present." ECPS Leader Profile Series. Brussels, 2020.
- Keohane, Robert O. "Alliances, Threats, and the Uses of Neorealism." *International Security* 13, no. 1 (1988): 169–76.
- Kiss, Balázs, and Csaba Zahorán. "Hungarian Domestic Policy in Foreign Policy." *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* 16, no. 2 (2007): 46–64.
- Kitchen, Nicholas. "Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation." *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 1 (2010): 117–43.
- Kolodziej, Edward A. *Security and International Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Köse, Talha. "Çözüm Sürecinin Yükseliş ve Düşüşü." *Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi* 4, no. 1 (2017): 13–40.
- Kovács, András. "The Post-Communist Extreme Right: The Jobbik Party in Hungary." In *Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse*, 223–34. London: Bloomsbury, 2013.
- Kovács, Áron, and M. István Szabó. "Paks II.: Gyurcsány Pálfordulásától Orbán Nagy Üzletéig." hvg.hu, 2014. https://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20140115_Oroszok_Pakson_hogyan_jutottunk_idaig.
- Kowalczyk, Michał. "Hungarian Turanism. From the Birth of the Ideology to Modernity – an Outline of the Problem." *Historia i Polityka* 27, no. 20 (2017): 43–63.
- Kozyrev, Andrei. "Russia: A Chance for Survival." *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 2 (1992): 1–16.
- Külügyminisztérium. "Magyarország a NATO-Ban," 2013.

https://20102014.kormany.hu/download/0/7b/20000/magyarorszaga_NATO-ban.pdf.

- Kupchan, Charles A. Kupchan, Clifford A. "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe." *International Security* 16, no. 1 (1991): 114–61.
- Kuru, Ahmet T. "Türkiye’de Askeri Vesayetın Yükseliş ve Düşüşü: İslamcılık, Kürtçülük ve Komünizm Korkuları." In *Türkiye’de Demokrasi, İslam ve Laiklik*, 139–59. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2013.
- Kutay, Acar. "A Historical Analysis of the AKP in Power: Hegemony, Predominance, and Interregnum." *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift* 123, no. 1 (2021): 55–73.
- Kuyumcu, M. İhsan, and Hülya Kösematoğlu. "The Impacts of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey’s Economy (2011-2016)." *Journal of Turkish Social Sciences Research* 2, no. 1 (2017): 78–93.
- Lamont, Christopher. *Research Methods in International Relations*. London: SAGE Publications, 2015.
- Lavrov, Anton. "Russia in Syria: A Military Analysis." *ISSUE, Chaillot Paper* 148 (2018): 47–56.
- Lebow, Richard Ned. "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism." *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (1994): 249–77.
- Legro, Jeffrey W., and Andrew Moravcsik. "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999): 5–55.
- Lendvai, Paul. *Orbán: Hungary’s Strongman*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Lindgaard, Jakob, and Moritz Pieper. "Turkey’s NATO Future: Between Alliance Dependency, Russia, and Strategic Autonomy." Copenhagen, 2020.
- Liska, George. *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962.
- Lobell, Steven E., Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Vol. 324. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

- Los Angeles Times. "Broader NATO May Bring 'Cold Peace,' Yeltsin Warns : Europe: Russian President Accuses U.S. of Being Power Hungry. Speech Comes as Nations Finalize Nuclear Treaty," 1994. <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-12-06-mn-5629-story.html>.
- Majtényi, Balázs, Alíz Nagy, and Péter Kállai. "„Only Fidesz” – Minority Electoral Law in Hungary." *VerfBlog*, 2018. <https://verfassungsblog.de/only-fidesz-electoral-law-in-hungary/>.
- Mankoff, Jeffrey. *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009.
- Marantz, Paul. "Russian Foreign Policy During Yeltsin's Second Term." *Communist and Post Communist Studies* 30, no. 4 (1997): 345–51.
- Mariann, Katona. "Nyugat Felé Fordulna a Jobbik." *Magyar Nemzet*, 2015. <https://magyarnemzet.hu/belfold-archivum/2015/03/nyugat-fele-fordulna-a-jobbik>.
- Matura, Tamás. "Chinese Investment in Central and Eastern Europe: A Reality Check." Budapest, 2021.
- . "Hungary: No Need for a Chinese Soft-Power Strategy." The Hague, 2021.
- Mearsheimer, John J. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War." *International Security* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5–56.
- Miklóssy, Katalin, and Justyna Pierzynska. "Regional Strategic Culture in the Visegrad Countries: Poland and Hungary." In *Strategic Culture in Russia's Neighborhood: Change and Continuity in an In-Between Space*, 83–114. New York: Lexington Books, 2019.
- Milliyet. "Erdoğan'a 10 Ay Hapis," 1998. <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/Erdogana-10-ay-hapis-5358830>.
- . "Milli Görüş'ü Terk Ettiler," 2003. <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/milli-gorusu-terk-ettiler-5179000>.
- Morgan, T. Clifton, and Glenn Palmer. "To Protect and to Serve: Alliances and Foreign Policy Portfolios." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 2 (2003): 180–203.

- Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948.
- Morrow, James D. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances." *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4 (1991): 904–33.
- Mufti, Malik. *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture Republic at Sea*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Murinson, Alexander. "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy." *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 6 (2006): 945–64.
- Mynet. "27 Nisan E-Muhtırası Tam Metni," 2015.
<https://www.mynet.com/27-nisan-e-muhtirasi-tam-metni-110102212559>.
- Narizny, Kevin. "On Systemic Paradigms and Domestic Politics: A Critique of the Newest Realism." *International Security* 42, no. 2 (2017): 155–90.
- Németh, József Lajos. "The Evolution of the Hungarian Security Policy Thinking between 1989-1999, with a Special View on the Hungarian Defence Forces." *Security and Defence Quarterly* 1, no. 2 (2013): 93–106.
- Newnham, Randall. "Oil, Carrots, and Sticks: Russia's Energy Resources as a Foreign Policy Tool." *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 2, no. 1 (2011): 134–43.
- Nézőpont Institute. "A MAGYAROK ELLENZIK AZ ENERGIASZANKCIÓKAT," 2022. <https://nezopont.hu/a-magyarok-ellenzik-az-energiaszankciokat/>.
- O'Sullivan, John, and Kálmán Pócsa. *The Second Term of Viktor Orbán: Beyond Prejudice and Enthusiasm*. London: Social Affairs Unit, 2015.
- Oest, Kajsa Ji Noe. "The End of Alliance Theory?" Copenhagen, 2007.
- Oğuz, Şafak. "The Evolution of Peace Operations and the Kosovo Mission." *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 13, no. 51 (2016): 99–114.
- Oğuzlu, Tarık. "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?" *Turkish Studies* 9, no. 1 (2008): 3–20.
- . "NATO ve Türkiye: Dönüşen İttifakın SorGülayan Üyesi."

- Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 9, no. 34 (2012): 99–124.
- . “Turkey’s Eroding Commitment to NATO: From Identity to Interests.” *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 3 (2012): 153–64.
- Oltay, Edith. “Redefining the Concept of the Hungarian Nation.” *Hungarian Review* 12, no. 2 (2021).
<https://hungarianreview.com/article/redefining-the-concept-of-the-hungarian-nation/>.
- Onea, Tudor. “Putting the ‘Classical’ in Neoclassical Realism: Neoclassical Realist Theories and US Expansion in the Post-Cold War.” *International Relations* 26, no. 2 (2012): 139–64.
- Öniş, Ziya, and Şuhnaz Yılmaz. “Turkey and Russia in a Shifting Global Order: Cooperation, Conflict and Asymmetric Interdependence in a Turbulent Region.” *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 1 (2016): 71–95.
- Orbán, Tamás. “Citizenship and Voting Rights in the Hungarian Diaspora.” Hungarian Conservative, 2022.
https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/culture_society/citizenship-and-voting-rights-in-the-hungarian-diaspora/.
- ORIGO. “Gyurcsány: Léket Kapott a Keleti Nyitás Politikája,” 2014.
<https://www.origo.hu/itthon/20141202-gyurcsany-leket-kapott-a-keleti-nyitas-politikaja.html>.
- Osgood, Robert Endicott. *Alliances and American Foreign Policy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968.
- Özalp, Mustafa. “Fayda ve Zararlar: Çıkmakla Kalmak Arasında Türkiye-NATO İlişkileri.” *Bilecik Şeyh Edebali Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 3, no. 2 (2018): 404–21.
- Özbudun, Ergun. “AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan’s Majoritarian Drift.” *South European Society and Politics* 19, no. 2 (2014): 155–67.
- Özlük, Erdem. “Dengeleme Mi Peşine Takılmak Mı?: Dış Politika Stratejilerini Yeniden Düşünmek.” *Gaazi Akademik Bakış* 10, no. 20 (2017): 221–63.
- Özlük, Erdem, and Duygu Özlük. “NATO’yu Anlamak: Dönüşümü, Yeni Kimlikleri ve Uyum Süreçleri.” *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 31, no. 1 (2014): 209–25.
- Peou, Sorpong. “Realism and Constructivism in Southeast Asian

Security Studies Today: A Review Essay.” *The Pacific Review* 15, no. 1 (2002): 119–38.

Peter, Magyari. “A Fideszesek Nagyon Megszerették Putyint És Oroszországot.” *444*, 2018. <https://444.hu/2018/03/14/a-fideszesek-nagyon-megszerettek-putyint-es-oroszorszagot>.

PEW Research Centre. “Europeans Face the World Divided,” 2016. <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/06/Pew-Research-Center-EPW-Report-FINAL-June-13-2016.pdf>.

Poussenkova, Nina. “The Global Expansion of Russia’s Energy Giants.” *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 2 (2010): 103–24.

Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027697>.

RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. “Hungary Sets Condition For Ukraine’s Participation In NATO Meeting,” 2018. <https://www.rferl.org/a/hungary-sets-condition-for-ukraine-participation-in-december-nato-metting/29609366.html>.

———. “Turkey Isolated At NATO Meeting, Slammed For Syria Incursion,” 2019. <https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-ministers-to-meet-amid-disagreements-over-turkish-syria-operation/30233926.html>.

Ratti, Luca. “Back to the Future? International Relations Theory and NATO-Russia Relations since the End of the Cold War.” *International Journal* 64, no. 2 (2009): 399–422.

Reuters. “Hungary Vetoes NATO Statement on Ukraine over Minority Rights: Minister,” 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-nato-ukraine-idUSKBN1X91ZI>.

———. “U.S. Urges Hungary Not to Block Ukraine’s NATO Engagement,” 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-hungary-idUSKBN1OC1KB>.

Ripsman, Norrin M. “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups.” In *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, 170–93. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

- Ripsman, Norrin M., Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell. *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas. "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community." In *Domestic Politics and Norm Diffusion in International Relations: Ideas Do Not Float Freely*. New York: Routledge, 2017.
- . "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies." *World Politics* 43, no. 4 (1991): 479–512.
- Robins, Philip. "Between the EU and the Middle East: Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Government, 2002-2007." Milano, 2007.
- . "Turkish Foreign Policy since 2002: Between a 'Post-Islamist' Government and a Kemalist State." *International Affairs* 83, no. 2 (2007): 289–304.
- Rogin, Josh. "U.S. Delivers First Aid Shipment to Free Syrian Army." *Foreign Policy*, 2013. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/01/u-s-delivers-first-aid-shipment-to-free-syrian-army/>.
- Rose, Gideon. "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy." *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998): 144–72.
- Rousseau, David L. *Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities: The Social Construction of Realism and Liberalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006.
- Rumer, Eugene. "The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action." Washington DC, 2019.
- Sadecki, Andrzej, and Tadeusz Iwański. "Ukraine–Hungary: The Intensifying Dispute over the Hungarian Minority's Rights." Warsaw, 2018.
- Saraçoğlu, Cenk. "Akp, Milliyetçilik Ve Dış Politika: Bir Milliyetçilik Doktrini Olarak Stratejik Derinlik." *Alternatif Politika* 5, no. 1 (2013): 52–68.
- Saraçoğlu, Cenk, and Özhan Demirkol. "Nationalism and Foreign Policy Discourse in Turkey Under the AKP Rule: Geography, History and National Identity." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 3 (2015): 301–19.
- Schimmelfennig, Frank. "NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist

- Explanation.” *Security Studies* 8, no. 2–3 (1998): 198–234.
- Schroeder, Paul W. “Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management.” In *Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe, 195–222*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
- Schwartz, David N. “The Role of Deterrence in NATO Defense Strategy: Implications for Doctrine and Posture.” *World Politics* 28, no. 1 (1975): 118–33.
- Schweller, Randall L. “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing.” *International Security* 29, no. 2 (2004): 159–201.
- Şen, Mustafa. “Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party.” *Turkish Studies* 11, no. 1 (2010): 59–84.
- Shevchenko, Alexei. “From a Follower to a Trendsetter: Hungary’s Post-Cold War Identity and the West.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 51, no. 1 (2018): 63–72.
- Simon, Michael W., and Erik Gartzke. “Political System Similarity and the Choice of Allies: Do Democracies Flock Together, or Do Opposites Attract?” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 4 (1996): 617–35.
- Sinkaya, Bayram. “Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu Politikası ve Batı Etkisi.” *Adam Academy Journal of Social Sciences* 1, no. 1 (2011): 79–100.
- Siverson, Randolph M., and Juliann Emmons. “Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 2 (1991): 285–306.
- Siverson, Randolph M., and Harvey Starr. “Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances.” *American Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 1 (1994): 145–51.
- Sjursen, Helene. “On the Identity of NATO.” *International Affairs* 80, no. 4 (2004): 687–703.
- Small, Melvin, and J. David Singer. “Formal Alliances, 1816–1965: An Extension of the Basic Data.” *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969): 257–82.

- Snyder, Glenn H. "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut." *Journal of International Affairs* 44, no. 1 (1990): 103–23.
- . "Alliances, Balance, and Stability." *International Organization* 45, no. 1 (1991): 121–42.
- . "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (1984): 461–95.
- Sokolsky, Richard D. "The New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications for European Security." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* 13, no. 1 (2017): 1–19.
- Solana, Javier. "NATO's Success in Kosovo." *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 6 (1999): 114–20.
- Sönmez, A. Sait. "Moskova'nın Kutuplaşma Çabaları: Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikası." *Avrasya Etüdleri* 37, no. 1 (2010): 37–76.
- SÖZCÜ. "Erdoğan'dan Başkanlık Sistemi Açıklaması," 2015. <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/gundem/Erdoğan-dan-baskanlik-sistemi-aciklamasi-989489/>.
- Spiegel. "Hungary Wants to Throw Out IMF," 2013. <https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/hungary-calls-on-imf-to-close-its-budapest-office-a-911250.html>.
- Stepashin, Sergey, Konstantin Kobets, and Dmitry Volkogonov. "MEMORANDUM about Results of the Delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR's Visit to Belgium on Invitation of the NATO Headquarters," 1991. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/4390815/Document-01-Memorandum-to-Boris-Yeltsin-about.pdf>.
- Szakacs, Gergely. "Europe 'shot Itself in Foot' with Russia Sanctions: Hungary PM." *Reuters*, 2014. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-sanctions-hungary-idUSKBN0GF0ES20140815>.
- Székely, Tamás. "Hungarian Foreign Minister: Elimination Of ISIS Key To Solving Migration Crisis." *Hungary Today*, 2017. <https://hungarytoday.hu/hungarian-foreign-minister-elimination-isis-key-solving-migration-crisis-12531/>.
- Szunomár, Ágnes, Katalin Völgyi, and Tamás Matura. "Chinese Investments and Financial Engagement in Hungary." Budapest, 2014.

- T24. “Başbakan Erdoğan’ın Konuşmasının Tam Metni,” 2012.
<https://t24.com.tr/haber/basbakan-Erdoganin-konusmasinin-tam-metni,214180>.
- Tálas, Péter. “Hungarian Strategic Culture and the New National Military Strategy.” *Nemzet És Biztonság / Nation and Security* 6, no. 1 (2014): 3–16.
- Tálas, Péter, and Tamas Csiki. “Strategic Cultures in Europe - Hungary.” In *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*, 165–79. Postdam: Springer, 2013.
- Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource- Extractive State.” *Security Studies* 15, no. 3 (2006): 464–95.
- Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman. “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy.” In *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, 1–41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Tarcan, Burçin Hafize, Hilal Akgüller, and Kübra Işık. “Ahmet Davutoğlu Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası.” *Econder International Academic Journal* 2, no. 2 (2018): 250–71.
- Tarrósy, István, and Zoltán Vörös. “Hungary’s Pragmatic Foreign Policy in a Post-American World.” *Politics in Central Europe* 16, no. 1 (2020): 113–34.
- Taş, Hakkı. “Continuity through Change: Populism and Foreign Policy in Turkey.” *Third World Quarterly*, 2022, 1–19.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2108392>.
- Taşçı, İhsan. “10 Soruda Suriye Sınırında ‘Güvenli Bölge.’” *BBC NEWS TÜRKÇE*, 2015.
https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/07/150728_guvenli_bolge_nedir.
- Tellal, Erel. “Zümrüdüanka: Rusya Federasyonu’nun Dış Politikası.” *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 65, no. 3 (2010): 189–236.
- The Budapest Beacon. “Ukraine’s Language Law Sparks Political Storm in Hungary,” 2017. <https://budapestbeacon.com/ukraines-language-law-sparks-political-storm-hungary/>.
- The Economist. “Turkey and NATO Are Growing Apart,” 2018.

<https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/02/01/turkey-and-nato-are-growing-apart?>

The German Marshall Fund. "Transatlantic Trends: 2004 Partners," 2004.

———. "Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2013," 2013.

The Guardian. "Hungary Suspends Gas Supplies to Ukraine under Pressure from Moscow," 2014.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/26/hungary-suspends-gas-supplies-ukraine-pressure-moscow>.

———. "Turkey to Allow Kurdish Peshmerga across Its Territory to Fight in Kobani," 2014.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/20/turkey-allows-peshmerga-forces-to-travel-to-kobani>.

Thies, Wallace J. *Why NATO Endures*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Tuğrul, Talip. "Milli Görüş Hareketi'nin Temel Karakterleri." *Mezhep Araştırmaları Dergisi* 10, no. 2 (2017): 617–57.

Tumen, Semih. "The Economic Impact of Syrian Refugees on Host Countries: Quasi-Experimental Evidence From Turkey." *American Economic Review* 106, no. 5 (2016): 456–60.

Tunahan, Özcan. "28 Şubat Süreci: Post-Modern Darbe'nin Sosyo-Politik Dinamikleri ve Toplum Desteği." *Bilgi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 30, no. 1 (2015): 23–41.

Turcsányi, Richard. "Central and Eastern Europe's Courtship with China: Trojan Horse within the EU?" Brussels, 2014.

Tüysüzöğlu, Göktürk. "Milenyum Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası: Yeni Osmanlıcılık ve Türk Avrasyacılığı Ekseninde İnşa Edilen Bir Pragmatizm." *Alternatif Politika* 5, no. 3 (2013): 295–323.

Varga, Imre. "Development of the Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Last Ten Years." *National Security and the Future* 1, no. 2 (2000): 117–31.

Varga, Mihai, and Aron Buzogány. "The Foreign Policy of Populists in Power: Contesting Liberalism in Poland and Hungary." *Geopolitics* 26, no. 5 (2021): 1442–63.

Végh, Zsuzsanna. "Hungary's 'Eastern Opening' Policy toward

- Russia: Ties That Bind?" *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* 24, no. 1 (2015): 47–65.
- Verbeek, Bertjan, and Andrej Zaslove. "Populism and Foreign Policy." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, 489–514. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Veres, Valér. "The Minority Identity and the Idea of the 'Unity' of the Nation: The Case of Hungarian Minorities from Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine." *Identities* 22, no. 1 (2015): 88–108.
- Visnovitz, Péter, and Erin Kristin Jenne. "Populist Argumentation in Foreign Policy: The Case of Hungary under Viktor Orbán, 2010–2020." *Comparative European Politics* 19, no. 6 (2021): 683–702.
- VOA News. "Çözüm Sürecinde AKP-MHP Gerilimi Artıyor," 2013. <https://www.voaturkce.com/a/cozum-surecinde-akp-ve-mhp-arasinda-gerilim-artiyor/1633471.html>.
- . "Erdoğan: Kıbrıs Konusunda Referandum'a Hazırız," 2004. <https://www.voaturkce.com/a/a-17-a-2004-01-24-10-1-87939227/821449.html>.
- . "US Pauses, 21 Years Later, to Remember 9/11 Terrorist Attacks," 2022. <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-marks-21st-anniversary-of-9-11-terror-attacks-/6739972.html>.
- Waisová, Šárka, and Ladislav Cabada. "China's Engagement in Central Europe: Words Speak Louder than Actions." *Politické Vedy* 25, no. 2 (2022): 151–76.
- Walker, Shaun. "Orbán Deploys Christianity with a Twist to Tighten Grip in Hungary." *The Guardian*, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/14/viktor-Orbán-budapest-hungary-christianity-with-a-twist>.
- Walt, Stephen M. "Formation and the Balance of World Power." *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985): 3–43.
- . *The Origins of Alliances*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1987.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics." *International Security* 18, no. 2 (1993): 44–79.
- . *Theory of International Politics*. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

- Weitsman, Patricia A. *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004.
- Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425.
- . *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Wenger, Andreas. "Crisis and Opportunity: NATO's Transformation and the Multilateralization of Détente, 1966–1968." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 6, no. 1 (2004): 22–74.
- Yeni Şafak. "Cılız Savunma," 2015.
<https://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/ciliz-savunma-2229774>.
- Yeşiltaş, Murat. "6 Soruda Ankara'daki Terör Saldırısı." *SETA*, 2016.
<https://www.setav.org/6-soruda-ankaradaki-teror-saldirisi/>.
- Yiğittepe, Levent. "Nato ve Rusya Arasında Türkiye'nin Güvenlik Algılaması: S-400 Krizi Örneği." *Journal of Management and Economics Research* 16, no. 1 (2018): 276–89.
- Yıldırım, Emek. "Boris Yeltsin ve 1993 Anayasa Krizi." *Birikim* 23, no. 1 (2017). <https://birikimdergisi.com/guncel/8229/boris-yeltsin-ve-1993-anayasa-krizi>.
- Yılmaz, Ihsan. "Erdoğan's Political Journey: From Victimised Muslim Democrat to Authoritarian, Islamist Populist." ECPS Leader Profile Series. Brussels, 2021.
- Yılmaz, Samet. "Neoklasik Realizm: İlerletici Mi? Yozlaştırıcı Mi? Lakatosyan Bir Değerlendirme." *Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 46, no. 1 (2015): 1–18.
- Zakaria, Fareed. *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
- . "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition." *International Security* 17, no. 1 (1992): 177–98.
- Zolotov, Andrei. "The Intrigue Behind the Hungarian Nuclear Deal." VALDAI, 2014.
https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the_intrigue_behind_the_hungarian_nuclear_deal/?fbclid=IwAR35JNWvzJrSaXjTFoQhQ-yGyiq_JlZxsRwTGq_vbC34koaltOdmN7Yi-pk.